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WASHINGTON AND PROBLEMS OF WORLD STABILITY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 3-5

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko]

[Text] The course the U.S. Administration has taken, toward reviving the policy of strength on a global scale and toward an arms buildup truly fantastic in its pace and dimensions, is arousing growing concern throughout the world. This course, as is well known, was reasserted as the general direction in Washington's domestic and foreign policy in President J. Carter's January "State of the Union" message to Congress.

In an attempt to justify this course, top representatives of the administration, including the President himself, and very influential organizations like the Committee on the Present Danger, all of whose members are associated with the military-industrial complex, are vigorously reviving the myth of the "Soviet military threat." Waves of hysteria are spreading far beyond the bounds of Washington and are overwhelming American cities and towns.

The myth of the "Soviet military threat" is a very crudely developed "argument." It is intended for "mass consumption," for stunning and intimidating the American public--partly with a view to distracting their attention in election year from domestic problems which grew worse every day and making them forget the promises given so generously by J. Carter during his 1976 presidential election campaign and in the first months of his presidency, which have remained unfulfilled.

Slightly more refined "arguments" are used for influencing the "intellectual elite" in the United States and in allied countries. Among them are, first and foremost, reasonings on stability and instability in the world and on what factors strengthen or undermine this stability.

Let us stipulate at once that reasonings on the need to maintain and strengthen stability in the world and on the direct interconnection and interdependence between the level of world stability and the firmness of international security in general, and U.S. security in particular, are

far from new. Such reasonings began to be circulated very widely by American political scientists and officials immediately after the present administration came to power. Let us recall, for instance, that as soon as Z. Brzezinski was appointed to the post of the President's national security adviser, without waiting for J. Carter to take office as President, he published an article in the journal SURVEY in late 1976 entitled "Observations on East-West Relations," in which the theme of stability was probably the main theme. It included calls--true, with stipulations so as to insure advantages for the United States above all--for greater stability both in USSR-U.S. relations and in relations between the United States Western European countries and Japan and in "North-South" relations.

You would not think that anyone could be in any doubt about the simple truth that in order to strengthen stability in the world as a whole or in individual regions it is necessary to take into account the real situation and the interests of all sides and to proceed on the basis of the inevitability and correctness of positive changes, at the same time doing the utmost to promote the deepening of detente, the resolution of the most acute problems and, above all, the just settlement of crisis situations.

However, as soon as the present administration had come to power, waverings and zigzags began to be observed in its policy. It eventually became clear that despite all assurances of concern for detente and stability and despite constitutional steps previously taken in that direction, Washington had adopted a course of refusing to participate effectively in the quest for ways of deepening detente and, therefore, consolidating stability. As for the concept of "stability" itself, in order to provide a propaganda foundation for its risky course, the Washington administration began--when it was convenient--to identify that concept with the social "status quo," hoping thereby to halt the erosion of "America's leading role" in world affairs. These calculations, made under pressure from the military-industrial complex and the political "hawks," amounted in general terms to emphasizing, under the pretext of concern for stability, the "U.S. recovery from the Vietnam syndrome" and the buildup of military might and to trying to turn the objective process of change in the world in a direction necessary and advantageous to U.S. imperialism.

All of this was accompanied by accusations against the Soviet Union, which has allegedly been using detente for its own expansion in the world and in order to undermine stability.

Washington's policy in the Near Eastern, Middle Eastern and South Asian region, which has been called a sphere of U.S."vital interests" and comprises the most important part of the so-called "crescent of crisis"--that favorite product of Z. Brzezinski's theoretical thought--has been and remains highly indicative on this plane.

Let us turn to the "Iranian problem." While the shah sat on the throne in Iran, while the Pentagon, the CIA and the military-industrial oil and other

monopolies bossed the show there, while the shah was investing billions of "petrodollars" in U.S. arms and U.S. banks, the situation there, Washington asserted, was the most stable in the entire region. Washington propped up the shah until the actual moment of the explosion. Was it thus concerned for stability? No. It was concerned to preserve the "status quo," to continue to pump Iranian oil on terms as profitable as possible to the United States, to insure that the shah's regime continued to play its assigned role of gendarme for the entire region, and to insure that the United States would continue to be able to keep its army military specialists and "advisers"--numbering many thousands--at the USSR's southern borders.

Or take the "Afghan question." While the dictatorial feudal regime was in power in Afghanistan, while the CIA believed there were chances of reinforcing the power of Amin's dictatorial grouping, while the United States, acting via the Afghan-Pakistani border, was able to interfere in events in Afghanistan, Washington did not consider the situation there to be critical. Was it concerned for true stability? No. Washington was concerned to preserve "for the time being" the "status quo" in order to create conditions for deviating from it, but in accordance with the "Chilean model."

Nor does the present "pumping" of arms into Pakistan, a country where a regime which has killed or imprisoned tens of thousands of people is in power, accord with the proclaimed concern for the consolidation of stability in the region. In this, as in many other cases, Washington does not care about the "defense of human rights," and still less about true stability.

And provocative steps like cobbling together and arming gangs of counter-revolutionaries entrenched in Pakistan and the plans to create, with Beijing, a new anti-Soviet bridgehead on the USSR's southern borders do not accord at all with the proclaimed concern for the consolidation of stability.

As soon as prospects for real and firm stabilization began to emerge on these sectors of the "crescent of crisis" after the overthrow of the shah in Iran and as a result of the successes of the Afghan revolution, Washington set about acting with a view to filling some "vacuum." A powerful--and, moreover, nuclear--naval force was concentrated off Iran's shores and "simultaneously" throughout the entire oil-bearing Persian Gulf region. This force was brought in to introduce "stability" American-style into the situation: to reestablish control over Iran and to hold in check the peoples of other countries of the oil-bearing region.

These steps cannot fail to intensify the danger of a new flare-up and that means they cannot fail to undermine stability to an even greater degree.

To a no lesser degree, U.S. actions like the cobbling together of the Israel-Egypt alliance, the export of more and more armaments--literally

mountains of them--to the region and plans for the creation of new military alliances and bases have long, and in a pre-planned manner, been undermining stability in the region--if it is at all possible to use the term "stability" to describe the situation which exists there.

Strictly speaking, there is nothing fundamentally new in this course of Washington's. This is clear if only from the admissions appearing in the United States itself. Back in 1975 a group of eminent U.S. political scientists who collaborated on the anthology "The Soviet Union in the 70's and Subsequent Years" came to the conclusion that tension (let us emphasize, tension and not stability) in the Near and Middle East has always been mainly the result of the United States' interference and its desire to create a system of alliances and pacts of an anti-Soviet nature along the Soviet Union's southern borders.

All the main elements of this course of Washington's can also be clearly traced on other sectors of the "crescent of crisis," in Africa for instance.

Washington's actions, which destabilize the entire international situation, extend far beyond the limits of the "crescent." The present administration has openly proclaimed its intention to violate the existing strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, dreaming of attaining military superiority--a course which has already led to the virtual renunciation of a stabilizing factor like SALT II. A grave blow has been dealt to stability in Europe as a result of the program of nuclear "arms upgrading" imposed by Washington on its allies.

This course is closely linked with Washington's playing of the "Chinese card," which also in no way promotes the consolidation of stability in the world. What concerns are there here for stability if Washington is acting in unison with Beijing, which comes out with territorial claims against all neighboring countries, pursues a hegemonistic course throughout the world and lightly embarks on acts of armed aggression against its neighbors?

The destabilizing effect of Washington's actions is now extended to virtually all spheres of international life: from sports (attempts to wreck the Olympic games in Moscow) to the entire system of international law (the violation or rejection of existing commitments and contracts already signed, pressure on allies with a view to forcing them to embark on the violation of international commitments).

Such is the dangerous destabilizing influence of Washington's actions in the world. It is all the more dangerous in that it is the leadership of a large influential power, from which people have the right to expect a considered and responsible policy, which is behaving thus.

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BEHIND THE FACADE OF NUCLEAR 'MODERNIZATION'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 6-16

[Article by V. S. Shein]

[Text] The situation in Europe today is greatly worrying the international public. The state of affairs on the European continent is being debated throughout the world. The central issue in these debates is the set of plans for so-called nuclear "modernization" adopted by the North Atlantic bloc and the alternative proposals set forth by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev in the fall of 1979. These proposals have been reasserted several times since then, but they have been rejected outright by the Western powers, most recently at last December's session of the NATO Council.

We should recall that the proposals of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries were aimed at progress in the resolution of all problems connected with military detente and arms limitation in Europe, including those pertaining to medium-range nuclear missiles. On 6 October of last year, the Soviet Union announced its willingness to reduce the number of medium-range devices now deployed in western regions of the USSR if no additional devices of this type would be deployed in Western Europe. The Soviet Union proposed the commencement of negotiations to settle the matter of this type of weapon. "The Soviet Union," L. I. Brezhnev said in response to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent, "believes that these should begin as soon as possible. We are ready for this. Everything now depends on the Western countries."[1]

The socialist states have cautioned NATO against reckless actions which could complicate the situation and interfere with the attainment of positive results. "The chances of attaining these results would be greater if no decisions regarding the production and deployment of these devices in Western Europe were to be made prior to the end of the negotiations. Conversely, these chances will be undermined if such decisions are made in NATO."[2] This applied primarily to the intention of NATO executive bodies to make a decision on the production and deployment in Western Europe of U.S. Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and land-based cruise missiles.

In spite of all warnings, however, this decision was made. The plan calls for the deployment of 108 launching sites for Pershing 2 missiles with a range of 1,800 kilometers and 464 winged missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometers on the European continent. According to representatives of the United States and NATO, this will "modernize" the bloc's nuclear arsenal in the European theater. In fact, however, the systems to be deployed in Western Europe, beginning with England, the FRG and Italy, will be qualitatively new and have no equivalent in the North Atlantic bloc's present arsenal. These American systems will be located near the Soviet border and will therefore be capable of destroying targets on Soviet territory, thereby serving the United States as strategic weapons.

The NATO leaders have actually ignored not only the views of the states of the socialist community, but also the strong opposition to the plans for the nuclear "upgrading" of the North Atlantic bloc in their own camp. The scales of this opposition are attested to by the fact that objections have been heard not only from mass public organizations, tens of thousands of participants in demonstrations and protest marches, and prominent statesmen and politicians, but also from entire countries. Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway have tried to convince the United States of the need to postpone any decisions regarding the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe and to begin negotiating with the USSR as soon as possible on the reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles by both sides. At the December session of the NATO Council in 1979, these countries either did not support the aforementioned decision or only supported it on certain conditions. Moreover, some other members of the bloc agreed to support the U.S. plans only as a result of massive pressure exerted by Washington.

The refusal of NATO to listen to these socialist initiatives of historic significance gave rise to new and extremely complex problems in East-West relations, which will have an unquestionably negative effect on the political climate in Europe and the rest of the world and will undermine all efforts to curb the arms race. The scales of this negative effect are much greater than they might appear at first glance--or at any rate, greater than they appear to some Western European politicians who have declared their approval of negotiations (but only after the "upgrading") and who do not see, or pretend not to see, what lies behind the American proposals, what goals Washington is pursuing and what effect the implementation of these plans could have.

The Logic of 'Atlanticism'

It would be useful to preface the discussion of the specific features of the present U.S. Administration's policy in Europe and its interrelations with NATO allies with a look at the propagandistic forms used to disguise Washington's line of nuclear "modernization" in the North Atlantic bloc. There are a number of these forms, and each has its own corresponding "argument" in favor of American initiatives. These are supposed to convince the public, political parties and organizations, parliaments, the

mass media and so on that the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Western Europe is "absolutely necessary."

The main "argument" used in this connection is the implication that NATO must "respond" to the allegedly existing "Soviet military threat" to the West. This "argument" is absolutely false and thoroughly hackneyed, but it is being presented from a new perspective. This time, the claim is that the Atlantic powers are being "threatened" by the situation in the sphere of medium-range nuclear missile systems. Emphasis is being placed on the so-called "asymmetry" of nuclear forces in the European theater, the reason for which, according to the claims of NATO strategists, consists primarily in the Soviet Union's new medium-range missiles and bombers (called the "SS-20" and "Backfire" respectively in the West).

A good deal of the discussion has centered around the missiles. They are supposedly quite dangerous, as they are modern, mobile, accurate and capable of destroying targets anywhere in Western Europe. The deployment of these Soviet missiles was depicted in the NATO countries as the reason for the "destabilization" of conditions on the "Eurostrategic" level, demanding an immediate response from the North Atlantic bloc.

In fact, and this has been explained by reliable sources in the USSR, the Soviet Union is improving its existing types of missiles. The SS-20 missiles, which are being added to armament supplies during the course of the present modernization, are intended to replace the old types of medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union's defensive measures are not in any way intended to violate the approximate power equilibrium between the USSR and the United States or between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As L. I. Brezhnev stressed in a speech in Berlin, the number of medium-range nuclear missile carriers in the European half of the Soviet Union has not increased by a single missile or a single plane in the last 10 years. On the contrary, the number of medium-range missile launching devices, just as the nuclear blast power of these missiles, has even decreased somewhat. The number of medium-range bombers has also decreased.[3]

The proposals of the USSR, supported by all members of the Warsaw Pact organization, dealt a crushing blow to the attempts to substantiate the line of "upgrading" NATO with new American missiles and demonstrated the total lack of grounds for turning Western Europe into a launching pad for new American nuclear weapons intended to deliver strikes on Soviet territory.

It must be said that Western Europe is far from defenseless, as the Atlanticists often argue. A quite sizeable arsenal of nuclear missile systems is concentrated here: around 1,500 units of forward-based U.S. devices and corresponding national devices of Great Britain and France, capable of reaching Soviet territory.

American President J. Carter and Secretary of State C. Vance have publicly confirmed the existence of East-West parity, particularly in Europe. These

admissions were completely "forgotten," however, when the time came to propagandize American plans for the nuclear "upgrading" of NATO.

The fact that the thesis regarding the "violation of parity" is an absolute lie serving to justify the plans of the United States and the North Atlantic bloc has been corroborated by numerous statements by various Western military experts. In particular, it is widely known that the appearance of Soviet medium-range systems long ago was a result of the deployment of American forward-based systems in the Western European NATO countries, as well as the existence of English and French nuclear devices capable of reaching the territory of the USSR.

The conclusions reached by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London with respect to the nuclear balance of power on the European continent had great repercussions in the West. A handbook published by this institute, "Military Balance 1979/80," notes that if the differing technical characteristics of corresponding systems are taken into account, "something extremely close to parity now exists between the nuclear forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact theaters of combat."[5] According to the institute, the mass-scale shuffling of quantitative data would be required to "prove" the existence of any kind of discrepancies.

This statement is not the only one of its kind. In particular, Chairman K. de Vries of the defense commission of the Dutch Parliament's Second Chamber believes that it is quite debatable as to whether the new Soviet medium-range systems represent the kind of step forward in this area that would require a response from the West. In an article printed in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G. Treverton says that the deployment of the SS-20 missile did not engender any qualitatively new "threat" to the NATO countries.[6] Prominent U.S. and Western European experts on "gray zone" weapons (this is what the medium-range nuclear missile systems are sometimes called in the West) P. Doty and R. Metzger feel that "existing medium-range nuclear missile forces in the West, along with the central strategic arsenal of the United States, meet the requirements of containment both on the level of the European theater and on the intercontinental level."[7]

Some Western researchers have pointed out that all of the different Atlantic strategists who make these alarmist statements are actually ignoring NATO's possession of A3-A6, and perhaps even more, Poseidon missiles with multiple warheads (each missile has up to 10 warheads), deployed on U.S. submarines, the targets for which are set by the command of the united NATO armed forces in Europe. In the opinion of P. Doty and R. Metzger, these missiles are a more "stable" and, consequently, more reliable instrument of "containment," although they are a less noticeable manifestation of American "nuclear guarantees" for Western Europe.[8] As for the "inaccuracy" of the Poseidon missiles, which, according to some advocates of the "rearmament" of NATO, cannot guarantee a reliable counterforce (that is, against military targets) response to a counterforce attack, here they deliberately "forget" the constant improvement of such

systems, including the heightening of their accuracy. They rarely remember, and more frequently "forget," about programs for the deployment of Trident submarines, as well as about the fact that the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France, which already represent a tangible force, will be perfected in the future, and that the United States, which already has a powerful grouping of forward-based nuclear systems in Europe, is capable of quickly moving several hundred additional aircraft to Western Europe, suitable for nuclear missions, not to mention probable manipulations with submarines and surface ships carrying nuclear weapons.

Statements about the Soviet "nuclear superiority" in the European theater are refuted by the facts, but these are usually hushed up in the West. Politicians and statesmen in the NATO countries are more aware than anyone else of these facts. If this is the case, why do they support the American plans for the "rearmament" of the North Atlantic bloc, which are depicted as a "response to the mounting Soviet threat"?

Apparently, this is partially due to Washington's overt use of the most flagrant blackmail to influence its allies. One of the elements of this blackmail was the frank speculation over the question of the so-called nuclear guarantees of the United States to Western European NATO members. Correspondingly, the line of deploying American medium-range missiles in Western Europe was disguised as concern about the stability of U.S.-Western European cooperation within NATO, including cooperation in the nuclear sphere. Progress in the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons was cynically used for this purpose: As soon as advances were made in these talks, representatives of U.S. ruling circles began to spread the idea, which became quite popular in Western Europe, that the achievement of approximate strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States had "eroded" and "undermined" American obligations to "defend" the NATO countries with the aid of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.

Naturally, discussions by Washington representatives about the "devaluation" of U.S. "nuclear guarantees" were not conducted on the official level. Officially, these "guarantees" were reaffirmed from time to time, although this reaffirmation often did not sound very convincing because it was accompanied by contrary unofficial statements by figures known in Western Europe. The greatest stir was caused by the statements of former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger, including his address at the conference on "NATO in the Next 30 Years" in Brussels last fall.

With the reputation of a man who knows "what's what" and with the pretense of sincerity, H. Kissinger unequivocally announced that in the event of Soviet-American strategic parity, the allies would not be able to expect "protection" from U.S. "central systems," the use of which would make America the target of a retaliatory strike. Declaring that the NATO countries are allegedly lagging behind in each significant military category, with the possible exception of naval forces, Kissinger frightened his

audience with the prospect of the annihilation of the Western European people if they should refuse to make their territory available for the deployment of new medium-range American missiles.[8]

The Pershing 2 missiles and land-based winged missiles are intended, Washington officials underscore, to become a means of implementing NATO's present military doctrine--the doctrine of "flexible response"--by providing the "missing rung" in the "ladder of armed conflict escalation," a "rung" which has supposedly become "absolutely essential" to the North Atlantic bloc as a result of progress in the strategic arms limitation talks and the modernization of Soviet medium-range nuclear missile systems. The idea that additional middle-range nuclear devices, intended for the delivery of strikes on Soviet territory, should be brought into Western Europe is being propagandized as a contribution to stronger "deterrents" and as a blessing for the people of Europe, since the use of "Eurostrategic" systems would supposedly postpone the impending world catastrophe inherent in the use of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces and would increase the chance that a possible conflict in Europe could be stopped at some "intermediate level."

There is no question that the main force advocating the deployment of new U.S. missiles on the European continent is the United States. The U.S. President's special adviser on national security affairs, Z. Brzezinski, who is actively promoting his own notorious ideas, assigns, according to the testimony of West Germany's DIE ZEIT, the decision to deploy these missiles "as much historic significance as the strategic air command created by the Truman Administration and the intercontinental missiles adopted for use by the Kennedy Administration."[9]

Nonetheless, even in Western Europe there are forces that are more or less enthusiastically supporting Washington's initiatives. Judging by the results of the latest NATO Council session, these forces have considerable influence, although their motives are not always clear--considerations of class solidarity, fear of a continued increase in centrifugal tendencies in the Atlantic camp, the hope that the possible consequences of the line approved in December 1979 will be of benefit, if not soon then in the more distant future, particularly in the area of decision-making on questions of nuclear policy, or some other motives. Verbally, the majority of Western European leaders who approve of the missile deployment proposed by Washington assert, as has already been pointed out, that they regard the corresponding NATO decisions as stimuli for the resumption of arms control talks with the socialist countries, although these assertions contradict elementary logic.

Those who eagerly took up the argument regarding the diminished reliability of U.S. "nuclear guarantees" included FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt. In his widely publicized speech in the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in October 1977, he aroused doubts in U.S. commitments with respect to the use of American strategic forces in the interests of

Western Europe, in view of the fact that these commitments, in his words, had been undermined by Soviet-U.S. strategic parity. He called for the establishment of parity, which supposedly does not exist as yet, with the Soviet Union on two other levels of the NATO "Triad"--in the areas of conventional weapons and combat theater nuclear forces--with a view to maintaining "stability and deterrents" in Europe. Schmidt also vigorously supported the idea of building up medium-range nuclear missile systems within the territory of the Western European countries party to the North Atlantic Alliance.

Schmidt's speech in London was interpreted in different ways in the West. In particular, some saw this as an attempt to propose a course which would lead to the strategic "separation" of the United States and Western Europe, or--proceeding from the assumption that this "separation" has already taken place as a result of the achievement of Soviet-U.S. strategic parity--would urge the United States' present allies to take steps toward the creation of potential "self-defense," naturally, nuclear and, naturally, with the FRG playing an active role in the process.

West German politicians later had to do much to "amend" Schmidt's speech and to prove that Schmidt favored--and this was all--stronger combat theater nuclear forces, and not separation or the FRG's gradual renunciation of the status of a non-nuclear power.

None of this changed the essence of the matter, however, as all of this revolved around a concrete action--the decision made on Washington's proposals regarding the deployment of new medium-range American nuclear systems in Western Europe. The hope that the decision on the "Eurostrategic" missiles would be positive united the FRG and United States and led to the creation of something like a Washington-Bonn axis, which was then used to exert pressure on undecided NATO countries.

There are a few noteworthy aspects of this entire affair of the American "nuclear umbrella." In particular, it appears that the commotion about the allies' diminished faith in U.S. "nuclear guarantees" was less connected with the actual views of Western European leaders (the categorical declarations of some representatives of the FRG leadership were the exception rather than the rule) than with agitation which was largely inspired overseas. The inflammatory statements made by H. Kissinger represent only one example of this. As P. Thinnes, president of the North Atlantic Assembly and member of the Norwegian parliament, said when he visited the United States, the need to reassert American NATO commitments was discussed much more frequently on that side of the ocean than in Europe.[10]

According to many political spokesmen and experts in the West, there is absolutely no basis for the assertion that the reinforcement of medium-range nuclear missile potential on the European continent is essential for the enhancement of the reliability of American guarantees.[11]

Not long before last December's NATO Council session, the WASHINGTON POST admitted that if Western Europe were to agree to the U.S. proposals, it would "not obtain any stronger guarantee of protection than it has now." The newspaper stressed: "The decision would still be made by the President of the United States, and American cities would be in as much danger of a retaliatory strike as before. Besides this, the deployment of this weapon in Europe would inevitably make the NATO countries the target of Soviet missiles in the event of war. How would this benefit Western European security?"[12]

Washington's European Gamble

The plan to "upgrade" NATO weapons with medium-range missiles represents, according to prominent West German expert C. Weizsaecker, "an American wish that is almost tantamount to an order."[13] The tough U.S. stand on this issue came as no surprise to the Western European countries and other states. It is totally in line with the present Washington Administration's general foreign policy strategy. A characteristic feature of this strategy is a more aggressive stand in relations with the socialist nations and some developing countries and more openly dictatorial behavior in the "partnership" with allies in military-political blocs. In addition, there has been a resurgence of Washington's exaggerated claims to world leadership and the role of world policeman.

Many of the statements in President J. Carter's speech before the Business Council in Washington on 12 December were probably the most obvious derivatives of the "position of strength" policy. In this speech, he mentioned negotiations "based on American strength," claims to "America's leading role and influence in the world" and the need to "enhance American rapid deployment potential for the fulfillment of U.S. obligations beyond the bounds of NATO," and, finally, he announced a "5-year armaments plan," during the course of which real U.S. military expenditures will rise 4.5-5 percent annually.

The Democratic Administration, which is leaning more and more toward the unconcealed revival of hegemonistic foreign policy, is clearly once again relying on strength as the chief means of its implementation. But the power of even a nation like the United States is no longer enough to direct the course of events in various parts of the world into convenient channels. This is why Washington is trying to "augment" its capabilities by strengthening its "partnership" with Western Europe within the NATO framework. The North Atlantic Alliance, which represents, according to Z. Brzezinski's definition, a guarantee of Western security, is also of particular importance to the United States in the context of the global strategic balance.

With the aid of NATO, American ruling circles are striving above all to achieve military superiority to the countries of the Warsaw Pact organization. Judging by the statements of U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, Washington hopes to attain this goal by the mid-1980's. By its vigorous

attempts to change the strategic situation in Europe in favor of the United States and NATO, the Carter Administration is dramatically increasing the danger of nuclear war.

The hope of making NATO militarily superior to the Warsaw Pact countries largely determined the approach taken by U.S. ruling circles to the question of deploying new medium-range nuclear missile systems in Western Europe.

The decision to deploy new American missiles on the European continent reflects Washington's line of augmenting the role of nuclear weapons in the strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance. Passing black off as white, however, participants in the December session of the council of this aggressive bloc declared in the final communique of the session that the program they had adopted would "not lead to increased NATO reliance on nuclear weapons."

It was even loudly announced at the session that, "as one of the elements of the program for the modernization of technical nuclear forces," 1,000 American nuclear warheads would be recalled from Western Europe "as soon as possible." But here, after all, the object of discussion was not a qualitatively new type of weapon, but an obsolete warhead which should have been discarded long ago and which--and this is the main point--belongs, even according to NATO's system of classification, to a totally different category of nuclear devices.

In addition, even many Western politicians and researchers are saying that there is more emphasis on the "limited" use of nuclear weapons in the modernized strategy of the United States and NATO.[14] It is true that American ruling circles expect any new conflict to be of a "Eurostrategic nature," with the United States outside its boundaries. But the reality of these expectations is doubted by many prominent experts in the West. For example, P. Doty and his co-author note that if the "nuclear threshold is crossed," there will be more pressure in favor of expanding the role of nuclear weapons and their use for targets far beyond the boundaries of the zone of conflict, creating the risk of escalation, right up to the use of long-range tactical nuclear weapons (or medium-range systems) from the Atlantic to the Urals, as well as the eruption of a nuclear war between the United States and the USSR.[15]

Judging by some signs, the United States may not limit itself to the deployment of the currently planned number of missiles in Western Europe. It is already being suggested that the USSR will supposedly "retain superiority" in this field even after the deployment of the new U.S. missiles.

The line of enhancing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. and NATO strategy is also regarded by Washington as one of the most reliable ways of impeding the further development of centrifugal tendencies in the North Atlantic Alliance and in U.S.-Western European relations.

At present, a factor which, so to speak, partially compensates for the increased tension in NATO between the United States and its "junior partners" is the military presence of the United States in Western Europe, including the American forward-based systems there. American retired Admiral T. Moorer quite recently referred with absolute candor to these systems as the "glue" holding the North Atlantic Alliance together. In his words, as soon as the United States refuses a NATO request for "advance support" or begins to reduce it, one member after another will drop out of the bloc, and NATO will simply fall apart as the "net" result of all this. It is for this reason, the admiral said, that the United States has painstakingly avoided talks with the Russians on forward-based systems for the last 10 years.[16]

Now that Washington feels that the stability of Atlantic military-political relations has been seriously undermined, U.S. leaders are trying to deploy the new medium-range missiles in Western Europe for the purpose of delivering a double strike: One at detente, many aspects of which displease an extremely influential segment of the American ruling elite, and one at the tendency toward greater independence on the part of the NATO allies. By deploying new nuclear missile systems on the European continent and thereby expanding and simplifying occasions for the use of nuclear weapons, Washington intends to create a situation in which the Western Europeans will be its lackeys.

This policy is arousing mounting irritation in the United States' NATO partners, because they surely realize that the United States is using its Pershings and winged missiles not only to acquire unilateral advantages in relations with the Soviet Union, but also to keep them within the Atlantic camp.

The Mine Under the Structure of Detente

Without idealizing the position of the United States' Western European allies, which coincides with Washington's own views on many issues, we can definitely say that their attitude toward detente in Europe does not always coincide with the American attitude. Most of the Western European countries are seeking and finding more and more new and important positive aspects of detente: the strengthening of security on the continent, the development of political, economic and other types of cooperation, the resolution of important concrete problems and so forth. As for the United States, here we find an obvious tendency to take a "critical" view of what is going on in Europe, to regard many of the processes taking place here as either a direct or a potential threat to "vital American interests."

Differences in attitudes toward detente have also affected the approach of the NATO countries to the question of the deployment of the new U.S. medium-range missiles within Europe. With good reason, the United States' allies are worried that the attempt to disrupt the existing balance of power in Europe and to guarantee the military superiority of the NATO bloc

could undermine the very basis of the detente process. Washington may not share the feelings of its partners, but it must take them into account and invent tactical moves to promote the political decisions it requires.

The particular move employed in the case involving the new American medium-ranged missiles was the proposal that the decision on the deployment of these missiles in Western Europe be combined with consent to "negotiate nonetheless" with the Warsaw Pact states regarding the limitation of this type of weapon. This proposal was supposed to satisfy the Western Europeans who were worried about the future of detente or simply saw no reason to challenge the Soviet Union and, simultaneously, to camouflage the real purpose of the steps to "rearm" NATO, to neutralize those who might block these steps and to create the illusion that the "rearmament" could always be abandoned.

The elaboration of the "disarmament" portion of the NATO position was assigned to a special group created in April 1979, representing experts from all of the NATO countries, with the exception of France. The group was headed by the director of the office of military policy of the U.S. State Department. Most of the work was also taken on by Washington representatives. It is not surprising that the NATO members themselves compare the activity of this special group to a search for a "figleaf" to cover up the desire to build up medium-range systems.[17]

By the end of September the group had drafted the recommendations which formed the basis of proposals set forth at the December session of the NATO Council. The members of the bloc announced their willingness to discuss limitations on U.S. and Soviet medium-range systems "during the course of bilateral negotiations within the SALT III network, employing a gradual approach." According to the NATO members, these negotiations should lead to agreement on limitations on U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear medium-range missile systems.

The "negotiation proposals" drawn up by the Atlantic powers last December were practically a mirror image of the recommendations drafted by the special group at the end of September. This similarity provides a better understanding of the position of the NATO countries.

The fact is that the special group finished its work at a time when the NATO members were "most worried," if we can believe their statements, by the "increase" in Soviet potential medium-range systems. It was precisely in accordance with this groundless declaration that the essence of the recommendations drafted by the group was determined. Within two and a half months, during which the recommendations of the special group were being held in reserve for the next NATO Council session, debates between East and West, between supporters and opponents of the new round in the arms race, over medium-range nuclear missile systems took on different features as a result of concrete Soviet proposals, and it became possible to begin the talks without waiting for any kind of decisions on the deployment of new types of nuclear weapons in Western Europe--that is, without starting up the entire mechanism for the production and deployment of these weapons.

If the NATO countries had taken a responsible approach to the need to preserve detente on the European continent, they would not have ignored the Soviet Union's willingness to take concrete steps to limit its own medium-range systems, and in a unilateral manner for a start. The West was required only to refrain from commencing any new programs.

Washington and its allies, however, decided to disregard these gestures which testifies to their lack of interest in real limitations on these types of weapons or fair negotiations without the setting of preliminary political conditions that are unacceptable to the other side.

Furthermore, NATO has suggested that SALT III be used as the negotiation forum. Session participants, however, were well aware of the Soviet position on this matter, which had been set forth, in particular, by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko. If SALT III, he stressed, "were to pertain not only to strategic weapons, but also to medium-range nuclear missiles, imagine how much time these talks would take! It would be a wonder if they took only 7 or 8 years. Does this not threaten Europe with great danger? And not only Europe. There will be talk, but no decisions."[18]

Moreover, American forward-based systems were not discussed in the NATO proposals, and French and British nuclear forces were completely excluded from the projected talks.

Even after all this, the decision about nuclear "modernization" in NATO is being depicted as a foundation for serious talks about the limitation of medium-range nuclear missile systems.

The unrealistic nature of the NATO proposals in the form in which they were set forth in December 1979 is completely obvious. This suggests that the NATO bloc, once again demonstrating its aggressive nature, is actually not only denying what was said literally just a few months, if not weeks, ago--the possibility of no decision and the abandonment of plans to deploy new American missiles in Europe--but is also making it quite clear that the NATO leadership's top priority is the deployment of missiles, and not the resolution of the problem impeding this. As for all of the talks about negotiations as a method of agreeing on the possible abandonment of the missile deployment plan, this is nothing more than a smokescreen to conceal Washington's actual plans.

It is also clear that, under U.S. pressure, the North Atlantic Alliance has taken a new step toward the further escalation of the arms race, a step which is extremely threatening to the people of Europe and to peace throughout the world. It was precisely the United States, as a TASS report of 7 January 1980 stressed, that "used the NATO bloc to force several Western European states to decide to deploy American medium-range nuclear missiles on this continent. This decision is contrary to the interests of peace and security in Europe, and people in many Western European capitals are wondering about the consequences of this action."[19]

It must be said that both the United States and Western Europe must give this matter serious thought and choose between actions which cannot be described as other than hostile to the interests of peace and a sober and farsighted approach to East-West relations, to efforts to strengthen international security and curb the arms race. It is this kind of constructive approach that must ultimately prevail in the Western countries because it is the only approach consistent with the desires of the European people and the people of the United States and with the interests of all mankind.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 6 November 1979.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 7 October 1979.
4. "Military Balance 1979/80," London, 1979, p 117.
5. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1979, p 1080.
6. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1978/79, p 43.
7. Ibid., p 22.
8. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1979, pp 4-8.
9. DIE ZEIT, NO 47, 1979.
10. "Western Security Issues: European Perspective," Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 12 September 1979, Washington, 1979, p 29.
11. "SALT and the NATO Allies." a Staff Report to the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, October 1979, p 23.
12. THE WASHINGTON POST, 5 December 1979.
13. DIE ZEIT, No 47, 1979.
14. "Western Security Issues: European Perspective," p 15.
15. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1978/79, p 20.
16. "Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty)," Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, pt II, Washington, 1979, p 602.

17. "SALT and the NATO Allies," p 23.

18. PRAVDA, 25 November 1979.

19. Ibid., 7 January 1980.

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AN EFFECTIVE BARRIER TO THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 17-27

[Article by K. P. Borisov]

[Text] On 5 March 1980 it will be 10 years since the day when one of the most massive and important agreements in the area of arms race limitation came into force--the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At present, 108 states are party to this agreement. Another 10 states have signed the treaty but have not completed the process of its ratification as yet.

The last decade has proved beyond any doubt that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has played an extremely useful role as the major means of preventing any increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons. But more remains to be done, and new efforts must be made now. The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress stated that "the institution of further effective measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons on our planet is still one of the most important objectives. The USSR is willing to cooperate with other states for its attainment."1

The Soviet Union and United States have noted the great significance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons several times in joint documents adopted at the time of summit-level meetings. For example, in a Soviet-American communique dated 18 June 1979, both sides reaffirmed the great significance they attach to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and reasserted their determination to continue their strict compliance with the obligations they had taken on in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They commented on the serious threat nuclear proliferation poses to international security and expressed their common opinion that the states which already possess nuclear weapons bear a special responsibility to display restraint. They reaffirmed their mutual belief that further efforts are needed and expressed the hope that the conclusion of the SALT II treaty will play an important part in the attainment of the goals of non-proliferation.

The question of preventing nuclear proliferation invariably occupies a central place in the Soviet Union's relations with other states as well. In February 1975 a joint Soviet-English declaration on nuclear non-proliferation was signed in Moscow, in which the USSR and England resolutely advocated strict observance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and adherence to this treaty by the widest possible group of states. In June 1977 an identical Soviet-French declaration was signed.

The reinforcement of nuclear non-proliferation standards is regularly proposed by the UN General Assembly, which adopts resolutions at its annual sessions, aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

The issue of nuclear non-proliferation arose a comparatively short time ago and seemed particularly acute in the 1960's, when the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons increased and the group of "near-nuclear" states expanded--that is, those whose scientific, technical and economic potential was such that they could produce their own nuclear weapons. These states include Canada, Italy, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, the FRG, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and others. According to some estimates, around 30 states are now capable of building nuclear weapons.

The now apparent plans to build nuclear weapons in South Africa and Israel are particularly disturbing. This would give rise to serious changes in the balance of power and increase tension in their respective regions, as a result of which the threat of nuclear war would be heightened. Other nations, such as Argentina and Brazil, have declined to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, making no secret of their intention to acquire nuclear weapons. Disturbing reports have recently come from Pakistan, where a plant for the concentration of uranium for military purposes is being built under a veil of secrecy. The United States, by giving 400 million dollars in emergency military aid to Pakistan, which has refused to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is actually casting suspicion on its promise to "vigorously pursue" the reinforcement of non-proliferation standards.

Although the treaty's sphere of influence has expanded in recent years and it has now been signed, in particular, by nations with a highly developed atomic industry--the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan and others--such nuclear states as France and China are still not party to the treaty.

The development of atomic energy for military purposes has been accompanied by the speedy development of peaceful nuclear power engineering, which entails possible dangers in addition to its obvious blessings. The fact is that one of the by-products of the operation of peaceful nuclear power plants is plutonium, which can be used to build a bomb. The amount

of plutonium covered by IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards increased from 2.5 tons in 1970 to 65 tons in 1978. According to IAEA forecasts, annual plutonium production in the world could reach 1.5 million kilograms by the year 2000. According to the data of a group of UN experts who prepared a report on the possible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the production of a nuclear bomb with a blast power of 20 kilotons (precisely the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima) would require only 8 kilograms of plutonium. Along with plutonium, highly enriched uranium is used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

In 1954 the world's first nuclear power station, with a capacity of 5 milliwatts, began operating in the Soviet Union. By 1965 capacities totaling 5,000 milliwatts were being operated throughout the world. By the end of 1978 this figure had reached 110,000 milliwatts, which constitutes 5.8 percent of all electric power produced in the world.[2] According to IAEA estimates, the capacity of electric power stations could represent 20-26 percent of all energy production capacities in the world by the year 2000. The main stimuli for this exceedingly rapid development of nuclear power engineering are such factors as the constantly rising demand for energy, the rising prices of traditional types of fuel, and the highly economical and safe types of nuclear reactors being developed. The average nuclear power plant conserves at least 1.5 million tons of petroleum a year.

How has the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons worked during the first 10 years of its existence, and how have states adhered to its provisions?

The basic provisions of the treaty can conditionally be divided into three categories:

The obligations of states concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons--that is, measures to prevent the emergence of new nuclear countries (in the West this group of obligations is often qualifed as the prevention of the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons);

Provisions regarding the peaceful use of atomic energy and obligations concerning arms race limitation and disarmament.

Obviously, it is wise to adhere to this set of categories in an analysis of the treaty's impact.

Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, which represent the key provisions of this international document, contain the so-called reciprocal obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states. The former have promised not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the non-nuclear states have undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These obligations quite effectively block all avenues and loopholes for

the possible spread of nuclear weapons. This has been conclusively confirmed by the fact that in all the years that the treaty has been in effect, not once has there been a case involving the conscious or unconscious violation of obligations regarding the non-transmission or non-acquisition of nuclear weapons by any of the treaty's signatories. The last annual IAEA report, which was submitted to the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly at the end of 1979, noted that the agency had not discovered "any inconsistencies attesting to the transfer of a significant quantity of safeguarded nuclear material for the production of any kind of nuclear weapon, the attainment of any other military goal or the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device."[3] This is an important conclusion, demonstrating once again the viability of the treaty and the system of nuclear non-proliferation constructed on this foundation.

Verification of the fulfillment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by states is accomplished with the aid of an essentially unified system of control--namely, the system of IAEA safeguards, which has proved to be totally effective. The annual report of this agency for 1978 contains the conclusion that the nuclear material covered by its safeguards has either remained within the bounds of peaceful nuclear activity or has been reliably accounted for in one way or another. In this sense, the activity of the IAEA in connection with the implementation of these safeguards has promoted regional and international security and has alleviated worries about the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons as a result of the proliferation of nuclear technology.

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation precisely limits control to the territory of the non-nuclear countries. In accordance with Article 3, the non-nuclear states party to the treaty must conclude agreements with the IAEA on these safeguards, establishing the agency's control over all nuclear activity within the territory of these states. Therefore, from the perspective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the establishment of control over the peaceful use of atomic energy in states possessing nuclear weapons would be meaningless.

At the end of 1978, 61 states party to the treaty concluded the necessary agreements with the IAEA, putting all of their nuclear activity under the jurisdiction of this agency's safeguards. On the basis of agreements concluded outside the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA has also applied safeguards in 12 other countries, which are not party to the treaty but are engaging in significant nuclear activity (Argentina, Brazil, Spain, Colombia, Pakistan, Turkey and others). By the end of 1978, the IAEA was monitoring 607 nuclear installations, including 112 nuclear power plants, 33 conversion plants and plants for the manufacture of fuel elements, and 3 enriching mills.[4]

The treaty envisages supervision of the movement of fissionable material, so as to prevent its move from peaceful production to nuclear weapon manufacture. This is accomplished by investigating the records on the movement of nuclear material, monitoring the work of operators at nuclear

installations and taking selective measurements in "key spots" or so-called "strategic locations" at installations specified in advance in the agreements on the safeguards concluded by states with the IAEA. If an unauthorized nuclear "leak" is discovered as a result of verification, this will serve as a signal for further investigation, on the basis of which the IAEA Board of Directors will determine whether the conditions of agreements on safeguards have been violated.

The huge volume of this work is attested to by the fact that 208,589 sets of records were checked by the IAEA in 1978.

The states must provide the agency with information about the construction of power plants, records and reports regarding nuclear material, and the right to inspect the nuclear material under IAEA jurisdiction. This kind of international control extends not only to the movement of material within a single installation, but also to its movement within a state and from one state to another. As a result, the treaty's system of safeguards actually covers all of the peaceful nuclear activity of the state party to the treaty.

The IAEA Charter expressly stipulates that the agency will conduct its activity with the proper respect for the sovereign rights of states. It monitors only the states' fulfillment of obligations they have voluntarily assumed in line with the treaty. In order to minimize the presence of foreign personnel, the treaty envisages the implementation of safeguards, whenever possible, with the aid of automatic control devices meeting the current standards of scientific and technical development. These devices are being used more and more widely. Special mention should be made of the fact that in all the years of the implementation of IAEA safeguards, not one of the states undergoing verification has complained that the agency's monitoring is troublesome or has been accompanied by intervention in internal affairs or commercial espionage.

The experience accumulated in the implementation of IAEA safeguards during the years that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been in effect has conclusively demonstrated that its monitoring machinery is functioning reliably and, what is more, has never involved the slightest violation of the sovereign rights of states or impeded their peaceful activity in the nuclear sphere. This is one of the reasons that the number of states covered by agency safeguards is increasing with each year.

The USSR takes an active part in the agency's inspections. Soviet specialists are working on new and better methods of control for the IAEA and are training agency inspectors. Some of this work is being conducted within the Soviet Union. Personnel from the IAEA department of safeguards and inspections have taken part in several experimental tests at the Novo-Voronezhskaya nuclear power station.[5]

The adoption of measures to make the development of nuclear weapons impossible in nations wich are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty for one reason or another are also extremely significant in the reinforcement of non-proliferation standards. The implementation of paragraph 2 of article 3 of the treaty has an important role to play in this respect. It obligates parties to the treaty not to provide fissionable material or special equipment to any non-nuclear state, including those which are not party to the treaty, unless the material and equipment are subject to the necessary safeguards. To execute this provision, an agreement was concluded on 22 August 1974 by the nations exporting fissionable materials and equipment (the USSR, the United States, England, the FRG, Canada and others) in regard to the implementation of this provision.[6] At the same time, a list of nuclear materials and equipment, whose shipment to any non-nuclear country would necessitate the establishment of IAEA control, was drawn up. This list was called the "Zanger list" after the Swiss representative who headed the group of experts drawing up the list. The agreement of 22 August 1974 has now been signed by 22 exporting countries; the expansion of this group to the maximum is now an extremely important objective.

At the beginning of 1976, several major exporters of nuclear equipment, materials and technology agreed to implement certain important principles in their nuclear export policy, which would aid in reinforcing non-proliferation standards. Since the exporters' conference was held in London, this group of states is often called the "London club" in the press. It includes the USSR, the United States, England, France, the GDR, the CSSR, Poland, the FRG, Japan, Canada, Italy, Sweden and others. The Soviet Union believes that all exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technology should adhere in their nuclear export policy to the strictest standards, which will completely close up all loopholes for the spread of nuclear weapons. Before the USSR delivers any shipments of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, it requires clients to accept IAEA safeguards on Soviet nuclear exports. They must officially certify that these materials, equipment and technology will not be used for any purposes which might result in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. In the event of re-export, they must certify that shipments will be made on the original export terms.

Among the measures taken to enforce nuclear non-proliferation, the guarantee of physical protection of nuclear materials or, as this is sometimes called, the "subnational non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons, is extremely important. Measures of this kind are aimed against any attempt by individuals, terrorist organizations or groups of criminals to steal fissionable materials and use them for such purposes as political blackmail, financial extortion and so forth. And it would not even be necessary for them to manufacture an atomic bomb: Just a few hundred grams of radioactive material could also pose a tremendous threat in the form of a radiological weapon. International steps must be taken to heighten the responsibility for keeping track of nuclear materials in the process of their accumulation, utilization and transport; when the USSR exports

fissionable materials, for example, it requires its clients to institute physical protection safeguards on the basis of IAEA recommendations. The Soviet Union also took part in drafting a universally acceptable international agreement on the physical protection of nuclear materials and equipment, which would be mandatory.[7]

Concerted effort by the exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to strengthen international control over nuclear exports will indisputably enforce the international non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This, however, cannot fully and completely block all of the possible channels of nuclear proliferation. The USSR has proposed the establishment of even more reliable nuclear export control. Above all, all exporters must agree to establish international standards, compulsory for all exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, stipulating that IAEA safeguards would apply to the entire fuel cycle in any non-nuclear recipient-nation--or, in other words, all of the nuclear activity of such a nation. This is vitally important in the interests of preventing the threat of nuclear war and safeguarding world peace.

Unfortunately, this view is not shared by all exporters of nuclear materials and equipment. Any relaxation of nuclear export control can only benefit the particular circles which are promoting the spread of nuclear weapons, consciously or unconsciously, in their pursuit of superprofits. In connection with this, the recent reports in the American press that the U.S. Government has relaxed restrictions on the export of nuclear materials are naturally disturbing. As the NEW YORK TIMES reported on 25 October 1979, a report prepared by the National Security Council states that the policy conducted by President J. Carter since 1977 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons "has undergone significant changes in recent months" and "the general direction of these changes is tantamount to a step backward," since "states not possessing the [nuclear] weapons will be given unlimited access to nuclear explosive materials, as was the case before 1977."

The interests of international security make it mandatory that competition for the sales markets of nuclear materials and equipment be replaced with egalitarian cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy, with the necessary safeguards against the armed control use of this grand achievement of the human mind. This is precisely the goal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other means of control, intended to aid in establishing universal rules regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibits non-nuclear states from developing and manufacturing nuclear weapons and other explosive devices--that is, it imposes serious restrictions on their activity in the nuclear field. Does this mean that the implementation of the treaty will deprive states of the opportunity to use the tremendous advantages they could accrue as a result of scientific achievements in the field of nuclear physics and

technology? The 10 years that have elapsed since the treaty went into effect have provided a cogent reply to this question. We can quite confidentially say that the treaty began a qualitatively new stage in international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. The consistent implementation of the principle of nuclear non-proliferation will provide even greater opportunities for the further expansion of this cooperation.

Article 4 of the treaty envisages the inalienable right of states to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without any kind of discrimination. This article specifically obligates the nations capable of doing this to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly within the territory of the non-nuclear states party to the treaty, with the proper consideration for the needs of developing areas in the world. Another important obligation of all parties to the treaty is the promotion of "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." This provision is of tremendous significance for the developing countries, which often do not have the necessary resources and technical base to carry out extensive programs for the peaceful use of atomic energy and require assistance from developed states.

An analysis of IAEA activity indicates that the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was followed by the considerable expansion and activization of the particular areas of agency work connected with the implementation of article 4. Each year IAEA gives more extensive technical assistance to developing countries for the peaceful use of atomic energy. In the 10 years after the treaty was signed (1969-1978), total technical assistance rendered through agency channels increased from 3.7 million dollars to 15.1 million. The regional distribution of this assistance was the following: Asia--30 percent, Africa and the Middle East--21 percent, Latin America--24 percent, and Europe--18 percent. In 1978 the IAEA rendered technical assistance in approximately 400 programs and around 45 other projects, ranging from consultations lasting a few days to large-scale activity lasting several years and entailing annual expenditures in six-figure amounts. In 1978 60 projects in 41 countries were being carried out to increase the grain yields, to produce more protein and improve its quality, to cultivate new strains of grain, to fight animal disease and to combat harmful pests.[8] In 1978, for example, the IAEA and FAO assisted in a large-scale project in Mexico in the use of sterile pests to prevent the fertile Mediterranean fruitfly from migrating North. This insect has settled in Guatemala and is threatening Mexico.

Attaching great significance to IAEA channels of technical assistance, the Soviet Union supplies member-countries with equipment, instruments and materials at the agency's request and aids in the training of personnel for these countries by organizing training courses and scientific demonstrations in the USSR. The Soviet Union has constantly increased its

voluntary contribution to the IAEA technical assistance fund: In the last 5 years alone (1975-1979), this contribution rose from 500,000 rubles to 750,000, for assistance primarily to the developing countries party to the treaty.[9]

The constant increase in nuclear information also testifies that the treaty has not diminished international contacts in the peaceful use of atomic energy, but, rather, has broadened these contacts. In 1970 an IAEA international information system was established for the collection of data on problems in nuclear power engineering in many countries. In the years that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been in effect, the number of countries and international organizations party to this system has risen significantly: from 39 in 1970 to 73 in 1978. The information bank now consists of almost 400,000 data units and contains around 100,000 documents, which can be obtained from the library of publications on microfilm.[10]

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also touches upon the important issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Explosions of this kind can be used to extract minerals, create artificial reservoirs or underground storage facilities for natural gas and petroleum, bury radioactive waste, build canals and harbors, lay roads, erect dams and tunnels and so forth. The treaty prohibits non-nuclear countries from building nuclear explosive devices for these purposes, since, from the technological standpoint, there is no difference between a nuclear bomb and a nuclear device for explosions for peaceful purposes. Moreover, article 5 of the treaty envisages the creation of a system of international cooperation in the use of such devices for peaceful purposes. It stipulates that the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear states party to the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible. This is to be accomplished either through an appropriate international body (IAEA) or on a bilateral basis. It is obvious that this procedure is extremely convenient for the non-nuclear countries. They will not bear the expense of developing and manufacturing nuclear explosive devices. In addition, the means by which they will receive services connected with explosions will not make them dependent on the goodwill of any particular nuclear states.

The conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation stimulated vigorous discussion of the peaceful use of nuclear explosions on the international scale, particularly within the IAEA framework. Corresponding work in this field is also being conducted on a bilateral basis. In May 1976 an agreement was signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In 1977 the USSR expressed its willingness to agree on a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and a ban on nuclear tests for a specific period.

An important element of current undertakings is the international assessment of the nuclear fuel cycle, an idea which was set forth by President J. Carter in April 1977 (it was later reinforced in the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation act of 10 March 1978). The idea was based on the international study of prospects for the development of peaceful atomic power engineering to satisfy the growing demand for energy resources with the simultaneous enforcement of non-proliferation standards. The plan acquired organizational form at a Washington congress in 1977, attended by representatives of more than 40 states and several international organizations. A 2-year program envisages the investigation of the economic and technical aspects of all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle in all possible areas of development.

The Soviet Union is participating in this program in the desire to promote the further application of nuclear power for peaceful purposes with the retention of strict international control over the nuclear activity of states, so that international cooperation in this field will not be used for purposes inconsistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The USSR believes, as was noted in the Soviet delegation's speech at the first conference on this program (United States, October 1977), that work on the program should be aimed at the resolution of two major problems: firstly, the planning of technical and other measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and explosive devices and to enforce non-proliferation standards; secondly, the assistance of individual countries to define optimal guidelines for national nuclear power engineering while taking no steps whatsoever to impede the development of nuclear power engineering in countries where such programs have already been adopted.

The final conference on this program is to be held in Vienna in the first half of 1980.

Speakers at the first conference to examine the effects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held in Geneva in May 1975, advocated research into the possibility of establishing international centers for the nuclear power engineering fuel cycle. The Soviet Union supports the study of this question within the IAEA framework, believing that the establishment of such centers would aid in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and guaranteeing effective control by the IAEA. It is also in the interest of parties to the treaty, since it will make atomic power engineering more economical and localize the radioactive waste products of the nuclear industry in a limited number of locations on our planet (thereby guaranteeing maximum radiation safety).

On the other hand, the tendency of some non-nuclear countries, including those in the initial stage of nuclear development, to build up an industry for the enrichment of uranium and the derivation of plutonium from irradiated fuel could have extremely dangerous consequences from the standpoint of nuclear proliferation.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not an isolated agreement unrelated to other measures to stop the arms race. One of its most important objectives is progress in this area. This is the purpose of article 6 of the treaty, which states that each of the parties to the treaty "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The particular importance and significance of this article consists in the fact that this is the first time that more than 100 states in the world have undertaken, by international agreement, to pursue negotiations on the broadest variety of disarmament issues. In the 10 years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty went into effect, several international agreements on disarmament and the deescalation of the arms race have been made possible by the consistent and persistent efforts of the Soviet Union and all peaceful countries.

The results that have been achieved in this field also testify that the states party to the treaty are striving to fulfill their obligations stemming from the sixth article of the treaty for practical purposes.

Article 7 of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation touches upon the question of the so-called territorial restriction of nuclear weapons--that is, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. It is obvious that this kind of restriction would unquestionably reinforce nonproliferation standards. The Soviet Union, which has always favored the creation of nuclear-free zones and has assisted the Latin American states in their efforts to bring this about, signed and ratified the supplementary second protocol to the treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America (the "Tlatelolco treaty") in 1978, thereby assuming the obligation to respect this continent's status as a nuclear-free zone. The USSR intends to continue promoting the creation of non-nuclear zones in various parts of the world. Naturally, it is important that these zones be truly nuclear-free. Any agreement regarding a nuclear-free zone must completely exclude the possibility of any loopholes for its violation.

At the 33d session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union also proposed the non-deployment of nuclear weapons within the territory of states not possessing these weapons at the present time. This actually meant that nuclear weapons would not be deployed in the future in states where they do not exist now, not in the form of combat-position nuclear systems or in the form of stockpiles of nuclear warheads, bombs, projectiles and mines. If this kind of agreement could be concluded, it would put an end to a process with potential dangerous consequences, including the diatabilization of the present strategic balance.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is directly related to international documents pertaining to safeguards guaranteeing the security of the states party to the treaty. In June 1968, the USSR, the United States and England made special announcements in the UN Security Council to reaffirm the intention of these three powers, as permanent

members of the Security Council, to seek immediate action to ensure support, in accordance with the UN Charter, for non-nuclear states party to the treaty that are the victims of aggression or are threatened with aggression involving nuclear weapons. A resolution passed by the Security Council applauded the intentions set forth in the statements of the three powers.[11]

These documents, which are called "positive guarantees" in international practice, represent one element of the system for guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear states party to the treaty. But many non-nuclear states are also requesting that the nuclear powers promise not to use nuclear weapons against--that is, they want "negative guarantees." In line with this request, the Soviet Union announced at the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 that it will never use nuclear weapons against states which refuse to manufacture or acquire these weapons and do not have nuclear weapons within their territory. The USSR is also prepared to conclude special agreements on this matter with any of these non-nuclear states. The Soviet commitment was reasserted by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979.[12] The Soviet Union has called upon all other nuclear powers to follow its example and take on identical commitments.[13] The UN General Assembly passed a fundamental resolution in favor of the Soviet proposal, and now this resolution must be given the form of a binding international convention.

What are the present immediate objectives in the work of creating an all-encompassing and effective system of nuclear non-proliferation? They include adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by more states, the improvement of IAEA safeguards, the enhancement of their effectiveness, the reinforcement of the technical basis of this system of safeguards and the improvement of inspection operations.

It would also be necessary to reinforce nuclear export control, establish more comprehensive export terms, right up to the extension of IAEA control to all nuclear activity in any non-nuclear client-countries, and to apply the resulting control standards to all exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.[14]

The concerted effort of all states will be required to stop the arms race, dismantle the military machine piece by piece and reduce weapon stockpiles, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament.

The second conference of states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will meet in Geneva in summer 1980 to determine its impact and discuss ways of enhancing the effectiveness of this major international agreement. The success of this conference would make an invaluable contribution to the cause of stronger international security and world peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 23.
2. "Annual Report of the IAEA for 1978," New York, 1979, p 3.
3. Ibid., p 4.
4. Ibid., p 46.
5. IAEA Document GC (XXI)/OR 194.
6. IAEA Document INFCIRC/209.
7. "Razoruzheniye" [Disarmament], Almanac, Moscow, 1979, p 50.
8. "Annual Report of the IAEA for 1978."
9. UN Document A/34/PV 52.
10. "Annual Report of the IAEA for 1978," p 62.
11. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament], Collected Documents, Moscow, 1977.
12. PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
13. For a more detailed discussion, see the article by V. F. Davydov, "Guarantees for the Non-Nuclear States and Washington's Position," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1979--Editor's note.
14. See the article by A. I. Utkin, "Inter-Atlantic Struggle over Nuclear Energy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 5, 1978--Editor's note.

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THE EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN MILITARY POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 28-40

[Article by S. F. Molochkov]

[Text] By the time this article is published, the readers will already know the answer to the question of who will make up the new Canadian Government as a result of the special general election of 18 February 1980--the Conservatives, who have been in power for less than 9 months, or the Liberals, who have governed the country for a total of more than 28 of the 35 years since World War II. As always, the candidates have offered the voters various alternative approaches to the resolution of several major problems in Canada today.

There is, however, one area of government activity where the positions of the two oldest bourgeois parties in the nation have recently seemed to differ less and less from one another even in terms of form--this is the area of military policy. In view of the fact that this sphere of activity touches directly upon the vital interests of the Canadian people and is most closely related to the future of the world as a whole, it would be wise to attempt an analysis of the basic stages in the evolution of Canadian military efforts in the 1970's.

Canadian postwar military policy has been colored by a number of factors: Canada's place among the highly developed imperialist states, its geographic location (between the United States in the south and the USSR in the north) and its interrelations with its powerful southern neighbor--the United States of America.

The class interests of the ruling circles of the Canadian bourgeoisie predetermined Canada's role as the junior partner of the United States. Canada was one of the principal initiators of NATO's founding, or its "midwife."

In the forces of this aggressive bloc in Western Europe, Canada maintained an army brigade and an air force division with a total strength of 10,000 and put a naval subunit at the disposal of the NATO command in the North

Atlantic. Canada also supplied its NATO allies with weapons and ammunition, allowed them the use of its territory for the training of English and West German infantry units and trained the military pilots of the NATO countries.

The establishment of the North American air defense system by the Americans gave Canada an opportunity to avoid costly efforts to establish separate Canadian defense systems and to limit itself to participation in NATO undertakings in conjunction with the United States. Since 1958 the day-to-day supervision of North American air defense has been carried out in accordance with a U.S.-Canadian agreement on the joint system of North American Air Defense (NORAD) and has virtually remained in the hands of the Americans.

During the period of U.S. aggression against the Korean people, the Canadian Government sent an infantry brigade, three destroyers and military transport aviation to give direct support to the interventionists, under cover of the UN banner.

In addition to activities connected with NATO and NORAD, Canadian-U.S. military cooperation has been conducted in line with many (more than 800) bilateral American-Canadian agreements and treaties pertaining to this sphere, the most important of which have been the February 1947 agreement on the postwar extension of the 1940 Ogdensberg agreement on military cooperation, a 1959 agreement on joint defense production, and a 1963 agreement on Canada's acceptance of American nuclear warheads for the Beaumark antiaircraft missiles deployed on Canadian territory. Canada has occupied a purely auxiliary position in this system of cooperation.

In terms of absolute numbers, the Canadian armed forces, which are formed on a professional, mercenary basis, were relatively small in 1968--98,000 people.[1]

When Trudeau took office in 1968, his government made significant changes in Canadian military policy. In the summer of 1968, while Trudeau was still campaigning, he criticized the existing situation in which, in his words, Canada's membership in NATO actually predetermined all Canadian military policy, and this, in turn, predetermined all Canadian foreign policy. After Trudeau had won the election, his government began a reassessment of foreign and military policy.

Reassessment of Priorities and Its Implementation

By the spring of 1969, the approaching conference of NATO defense ministers forced Trudeau to make certain decisions which were to largely determine the outcome of this reassessment. On 3 April 1969, Trudeau announced that the Canadian armed forces would have the following responsibilities in the future: 1) the monitoring of the mainland and coastline--that is, the protection of Canadian sovereignty; 2) the defense of North

America in conjunction with the United States; 3) the fulfillment of agreed-upon NATO commitments; 4) the performance of the international peace-keeping tasks which Canada might take on from time to time. The order of these priorities attested to an obvious move away from NATO military obligations and a definite departure from cold war dogma in the areas of foreign and military policy. The interests of Canada's own defense--Canadian territory and the North American region--took the fore. Moreover, the prime minister stressed the desire of the Canadians to rely on their own strength as much as possible in carrying out these tasks on Canadian territory. The desire for more freedom of movement in foreign policy was also attested to by the place assigned to UN peace-keeping missions. The general outline of these priorities was reinforced with concrete action: Trudeau announced the government's intention to consult with the allies on the reduction of the Canadian contingent of NATO armed forces in Europe in the near future.

A few days later, Trudeau frankly declared that foreign policy would determine military policy in the future, and that military policy, in turn, would determine Canada's membership in various alliances and the principles of Canadian defense. He again stressed that the primary objective of military policy, according to his government, was the protection of Canadian sovereignty, and not membership in NATO--an alliance which had turned into a purely military bloc with little interest in arms control or the alleviation of international tension. Trudeau cast doubts on the expediency of sharing in NATO's operations by maintaining an army brigade in Western Europe, which, by virtue of its specialized nature, could not be effectively used to protect Canada itself, as well as participation in the NATO system of antisubmarine defense in the North Atlantic. He admitted that many representatives of the Canadian financial community and the governments of some provinces felt that current levels of military spending were too high.[2]

In connection with these instructions, a decision was made in 1969 to freeze military expenditures for 3 years--that is, to keep them at 1.8 billion dollars a year until the end of 1972--to reduce total armed forces from 98,000 persons to 85,000-80,000; to reduce the total strength of the Canadian NATO contingent in Western Europe by half--from 10,000 to 5,000--by the fall of 1970; to remove the American "Honest John" nuclear missiles from the weapon supplies of the ground units of this contingent in 1970; to renounce the nuclear-attack role of the Canadian air division in the NATO European forces by the beginning of 1972--that is, to cease arming this division with missiles with nuclear warheads; to stop using the "Bonaventure" aircraft carrier.[3]

The principal results of the reassessment of Canadian foreign policy were set forth in the government's "White Paper: Foreign Policy for Canadians," published in June 1970. It declared that Canadian national interests would determine the content and form of the nation's foreign policy, which would, in turn, be an extension of domestic policy. As for military policy, the White Paper contained the eloquent statement: "Defense measures

should be maintained on a level high enough to guarantee respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Canada and preserve the trust of the United States and other allies."

Another white paper, entitled "Defence in the 70's," published in August 1971, was the logical continuation of "Foreign Policy for Canadians."[4] The Canadian Government's new policy-planning document, just as Trudeau's announcement of 3 April 1969, reflected the distinctive features of Canada's strategic position. On the one hand, the U.S. air defense system automatically took in the entire North American continent, whether the Canadians wanted this or not. This gave Canada an opportunity to limit its own defense efforts to the minimum needed to guarantee Canadian sovereingty within this system, and it did not have to contribute to the creation and maintenance of the system. On the other hand, as an integral part of this system, Canada would share the fate of the United States in the event of an American nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. The prospect of national catastrophe, which would be unavoidable if this should come about, gave the Canadians a keen interest in preventing conflicts of this kind, in strengthening peace in every way possible and in developing and consolidating international detente.

Trudeau's statements about the basic aims of Canadian military efforts, reflecting primary concern for problems connected with Canada's own defense, were amplified in "Defence in the 70's." The threat of catastrophic war between the superpowers was recognized as the only major threat to Canada's safety. The White Paper admitted that Canada's own potential for defense against a massive nuclear strike was negligible due to the complexity of nuclear technology and Canada's limited economic potential as a middle-ranking power. For this reason, the government announced that Canada's chief objective in the area of defense should be the prevention of nuclear war through the promotion of political regulation aimed at the elimination of causes of tension, participation in the planning of arms control measures and the drafting of disarmament agreements, and involvement in a system of stable mutual intimidation (that is, participation in NATO and NORAD).

The White Paper stated that military efforts should promote the economic development and internal political stability of Canada. In a discussion of the objective of ensuring national sovereignty and independence, the government directed the attention of the armed forces primarily to the northern regions, where commercial activity had increased dramatically by the beginning of the 1970's, not so much by Canadians as by American firms, attracted by the tremendous raw material potential of this region. In reference to the use of military subunits at times of internal political unrest, such as the crisis that broke out in Quebec in October 1970 as a result of terrorist actions by Franco-Canadian separatists, the White Paper ordered the armed forces to give the necessary assistance to civilian authorities in such cases.

Touching upon Canada's participation in NATO, the White Paper stressed that, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, "the collective defense of NATO is based chiefly on the national defense of each of its members."[5] The government explained its reduced participation in NATO by, firstly, the improved state of the economy in the Western European countries and their heightened ability to provide for their own defense needs in the area of conventional weapons and, secondly, the need for Canada to pay more attention to its own national priorities. The secondary place assigned to NATO in the new national security line actually signified, according to Peter Dobell, a prominent Canadian authority and the head of a parliamentary center for the study of foreign policy and trade, that the "Trudeau Government no longer regarded Europe as Canada's first line of defense, as its postwar predecessors had done."[6] In fact, the White Paper openly admitted that "a premeditated attack on Western Europe now appears unlikely."[7]

"Defence in the 70's" talks about new specific decisions: To discard, after 1976, the Centurion tank used by Canadian troops in Europe, as unsuitable for use in units based in Canada, and to replace it in the future with a light-weight Caterpillar vehicle for direct infantry support; to reduce the number of CF-104 aircraft, equipped with non-nuclear weapons since January 1972, by half in Europe. As for nuclear weapons, "the government decided that there is no longer sufficient reason to deploy Bomarc missiles in Canada in the future and, for this reason, this system will be discarded. The only system in the Canadian armed forces capable of using nuclear weapons will be the CF-101 aircraft based in Canada."[8]

Noting that the communication lines of the American antimissile system pass through Canadian territory, the Canadian Government expressly emphasized the fact that Canada is not participating in U.S. antimissile defense undertakings.

Reaffirming Canada's intention to continue its involvement in NORAD, the White Paper said that this agreement would be in effect only until 1973, and that the decision on its renewal would depend on the actual state of affairs at that time, including the degree of progress in Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks. The paper frankly stated that the government was "not prepared to allocate considerable sums in the future for equipment and installations intended only for active bomb defense," as this danger has abated considerably.[9]

On the whole, "Defence in the 70's," just as the preceding "Foreign Policy for Canadians," reflected a noticeable reversal in the Trudeau Government's policy toward the safeguarding of Canada's own interests at the expense of military commitments dating back to the cold war. The overall volume of Canadian military efforts decreased.

It appeared at first that the line of assigning Canadian sovereingty priority over NATO involvement would be implemented. By the fall of 1972 the Bomarc missiles had been discarded and their nuclear warheads had been sent back to the United States. The defense budget did not increase until 1973. Later, a decision was made regarding a one-time increase of 235 million dollars and an annual increase of 7 percent for the next 5 years.[10] Under the conditions of a rate of inflation reaching as high as 11 percent a year, these appropriation guidelines made it necessary to reduce actual expenditures--to use less equipment, means of transport and civilian and military personnel. The total strength of the armed forces was cut by the middle of 1974 from 83,000 to 78,000. The number of planes patrolling northern regions and the North Atlantic for the safeguarding of sovereignty was cut in September 1974. The patrol of Arctic regions was almost totally curtailed. Besides this, according to a report in Canada's OTTAWA JOURNAL, at a NATO defense ministers' conference in Brussels in December 1973, the Canadian representative, J. Richardson, expressed the opinion that the small NATO powers could no longer perform all of the alliance's military functions independently, and that specialization was therefore needed. Canada, Richardson said, would only be able to provide for one type of activity by its armed forces in Western Europe after 1976. In the middle of 1975 the same newspaper reported that the Ministry of National Defense had drawn up a plan for the implementation of this thesis, which envisaged the withdrawal of all ground subunits from Western Europe and the limitation of Canada's contribution to NATO armed forces in this region to three CF-104 squadrons.

The Canadians were also striving to coordinate NORAD activity more closely with Canada's own needs. Whereas the NORAD agreement was renewed for 5 years in March 1968, in May 1973 it was only renewed for 2 years. The discussion of this matter in the federal parliament and in the press reflected serious public opposition to Canada's involvement in NORAD. Parliamentary deputies from the New Democratic Party (NDP) stated that the original reason for the creation of NORAD--the supposed threat of attack by Soviet bombers--no longer existed and that Canada should monitor its own skies, cooperating with the United States in the exchange of information but not binding itself to the NORAD system. Toronto University Professor James Ayers, foreign policy commentator for the nation's largest newspaper, THE TORONTO STAR, said that Canada's participation in NORAD was absurd, since this was an air defense system intended to ward off bomber attacks after these had already been replaced by intercontinental ballistic missiles.[11]

Equally heated arguments broke out in connection with the approach of 12 May 1975, when the agreement would be coming up for renewal. The main argument of those who supported this renewal was the assertion that Canada's renunciation of NORAD would give rise to new complications in the already strained Canadian-U.S. relationship.[12] This time, however, the renewal of the agreement was not opposed only by deputies from the NDP, but also by some Liberals. The largest central labor organization in

Canada, numerous peace organizations and the Canadian Communist Party also demanded Canada's withdrawal from NORAD.

It is possible that the presence of this broad and increasingly vigorous opposition to Canadian participation in NORAD was used by the Canadians during negotiations with the Americans for the purpose of gaining concessions. As a result of these negotiations, considerable changes were made in the agreement: The Canadians took control over Canada's air space west of the province of Ontario, which had been under U.S. control up to that time. Plans were made to locate the headquarters of the new Canadian air defense region in Winnipeg (Manitoba). For the first time since the conclusion of the NORAD agreement, air defense throughout Canada was controlled by Canadians.

In May 1975 the NORAD agreement was renewed for 5 years (National Defense Minister J. Richardson wanted to renew it for an indefinite period of time). The Canadians were obviously worried about a negative reaction in Washington. At the same time, however, the Canadian Government stressed once again that Canadian participation in this system would not obligate it to participate with the United States in North American antimissile defense.

Rearmament--The Price of Admittance to the EEC Market

The tendency to reduce foreign obligations in military policy and to "Canadize" this policy conflicted with the mounting opposition and did not develop fully. From the very beginning, steps toward the revision of Canadian military policy evoked pointedly negative reactions from NATO and U.S. leaders. At a plenary session of the NATO Assembly in Brussels in October 1969, a resolution was passed which indirectly censured the reduction of Canadian participation. Statements to this effect were made by former commander in chief of the West Germany Bundeswehr, General H. Speidel, and American General L. Lemnitzer. Pro-American and pro-NATO groups in Canada echoed the sentiments of overseas opponents of the "Canadization" of foreign and military policy. The campaign was headed by representatives of the Conservative Party, who declared that reduced participation in NATO was a mistake, that the so-called "military threat is real" and that the actions of the government were arousing suspicion among Canada's allies.[13]

Pressure was exerted on the Trudeau Government on unofficial and official levels. At a conference on American-Canadian relations at the end of 1971, a White House representative unequivocally said that Canada's military expenditures were "inadequate."[14] This pressure continued for some time. When U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger visited Ottawa in September 1975, for example, he also quite unceremoniously spoke of the inadequacy, as he put it, of Canada's contribution in NATO and advised the Canadians to entrust the defense of Canada and the entire North American continent to the United States while focusing the attention of Canadian armed forces on participation in NATO in Western Europe and the safeguarding of sea lanes in the North Atlantic.

Without underestimating the significance of U.S. opposition to the Trudeau Government's attempts to "economize" on defense, we must say that the Europeans, and not the Americans, had the deciding influence on Canadian policy in this sphere. And Canada itself offered them this opportunity. A special issue of INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, published under the auspices of the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs and dated October 1972, contained only one article--"Canadian-American Relations: Alternatives for the Future," by M. Sharp, Canadian deputy prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs. He analyzed three alternative foreign policy lines in relations with the United States: the preservation of the status quo in these relations, the conscious promotion of further integration with the United States and a long-range strategy for the development and reinforcement of the Canadian economy and other areas of national life for the purpose of diminishing Canada's "current vulnerability." Sharp concluded his article by unequivocally supporting the third alternative as the only one leading to a "stronger Canada."[15] Later Sharp made repeated references to this article as a statement of government policy rather than simply his own personal opinion.[16]

The "third alternative," as this program of action began to be called, envisaged the creation of counterbalances to U.S. influence, particularly in the economic sphere, as one of the most important tasks facing Canada. At a time when three main centers of economic gravity began to take concrete shape in the capitalist world--the United States, Japan and the Western European Common Market countries--the Trudeau Government concentrated on developing economic relations with the EEC, Canada's second largest trade partner.

This convergence with the Western European nations was complicated from the very beginning by the economic alliance of nine of them--the EEC, in which an entire system of tariff and non-tariff restrictions made the unimpeded penetration of their markets impossible. It was clear that the policy of developing economic relations on a bilateral basis with individual Western European countries was not producing the desired effect--making Western Europe a counterbalance to the United States, which accounted for 70 percent of all Canadian foreign trade. This is why Trudeau determined to create a legal basis for the development of economic relations between Canada and the EEC as a whole.

When the Canadians took their first steps in this direction, they encountered a wall of alienation. Ruling circles in Western Europe saw no reason to regard Canada as an entity with its own persona and interests differing from U.S. aims. It took the Canadians a great deal of time and effort to convince EEC members that this view of Canada was mistaken. Besides this, they had to prove--by words and deeds--that Canada was truly interested in Western Europe.

Ruling circles in the Western European countries, closely connected with NATO, made their decision on the Canadian proposal to establish "contractual ties" conditional upon bigger and better participation by Canada in

NATO military undertakings in Western Europe. The transfer of NATO obligations from first to third place in the list of military policy objectives and the reduction of the Canadian contingent of NATO forces in Western Europe by half were interpreted as a "betrayal of NATO principles" and a sign of "continental isolationism."[17] A particularly harsh reaction was aroused by the plans for the further reduction of Canadian participation in NATO forces in Western Europe--first by refusing to replace the obsolete Centurion tank--that is, discarding tank weaponry in general--and then by withdrawing all ground subunits from Europe. The leading role in the resistance of these plans was played by the FRG, representatives of which led the criticism of the Canadian Government's plans at the summit-level NATO conference of May 1975. According to reports in the West German press, one of FRG Defense Minister G. Leber's main reasons for visiting Canada in June 1975 was to impede the possible reduction of the number and combat strength of Canadian troops in the FRG. The concerted pressure exerted on Ottawa by the Americans and Western Europeans was summed up, as it were, by NATO Secretary General J. Luns, who said on 12 November 1975 that all of the main components of the weapons of the Canadian NATO contingent--tanks, naval ships and aviation--had serious defects and that there was increasing dissatisfaction among Canada's allies with its delays in making decisions on this matter.

When the Trudeau Government was confronted by the categorical and tough line of Canada's Western European partners, it had to make concessions. The prime minister had to repeatedly assure the NATO allies that his government would not make any changes in Canada's current military contribution to Western European defense and would not reduce the effectiveness of Canadian participation in NATO.[18] Trudeau admitted that he had to contend with a serious problem: the problem of explaining the need for huge military expenditures to the Canadian public, to the average Canadian, particularly at the height of a fight against inflation. This thankless task was assigned to Canadian Defense Minister Richardson. Soon his speeches began to include statements that were obviously intended, firstly, to justify the costly changes in government military policy and, secondly, to pacify NATO circles.

Contradicting the basic premises of the 1971 White Paper on military policy, he announced in December 1974 that the main military threat to Canada was the group of Warsaw Pact countries, with the USSR in the lead, and that "Canada's first line of defense is located in Central Europe."[19] Later Richardson resorted several times to references to the bugbear of "the mounting Soviet military threat" to justify the escalation of Canadian military efforts. At a conference of NATO defense ministers in December of the same year, Richardson supported the proposal that NATO forces in Europe continue to be armed with nuclear weapons.[20] His successor, B. Danson, adhered to the same line.

This departure from the fundamental position of 1971 was a sure sign that the Trudeau Government would also depart from its previous intentions in specific foreign policy matters. On 27 November 1975, 2 weeks after Luns

made the abovementioned statement, the Canadian defense minister made a speech in the House of Commons about the results of a government "study of the defense structure" of the nation. The minister assured the legislators that no changes had been made in the content or priority sequence of the functions of the Canadian armed forces, as set forth in the 1971 White Paper. Moreover, he repeated that the Canadian Government had no intention of increasing the overall size of the regular army. The rest of his speech, however, as well as specific measures taken in the military sphere, attested to serious changes in government policy. Richardson announced that decisions had been made to: 1) begin the broad-scale modernization and renovation of the basic types of heavy armaments as soon as possible; 2) continue the maintenance of aviation and ground subunits in NATO forces in Western Europe; 3) provide the Canadian contingent of NATO European forces with modern high-efficiency tanks; 4) replace the Argus patrol aircraft with 18 P-3 planes purchased from the Lockheed Aircraft firm for a total sum exceeding 950 million dollars; 5) continue investigating the expediency of replacing fighter planes and naval ships; 6) increase allocations for capital expenditures (weapon purchases) 12 percent a year for the next 5 years, until such time as these expenditures would constitute at least 20 percent of all defense appropriations.[21]

At a meeting of the NATO planning committee in Brussels in December 1975, Richardson reported that the Canadian Government had made some new decisions: to augment the tank weaponry of the brigade group in Western Europe; to strengthen the artillery armament of the group in accordance with the recommendations of the NATO supreme command in Europe and approved a program of artillery modernization; to increase the size of the reserve brigade group. The minister informed his colleagues of the increase in military appropriations for fiscal year 1975/76 to almost 3 billion dollars, which immediately exceeded the previous year's figure by 18.7 percent.[22]

In April 1976, at a meeting of the standing committee of the House of Commons on questions of foreign policy and national defense, Richardson also spoke of the plans to purchase new fighter-interceptors, armored carriers, missiles and trucks and to build naval ships.[23]

The content of some rearmament programs was set forth in greater detail in a special supplement to the 19 February 1977 issue of the FINANCIAL POST, the influential newspaper of the Canadian business community, in which possibilities were openly advertised for Canadian firms to acquire profitable government orders for new types of weapons. In particular, it was reported that 120-130 new fighter-interceptors were to be purchased for a sum exceeding 2 billion dollars. The intention to completely replace all 20 destroyers was corroborated. It was reported that at least 300 million dollars would be spent on the manufacture of new armored carriers on a Swiss license (up to 700 carriers). The FINANCIAL POST reported that the Canadian military establishment had ensured the financing of its undertakings by the federal treasury in accordance with a specified quantitative volume, regardless of the inflationary devaluation of initi- located

sums. It was stressed that, in this respect, the Ministry of National Defense was the sole exception to the rule applying to Canadian Government institutions, and that it was therefore the object of envy in the military establishments of the United States and other NATO countries. In setting forth the Canadian Government's new military policy, the authors of the special supplement admitted that it signified "a near-revolution" in Canadian military efforts, thereby stressing the qualitative nature of the changes that had taken place in this policy since November 1975.

The qualitative difference between Canadian Government decisions and actions before and after November 1975 has also been acknowledged by prominent Canadian foreign and military policy. A. McLaren from the University of Toronto believes that the "development of the policy line known as the 'third alternative' prevented defense policy from moving in a more national and less international direction. Instead of working on the priorities set forth in the 1971 White Paper, defense policy returned to what it was in the days before Trudeau...before the partial withdrawal of troops from Europe and before the elaboration of the fundamental premises of contemporary Canadian foreign policy."[24] Virtually the same opinion is expressed by Canadian B. Cuthbertson in the book "Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers."[25] A direct relationship between the pressure exerted by the EEC and the change in Canadian military policy is also pointed out by Professor A. Donner from the University of Quebec in Montreal and Professor R. Byers from York University in Toronto.[26]

Later events proved that these views were correct. Throughout the year of 1976 the Canadian Government repeatedly declared the primacy and invariability of Canada's NATO obligations. At a summit-level NATO conference in May 1977, P. Trudeau supported U.S. President Carter's appeal for coordinated action to augment Western military efforts, particularly in connection with the standardization of weapons and ammunition. In July 1977, B. Danson announced that the government had decided to increase the overall strength of the armed forces in the near future. Despite the insignificant absolute dimensions of this increase (4,700 individuals), this decision--the first of its kind since the end of World War II--was of fundamental significance. In the spring of 1978 it was announced that an amphibious combat group had been formed in Canada, consisting of three battalions, an artillery regiment and other maintenance and support units, which would be transported, if necessary, by air or sea to Norway, to the northern flank of NATO. Rearmament continued at full speed. In August 1978 the approval of a program was announced--a program for the construction of six escort ships for a total sum of 1.5 billion dollars to replace an equal number of destroyers. At the December session of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, B. Danson said that Canada would join the United States and the FRG in financing, maintaining and operating the air warning and air control system (AWACS) in Western Europe.[27]

In conclusion, Danson said that the dissatisfaction of Canada's Western European allies and the supreme command of this aggressive bloc had been replaced by their praise of Canadian military undertakings.

While the Trudeau Government was building up its military efforts primarily in the NATO framework, it also gave NORAD considerable attention. Plans were drawn up for the radical modernization of the long-range radar warning system. The sum of 270 million dollars was to be allocated for the renovation of the existing "Line of Pines" (along the Canadian-U.S. border). It was to be extended along the Pacific and Atlantic coastlines of Canada. The complete remodeling of the long-range radar warning line (the so-called "DEW Line") along the Arctic coastline was planned. In December 1977, Trudeau himself visited NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs (in the state of Colorado).

The Canadians, apparently hoping to lend their undertakings and the very fact of their participation in NORAD greater weight in the eyes of Western Europeans, persistently implied that all of this was part of Canada's NATO contribution.[28] But the United States did not interpret NORAD in the same way, apparently because it did not want to give the Western Europeans a voice in questions pertaining exclusively to U.S. defense.

As the date of the general election approached in the spring of 1979, questions of military policy were more frequently the subject of political debates and party battles. Segments of the Canadian public and experts on military policy did not cease their criticism of Canada's involvement in NORAD. It was said that this agreement obligated Canada to serve as the first line of defense for the United States. In the event of a crisis, as was the case at the time of the "Caribbean crisis" in 1962, Canada would have virtually no chance of opposing U.S. decisions on the use of NORAD, although they would sometimes be made without the preliminary political consultations with the Canadians stipulated in the agreement and might be contrary to Canada's interests.

Emotions were aroused by the decision to replace the fighter planes. The sum of 2.34 billion dollars was allocated for this purpose in August 1977. By the end of 1978, of the six types of fighter planes proposed by the firms competing for this largest military order in Canadian history, the Canadians had selected only two for further investigation, and both of these were American. Critics of the government said that the exclusion of the fighters of the European Panavia firm from the running was dictated by an attempt to improve relations with the United States rather than by the technical features of the aircraft. As for the most probable "victor" of the contest--the American F-16 fighter--it was said that it was being chosen because it was the cheapest, and not because it was the best. Besides this, an important role was played by motives connected with the quantity of subcontracts (and, consequently, profits) that this would give Canadian businessmen, and the number of new jobs that would be created in line with these subcontracts. The latter consideration was directly linked with the political advantages accruing to the Liberals as the ruling party on the threshold of the general election. Supporters of the Conservative Party voiced various arguments to keep the Trudeau Government from making a final decision on the specific designation of the

2.34 billion dollars before the election, asserting that this would be a "criminally irresponsible" action.[29] The attempt made by B. Danson to justify the program for the purchase of the new fighter planes in a letter published in the 9 December 1978 issue of the capital's OTTAWA CITIZEN newspaper was apparently unconvincing. In an editorial responding to the letter, the newspaper cast doubts on the validity of the very goals of the Canadian Air Force and NORAD. Danson was reminded that the United States had already excluded the very possibility of a Soviet bomber attack on Canada by way of the North Pole, and candidly asked: "Are we not arming ourselves for a phony war?" The minister did not reply.[30]

Heated debates broke out over the neutron bomb issue. At first, National Defense Minister B. Danson and Admiral R. Folz, chief of defense headquarters, followed the lead of the Americans and supported this new weapon of mass destruction, absurdly assuring the Canadians that the probability of nuclear war would supposedly be reduced if the Western countries armed themselves with the neutron bomb. This view was condemned by broad segments of the progressive public and the Communist Party of Canada. In Parliament, the irresponsible statements made by Danson and Folz were criticized by representatives of the New Democratic Party, who pointed out the particularly inhuman character of the neutron bomb, the danger of undermining SALT II if the West should arm itself with this weapon and, contrary to the statements of Danson and Folz, the increased danger of nuclear war.[31]

The Soviet Union's firm stand on the neutron bomb issue and the extensive support of this Soviet view by the international public, which also condemned the expansion of the nuclear arsenal, forced the United States to abandon its original plans.

The Canadian Government's attitude toward these and other questions of war and peace was set forth by P. Trudeau in May 1978. At first, speaking at the special UN General Assembly session on disarmament, he stressed that his nation not only refused to assign any kind of nuclear role to its armed forces in Europe (meaning the Canadian NATO contingent--S. M.), but was also currently replacing its aircraft designated for North American use and capable of performing a nuclear role with planes with conventional armament and, therefore, was the first nuclear state to discard this type of weapon. Trudeau set forth his plan for a "suffocation strategy," consisting of four parts, to stifle the nuclear arms race: 1) a comprehensive nuclear test ban, 2) the cessation of tests of new systems for the delivery of strategic weapons, 3) a ban on the production of fissionable material for the manufacture of weapons, and 4) the limitation and subsequent progressive reduction of expenditures on new systems of strategic nuclear weapons. Expressing the opinion of the indisputable majority of Canadians, he praised the U.S. President's decision to postpone the production of the neutron bomb. In accordance with this position, B. Danson announced on 31 May 1978 that the positive assessment of the neutron bomb made by Admiral R. Folz the day before, at a

meeting of the standing committee of the House of Commons on foreign policy and defense, was nothing more than the biased opinion of a professional military man and did not reflect the views of the government.[32]

After this, Trudeau attended a summit-level NATO conference in Washington. In contrast to the Americans and some of the Western Europeans who were arguing in favor of the escalation of the arms race, the Canadian prime minister supported the further relaxation of international tension, to which, Trudeau stressed, there is no alternative. At the same time, he approved of the "idea and purpose" of the long-range program for the buildup of NATO military efforts.[33]

This inconsistent position was the result of several contradictory factors. On the one hand, it appears that Trudeau was still trying to prevent Canadian involvement in an escalated arms race and was not departing from the principled decision of 1969 to refuse to play a nuclear role. On the other hand, his government was the object of unremitting pressure exerted by the NATO allies and it continued to make concessions to them in the area of the re-equipping of Canadian armed forces with conventional weapons.

Therefore, Canadian military policy underwent a change in the fall of 1975, a definite return to the priorities inherited from the cold war. The tendency to give Canada's own defense needs priority in military policy is obviously and indisputably weaker, as well as the purely Canadian basis of this policy. The scales and dynamics of this reversal and the factors bringing it about threatened a revival of the once decisive influence of military policy and Canada's membership in the NATO bloc on its foreign policy, which would have an extremely negative effect on Canadian national interests and on all efforts to consolidate international detente in general.

Later events proved that the end pursued by the Trudeau Government, when it made the decision that was announced in November 1975, did not justify the means. The "contractual ties" with the EEC did not produce any tangible results, and Canada's trade with the Common Market countries is growing more slowly than its trade with the United States. Besides this, the increase in military appropriations has given rise to destabilizing phenomena in the Canadian economy and, above all, has promoted a new rise in the rate of inflation, which, in turn, was one of the main reasons for the defeat suffered by the Liberal Party in the general election of 22 May 1979.

The Conservatives not only had no intention of changing the military policy line of their predecessors, but, on the contrary, were prepared to take more steps in the same direction. Party leader J. Clark, who became prime minister, announced his intention to increase the defense budget in spite of the overall reduction of federal spending, increase the total strength of the Canadian armed forces and strengthen Canada's involvement in NATO. At the December session of NATO in 1979, the Conservative

Government approved the plan to deploy the new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The Conservatives had simply no time to move in this direction: After being confronted by the same economic and social problems encountered by the Liberals, whose solutions to these problems had been so zealously criticized by the Conservatives when they were in the opposition, the Conservatives lost even their relative majority in parliament in less than half a year and the Clark Government was given a vote of no confidence in parliament when the draft of its first budget was being discussed in December 1979.

Time will tell what lessons all of this has taught those who will govern the nation after 18 February 1980. There is no question, however, that the successful resolution of the extreme difficult problems facing the victors will not be compatible with intensive military efforts.

FOOTNOTES

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28. THE FINANCIAL POST, Special Report, 19 February 1977; 15 February 1978; THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 28, 29 December 1977; INTERNATIONAL CANADA, December 1977, p 288; CANADA WEEKLY, 3 January 1979.

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31. INTERNATIONAL CANADA, December 1977, p 285; THE TORONTO STAR, 9, 31 May 1978.

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WOMEN'S EQUALITY: THE SEVENTIES IN REVIEW

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 41-49

[Article by Ye. N. Yershova]

[Text] The 1970's are now behind us, and today not only government officials and public spokesmen, but also average Americans, are trying to review this decade and take a look into the future. This also applies to the millions of American women who stubbornly fought for their own rights throughout the entire decade.

The beginning of the past decade coincided with a dramatic upsurge in the movement for "women's liberation."[1] It loudly announced its presence on 26 August 1970 at a demonstration involving 10,000 participants in New York, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the first victory of the American suffragettes--the adoption of the 19th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which gave women the right to vote. This demonstration marked the beginning of a new and lengthy campaign for the adoption of the 27th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, proclaiming sexual equality. Around 2 years ago, in July 1978, 100,000 women took part in the largest women's demonstration in U.S. history, demanding that this amendment, which was passed by the Congress in 1972, finally be ratified. The mass scale of this demonstration and the participation of women representing all of the largest labor unions, numerous women's organizations and ethnic minority organizations vividly illustrated how far the women's movement had come in the 1970's.

Both demonstrations were initiated and organized by the National Organization for Women (NOW). This organization, which was founded in 1966 by 28 feminists headed by Betty Friedan, not only attracted attention but also won the sympathy of the general public with its appeal for "action to gain full and active participation by women in American life NOW."[2] It appealed primarily to women, who are constantly encountering discrimination and are being treated like "second-class citizens" on the job and in the home. Given the fact that objective prerequisites[3] for the formation of a women's movement as a separate and independent area of democratic

struggle had fully taken shape in the United States, this sympathy quickly evolved into active participation by women in the work of NOW and other women's organizations.

The number of associations of this kind constantly rose throughout the 1970's, and although some of them turned out to be unstable and quickly ceased to exist, the process of the creation of new organizations and groups in support of women's rights is still going on at all levels--federal, state and local. They already number in the hundreds. A broad coalition of women's organizations has been functioning since 1971--the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), originally created for the purpose of encouraging participation by women in the 1972 presidential election campaign. It now has more than 200 branches in all 50 states. An organization called ERAmerica was formed expressly to campaign for the ratification of the 27th amendment to the Constitution, proclaiming equality before the law regardless of sex.[4] But NOW is still the most influential and largest of these associations. During these years, its membership rose to over 100,000 and it now has branches in all of the states and large cities in America. The numerous political campaigns successfully conducted at NOW's initiative throughout the decade have made it a visible force in national politics.

The sociopolitical character of the movement did not change over the last 10 years--it was and is democratic. Its basic goals and objectives did not change either--the transformation of the "sexist" society--that is, the society lacking in sexual equality--by means of reforms intended to eliminate discrimination against women and the conditions giving rise to it. According to the women's movement, the attainment of this goal will first necessitate the ratification of the 27th amendment and the repeal of all laws discriminating against women (mainly state laws), as well as proportional representation for women in elected offices of federal, state and local government, political organizations and their leadership. Great significance is attached to the modification of public thinking and existing stereotypes, the eradication of biases and attempts to develop new forms of interpersonal relations. The realities of life have forced women and their organizations to give increasing attention to the struggle for women's rights in other spheres as well--equal wages for equal work, equal educational opportunities, laws favoring women in cases involving divorce, protection of the rights of mothers, the establishment of a child care network, etc.

On the whole, the forms and methods of activity employed by the women's organizations, which stem from their reformist nature and are aimed at the exertion of pressure on legislative and executive bodies at all levels, have not changed either. Women's organizations engage in widespread lobbying, take an active part in election campaigns, strive to use the press, radio and television in their interest and conduct educational and propaganda activity. They also resort to mass demonstrations, protest marches and even nonviolent civil disobedience--methods inherited from the social

protest movements of the stormy 1960's. They have also armed themselves with the boycott. For example, women's organizations announced that they would boycott the capitals of states that have not ratified the 27th amendment. The subsequent cancellation of conventions and other undertakings by various social organizations inflicted losses exceeding 250 million dollars on these states.[5] But nothing in the program or the concrete actions of the neofeminists, by their own admission, can affect the "basic social, political or economic institutions...of capitalist society."[6]

Nonetheless, the women's rights movement has undergone significant changes in many of its aspects over the last 10 years. The most important of these is the expansion and democratization of the movement's social base.

The basis of the movement in the 1960's consisted primarily of women representing the intelligentsia and middle strata, well-to-do and educated women, many of whom had careers in business, politics, law, teaching and journalism. Although they did not limit their demands specifically to women's problems (which was a step forward in comparison to the feminism of the beginning of this century), their views and their activities were marked by class limitations.

In addition, the founders of "women's liberation" included many women from the "New Left" movement, young and energetic women with radical views, who brought along their useful experience in political struggle, but also the negative elements of the petty bourgeois extremist ideology. They often called themselves "socialist-feminists," although there was nothing socialistic about their views except for the way they phrased them. This branch of the women's movement preached extreme forms of struggle and appealed for a "feminist revolution." But if we discard the verbal trappings of their deliberately "shocking" slogans, we can see that their sermons were essentially based on views that differed little from the ideology of the liberal reformist part of the movement. Both branches denied the connection between the women's rights movement and the class struggle in contemporary capitalist society; they regarded women as a separate "class" or as a "fourth world" opposed by male antagonists. "The biggest problem in the world today is man's exploitation by man. But there is an even greater issue, which no revolutionary has ever even tried to analyze in its entirety or, certainly, to resolve. This is the issue of woman's exploitation by man"[7]--this supposedly "Marxist" statement by Kathleen Cleaver is typical of the extremist part of the movement. This approach to questions of Marxist doctrine has unavoidably led many to the false conclusion that exploitation of women exists in any social structure--"whether it is communist, capitalist, semisocialist (?), bourgeois--all of them."[8] This is why, consequently, it is necessary to fight against men and all of the institutions created by them, but first and foremost, naturally, against marriage and the family, as the institutions touching most closely upon the interests of women.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's the "socialist-feminists" tried to practice what they preached. In some places, groups with pretentious

names were formed ("Redstockings" and "Bread and Roses") and women's communes were established as the prototype of the future nucleus of a free society. By the middle of the decade, however, most of these had disintegrated. The few that remained managed to lose their social significance. At that time, the "socialist-feminists" either left the movement or joined liberal-reformist women's organizations. Moreover, by preaching the dissolution of the family unit and demanding "equality" for lesbians and homosexuals (including equality in the teaching profession), they are hurting the women's movement by discrediting it in the eyes of many Americans who are worried about the future of their families and children. In this way, they are objectively helping antifeminist forces, which are taking advantage of these "slogans."

In the beginning of the 1970's, the number of working class women belonging to women's organizations was insignificant, although they needed to defend their rights more than other women did. After all, the millions of working women have suffered and are still suffering from a specific type of discrimination. The firmly entrenched discrimination in the payment of wages, the acquisition of professional training and professional advancement and the absence of legislation to protect the interests of working mothers--all of this makes their fight for equality vitally important. The heavy burden of working women is compounded by the fact that the overwhelming majority of them do not belong to labor unions and do not enjoy the protection of collective bargaining. What is more, the AFL-CIO leadership itself widely practices a policy that encourages discrimination against women.

In the 1970's, working women began to fight more vigorously for their rights (within the women's and labor movements) and won some definite victories. During these years, more than half of all new union members were women. They accounted for 25 percent of all organized workers by the end of the decade, in comparison to 10 percent in 1956.[9]

Women played a significant part in the formation and functioning of new labor unions--of medical personnel and agricultural workers--and made an attempt to organize an office workers' union (almost all clerical jobs are held by women, and these women have virtually no legal protection). In 1979, 13 local organizations of women secretaries and other office workers founded the National Association of Working Women.

The founding of the Coalition of Labor Union Women in 1973, uniting representatives of 58 professional associations, was an important event. The next year, 1974, another working women's organization appeared on the political scene--Women for Racial and Economic Equality, made up primarily of rank-and-file union members and representatives of racial minorities. Although working women's organizations in the United States are still influenced mainly by the neofeminist ideology, the very creation of these organizations marked the beginning of a process by which a new current took shape in the American movement for equality for women. Only a working

women's movement, indissolubly connected with the struggle of the working class for its social liberation, can achieve real equality for women in society in the future.

The increased activity of working women influenced the views of liberal-reformist women's organizations. They, as was mentioned above, no longer limit themselves to demands of an expressly judicial nature, but are mainly defending equality in the sphere of labor and social relations. They are taking an active part in the movement for the unionization of working women (or the formation of women's labor unions), are insisting on their promotion to administrative positions in labor unions and are demanding their participation in decision-making in various spheres of public life. The rising rate of unemployment among women, which escalated dramatically in the years of economic crisis (1974-1975), advanced the fight against unemployment and for the creation of new jobs to a position among the top priorities of women's organizations. At the end of the decade, these organizations also took a clear-cut stand on a major issue in today's America--the existence of special quotas which make it easier for members of groups suffering discrimination (that is, representatives of racial and ethnic minorities and women) to find jobs and enroll in academic institutions. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Bakke case on the "unconstitutional" nature of these quotas evoked widespread protests from all democratic forces, including the women's movement. The reestablishment of these quotas is now regarded as one of the chief goals of the fight to eliminate discrimination against women in the sphere of labor relations, education and science.

Another important result of the past decade was the women's movement's increased awareness of its indissoluble connection with the fight against racism. In the 1970's this movement was joined by black and Puerto Rican women and representatives of other minority groups. In 1973 the National Organization of Black Feminists was founded, and within a year it already had branches in 10 cities. The Organization for Action by Black Women began operating on the West Coast at the same time. The strengthening of the women's movement's ties with antiracist forces is also discussed in the National Program of Action adopted at the National Women's Conference in Houston in November 1977. It lists the main goals of the movement, among them the elimination of all signs of racial inequality and the institution of special measures to lighten the burden of black, Puerto Rican and Chicano women, immigrants from Asia and others.

Throughout the 1970's, working women and representatives of racial and ethnic minorities were constantly urged to join the women's movement. "The increasing influence of working women, primarily blacks and other women subjected to oppression on ethnic grounds," G. Hall stressed in his accountability report at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party, USA in August 1979, "has led to a new level of solidarity between leading women's organizations and to their realization of the need to fight against racist ideas and discriminatory practices, which are threatening to break up the women's movement."

Therefore, the women's rights movement not only preserved its mass character in the 1970's, but also expanded and democratized its social base.

One of the great services performed by the women's movement throughout the entire decade was its vigorous participation in the fight for peace and against militarism and the threat of war. In this respect, women's organizations have carried on their own best traditions, dating back to the time of the struggle to stop the aggression against Vietnam. In the 1970's they consistently and persistently demanded cuts in the defense budget and objected to new armament programs--the B-1 bomber, the Trident and MX nuclear missile systems, and the winged missile. Demonstrations against the production of the neutron bomb were particularly massive in scale. In 1978 and 1979, women's organizations energetically joined the campaign in support of the SALT II Treaty. One of the most active women's peace organizations--Women Strike for Peace--appealed to senators to approve the treaty, as it is in the national interest of the United States, and declared that it saw no basis for the hopes of the treaty's opponents to wrest unilateral political concessions from the USSR by obstructing the Senate's examination of the treaty. Many other women's organizations supported the treaty--NOW, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the League of Women Voters, the Association of University Women and others. A coalition organization was formed, "Women for SALT and Arms Control," which takes the stand that the SALT II Treaty is totally in line with the vital interests of the Soviet and American people and the interests of international security.

During these years, the elevation of the American woman's consciousness was noticeable and she became more active politically. Under the influence of the women's struggle for equal rights, changes took place in public thinking. More and more men began to not only sympathize with the women's fight for equality, but also to assist them in this fight. They included politicians, public spokesmen, labor leaders, activists from other public organizations and simple average Americans, who were not only able to see woman's status in society in a new way, but were even influenced by the movement to treat the members of their own families differently (which is sometimes more difficult). By the end of the decade, most of the men in the United States sympathized to some degree with the women's struggle; according to the data of Harris and Gallup polls, two out of every three respondents supported the campaign for the ratification of the 27th amendment. These processes also influenced, in particular, American beliefs about the "ideal woman of the 1970's." Even judging by TV commercials and the covers of popular magazines, she was more likely to be an independent, self-confident working woman, and not just a housewife or "playmate."

Proof of the movement's success can be seen in the changed attitudes of ruling circles, the forces which call the tune in politics. The movement can no longer be ignored. Both G. Ford and J. Carter met with representatives of the female population immediately after their inaugurations to

assure them of support. Women also appeared in the top echelon of the power structure--right up to the level of cabinet members, state governors and mayors of big cities. The National Committee of the Democratic Party passed a resolution on the equivalent representation of men and women at the conventions of this party. This principle was first implemented at the Democratic mid-term convention in 1978 and will be maintained in the 1980 campaign as well. The Republicans also recommended equal representation for men and women at their party conventions, but they did not make this balance mandatory.[10]

The popularity of the women's movement was vividly illustrated by the National Women's Conference in Houston at the end of 1977, which was attended by 14,000 delegates from all states. The conference was organized with the administration's support (and was partially made possible by its financial assistance). Incidentally, the administration tried to use this conference in its own interest by turning it into a grand-scale political advertisement. But the conference took a different direction--that of a responsible discussion of the inferior status of women--and drafted a national program of action, outlining the necessary steps for the modification of the existing state of affairs.

Ruling circles are doing their utmost to shelve this document, in which, in addition to the objective of formal legal equality, a prominent place was given to the need to protect the interests of working and non-white women, the protection of the rights of mothers and infants and other social demands. The administration's total lack of desire to carry out this plan became absolutely clear after President J. Carter dismissed Bella Abzug, one of the leaders of the women's movement, from her duties as chairman of the advisory committee on women's affairs. The reason for his action was Abzug's uncompromising stand on issues connected with the implementation of this plan; besides this, she made several public statements against the administration's intention to pad the defense budget even more by making cuts in social programs.

The administration, just as other representatives of the ruling elite, prefers a policy of minor concessions and political flirtation with this largest group of American voters. For this reason, a two-sided process can be seen. It is obvious that the feminine consciousness has been elevated and the mass mentality has undergone an evolution. But these processes have not been adequately reflected in the political decisions of ruling circles or in legislation. There are still more than 800 laws in effect in the United States (mainly state laws) which suffer, to put it mildly, from a prejudiced view of women and are sometimes absolutely absurd in their denial that women are equal to men.[11]

The fate of the 27th amendment has still not been decided, although the 7 years allowed for its ratification by 38 states (according to the Constitution, these are the requirements for it to become law for all states) were up in March 1979. In the last few years, not one state has

joined the 35 which approved the amendment in the first half of the 1970's. Moreover, women's organizations had to put forth a great deal of effort to convince Congress that the attempts of some states to reverse their previous positive decisions should be branded illegal.

Another area of struggle over the amendment was the broad campaign to extend the deadline for ratification specified by law. For this purpose, in 1978, the year of the mid-term elections, NOW, the NWPC, ERAmerica and the League of Women Voters concentrated on assisting the particular candidates for elected office on all levels who support the 27th amendment. They were successful: Congress postponed the deadline for ratification until the middle of 1982. Support for the 27th amendment has been expressed by a multitude of the most diverse public organizations and the largest labor unions. The results of public opinion polls testify that most Americans support the ERA, including the inhabitants of states which have not ratified it. Several state legislatures voted against the amendment even though an average of two out of every three inhabitants of their states, according to public opinion polls, favor ratification.

Besides this, 14 states have already included articles on sexual equality in their constitutions. Therefore, the 27th amendment is actually already in effect in some parts of the United States and is refuting the lies of rightists, who are frightening American women by telling them that if the amendment is ratified, they will lose their families, their daughters will be drafted into the army, they will have to pay alimony to men if they divorce them, and so forth.

Women's organizations have resolved to concentrate most of their activity in the 1980 campaign in states which have not ratified the 27th amendment and, on the national level, to organize a campaign in support of congressmen and senators who have proved that they support women's equality. NOW has called upon all women to unite their efforts and ensure that the "1980 elections protect and broaden women's rights."[12]

The equal rights movement is experiencing a difficult time in its development as it enters the 1980's. On the one hand, it is more massive in scale, rests on a broad social base and enjoys the support of part of the ruling elite, the majority of the intelligentsia and many representatives of middle strata. Its cooperation with working class and ethnic minority organizations is increasing and becoming stronger. It is attempting (and with some degree of success) to influence decisions on a broader variety of domestic and foreign policy issues. On the other hand, its actual achievements in the sphere of women's equality are extremely modest and tenuous, and in some areas it has even lost ground and must struggle persistently to prevent further regression. The causes of this can be found in processes occurring in the women's movement itself and, most important of all, in the overall balance of power in U.S. politics.

By the mid-1970's, women had gained the right to engage independently in business, financial and credit operations, to sit on juries and even to be

ministers--that is, the issues with which bourgeois women were most concerned were positively settled. Moreover, the civil rights act of 1964 (the seventh articles of which prohibits discrimination of any kind, including sexual) became the means by which women possessing the necessary resources and legal knowledge acquired an opportunity to defend their rights. The demands of the majority of women from the working class, labor intelligentsia and racial minorities, however, essentially remained unsatisfied. It turned out that the successful women in the movement's ranks were often less interested in the resolution of acute social problems than in encouraging new social groups to join the women's movement and--as a result of this--the general democratic struggle. It was precisely this that caused the abandonment of the movement by some members and the polarization of forces within it.

The decline in democratic struggle and the increased activity of reactionary forces in these years contributed to a shift to the right in the attitudes of ruling strata. This resulted in the consolidation of antifeminist forces, which, backed up (and financed) by the right-wing organizational structure and by the generous "contributions" of the Catholic Church, began to form their own organizations. This is how STOP-ERA, the American Life Lobby, the National Right to Life Crusade and other similar groups came into being. They most often attacked state laws giving women the right to terminate pregnancies at their own discretion (the Catholic Church and closely related political forces categorically deny that women have a right to seek abortions). The abortion right in several states was won by the women's movement after a lengthy and extremely persistent struggle and is regarded as one of the movement's most significant victories. It was not until these laws were passed in the 1970's that women in the United States, the most "progressive" nation in the West, could (and even then, not in every state!) make a conscious choice regarding motherhood, and family planning actually became possible. The antifeminist organizations opposing the movement are giving no thought to the price women will have to pay, with their health or even their lives, if the sanctimonious constitutional amendment, proposed by rightist forces, guaranteeing unborn infants the "right to life," is imposed on the nation. According to the correct opinion of PROGRESSIVE magazine, the policy of reactionary forces in this matter "objectively signifies the imposition of religious morality and an attempt to undermine the separation of church and state."[13]

The actual goal of these forces is even broader--to stop the growth of the democratic women's movement and, wherever possible, to liquidate its gains. Naturally, they oppose the 27th amendment, and this is not all they oppose. According to Phyllis Schlafly, the leader of the antifeminists, the 27th amendment is "absolutely unnecessary" for the achievement of equal rights, and such important amendments as the 14th, 15th and 19th[14] were also "unnecessary to America."[15]

The organ of the steelworkers' union, STEELABOR newspaper, cautioned its readers that "the groups which are opposing the Equal Rights Amendment and

are misinforming [for this purpose] the public...are the same rightist groups which speak out against the reform of labor laws, against the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill. [against the guaranteed] minimum wage and other important questions whose resolution will benefit all workers."[16]

In addition, the same groups support increased military spending, the policy of interventionism in international affairs, and programs for the development of new weapons of mass destruction and are trying to subvert the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Therefore, questions connected with equal rights for women are now more often the central issue in confrontations between political forces.

We must agree with Shirley Chisholm, the first black woman ever to be elected to the U.S. Congress, that "antifeminism, just as any other form of discrimination, is destructive for women and for those who practice it.... No one in America has escaped the wounds inflicted by racism and antifeminism."[17]

It is the duty of the women's movement to not only ensure that the majority of American citizens fully exercise the rights proclaimed in the laws of this nation, but also to help America heal these wounds.

American women have taken only the first steps on the long and precarious road leading to this goal. In the present decade of the 1980's, they will have to fight new and--there is every reason to hope--successful battles in this field.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the American literature of those years, the women's movement was called "women's liberation" or "women's lib" for short. Later, the term "women's rights" became more popular.

2. In this appeal, there is a play on words--the English word "now" is the same as the acronym for the National Organization for Women--NOW.

3. For more detail on the status of women in American society and the prerequisites for the formation of a women's movement, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1978, pp 57-63, and No 3, 1979, pp 32-41--Editor's note.

4. The name of this organization--ERAmerica--is a combination of the word "America" and the acronym of the 27th amendment--ERA (Equal Rights Amendment).

5. SEVEN DAYS, August 1978, p 7.

6. WOMEN, A JOURNAL OF LIBERATION, vol 2, No 4, p 10.

7. THE BLACK SCHOLAR, December 1971, p 54.

8. Ibid.

9. GUARDIAN, 18 October 1978.

10. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 4 August 1979, p 1615.

11. "Statement on the ERA. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights," December 1978, p 2.

12. NATIONAL NOW TIMES, September/October 1979.

13. PROGRESSIVE, March 1979, p 29.

14. The 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution gave blacks the right of citizenship and the right to vote, and the 19th gave women the right to vote.

15. NATIONAL NOW TIMES, September/October 1979.

16. STEELABOR, January 1979, p 9.

17. THE BLACK SCHOLAR, December 1971, p 19.

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A CONTRADICTORY DECADE (TRENDS IN AMERICAN LITERATURE AND ART)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 50-60

[Article by A. S. Mulyarchik]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE TORIES AND WASHINGTON: REVIVAL OF THE 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 61-66

[Article by V. F. Davydov]

[Text] Margaret Thatcher's first official visit to the United States last December proved, as foreign political correspondents noted, that the tradition of coordinated political actions and informal consultations between Washington and London, which was characteristic of the "special relationship" of the past, is being revived. The agenda of the talks conducted during this visit took in a great variety of military-political and economic issues facing the United States and England at the beginning of the 1980's. The U.S. President and English prime minister discussed the American-Iranian crisis, the situation in Rhodesia, the Middle East and Northern Ireland, East-West relations, relations with developing countries, international economic, energy and trade problems and currency and financial questions. Talks about the "modernization" of NATO nuclear weapons and continued bilateral cooperation in questions of military strategy between Washington and the Tory Government occupied a prominent place.

Washington's reaction to the news of the Conservative victory in the May 1979 elections was guarded. In contrast to the Labor Party, Conservatives believe that relations with Western Europe would deserve more attention than relations with the United States after England's entry into the Common Market. The events of the "Year of Europe" (1973) were still fresh in the memory of American ruling circles. At this time, when the Conservatives were in power, they tried to undermine the United States' dominant position in the "Atlantic world" for the sake of attaining their own objectives in the EEC. Some people in Washington then felt that the "Americans and the British were on different sides of the barricade" and that the "special relationship" between the two states was coming to an end. In the Western European capitals, on the other hand, the victory of the English Conservatives in the last parliamentary elections aroused unconcealed delight. For example, France's LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE reported that the Thatcher Government had a more positive outlook than the Labor Party in regard to Western European integration and "intends to preserve a certain distance" in relations with the United States.

To the unconcealed relief of the Americans and the disillusionment of England's EEC partners, these expectations were unjustified. The Tories began conducting their European policy by demanding the revision of the terms of England's membership in the Common Market and, in particular, a reduction of 1 billion pounds sterling in its contribution to the EEC agricultural fund. It is true that they did not threaten to withdraw from the EEC as the Labor Government had, but they did make it clear that they intended to take energetic actions within the community and subvert any community initiatives if London's interests should not be properly satisfied. At bilateral meetings between M. Thatcher and the heads of the FRG and French governments and at the Dublin talks of the leaders of the "big nin[illegible] a November 1979, dramatic differences of opinion between London and ot[illegible]r EEC members were expressed on matters of agrarian policy, currency an[illegible]nances, energy, trade, regional development and fishing.

The deterioration of London's relations with its EEC partners, primarily France and the FRG, was accompanied by the improvement of relations with the United States. At the June 1979 Tokyo conference of the heads of government of the industrially developed capitalist countries, London sided more with Washington than with Western Europe. For example, England supported the American plan, in accordance with which most of the burden of overcoming the economic crisis would be taken on by the "two locomotives" of the FRG and Japanese economies; London persisted in using the American dollar as the point of reference in currency and financial questions. In the approach to energy problems, England, which has become an exporter of oil, was even further removed from its partners. In questions of nuclear power engineering, cooperation developed with the United States, and not with Western Europe.

The intensive interpenetration of U.S. and English capital, which serves as the basis for joint economic ventures, continued throughout the 1970's. Whereas American capital investments in England totaled 7.2 billion dollars in 1969, the figure was 20.3 billion in 1978. In turn, English capital investments in the United States were equal to 7.3 billion dollars in 1978, surpassed in volume only by Dutch capital investments.

Great Britain's latest move in the direction of the United States in the economic sphere is due to the collapse of English ruling circles' hopes of correcting the situation with the aid of membership in the EEC. When England became a member of the Common Market, it encountered fierce competition on the part of other, more dynamic Western European monopolies and political competition on the part of France and the FRG, which had absolutely no intention of helping England for charitable purposes. Close to a decade of membership in the EEC did not save Great Britain from low labor productivity, commodities with little competitive potential and chronic recession in industry. "The English economy is gravely ill"--this is the underlying theme of all diagnosis pronounced by leading Western experts. All of the industrially developed countries except Italy are ahead of England in terms of economic growth rates. In terms of per

capita income, it is now in 20th place in the capitalist world, surpassed even by its own former possessions--Canada and Australia. At the same time, the rate of inflation here is one of the highest in the West--17 percent in 1979. There are 1.4 million unemployed, and FORTUNE magazine predicts that the number will rise to 2 million by 1981. Revenues from the sale of North Sea petroleum have not eradicated the chronic deficit in the balance of payments, which was close to 3 billion pounds sterling in 1979. The British press had to acknowledge the pitiful results of England's membership in the EEC and the dismal prospects of the British economy. According to the authoritative ECONOMIST journal, "England is the third poorest EEC member, after Italy and Ireland." The attitude of the GUARDIAN is even more pessimistic: "Not one nation in the world has changed from a developed country into an underdeveloped one. It is possible that Great Britain will be the first to take this road."

The situation is completely different in the military sphere: London is still the second strongest (after the United States) NATO member. England has nuclear weapons, and its navy, according to English experts, is in third place in the world. British military contingents are still stationed in the FRG. Despite the severe economic crisis, military expenditures are still rising in England. In 1979 they reached 10 billion pounds sterling (in 1977 they totaled 6.5 billion). Measured as a percentage of the gross national product, these expenditures are the highest in Western Europe--4.7 percent (in the FRG, for example, the figure is 3.3 percent). London was one of the first to implement the May 1978 NATO Council session's decision to increase military spending by 3 percent each year.

However, the process of international detente on the European continent and the improvement of the political climate, particularly after the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975 and the stipulation in its Final Act of the principles governing new relations between states of this continent, have caused the factor of military strength to lose more and more value and have advanced the factors of cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical and cultural spheres to the fore. It is indicative that England is far behind its EEC rivals--France and the FRG--in terms of level and volume of economic relations with the socialist countries. Under these conditions, it has been extremely difficult for English ruling circles to realize their ambitions in the international arena. England's Western European partners have had absolutely no desire to take the so-called contribution to "security" into account in the resolution of economic problems.

The idea of a "political gambit" arose in circles which had come to power and were feeling nostalgic about Great Britain's lost global influence: The idea of playing up to militaristic circles in the United States and Western Europe so that the Western allies would realize that England still took the lead in questions of so-called security and would respond to its economic problems with the "proper understanding."

The policy line mapped out by the Tories envisaged more active NATO military preparations and the coordination of U.S. and English military policy in questions of anticommunist strategy--in other words, the revival of "special military-political relations" with the United States to the detriment of the process of international detente.

In one of her first public addresses, Prime Minister M. Thatcher announced that England intended to continue augmenting its contribution to "Western security," and London immediately increased its military expenditures by 400 million pounds sterling. The "axe of economization" struck at social expenditures and did not touch military appropriations. In a TIME magazine interview in May 1979, M. Thatcher declared that the Conservatives deeply regretted the postponement of the production and deployment of the neutron bomb in Europe. England played a leading role in the political persuasion of NATO allies to consent to the deployment of American "Euro-strategic" weapons on their territory. At a "Eurogroup" meeting and NATO Council session in December 1979 London acted in concert with Washington.

The Soviet proposal that the reduction of medium-range nuclear forces in Europe be negotiated as soon as possible was opposed adamantly by London on the hypocritical pretext that disarmament should be preceded by the "upgrading" of weapons. Even before the December NATO Council session, London consented to the deployment of 160 missiles on the British Isles.

This zeal earned enthusiastic commendation in Washington at a time of continuous wavering in the NATO camp. At a White House reception honoring M. Thatcher, President J. Carter addressed her, stressing that "the recent decision made in the European community by members of the Atlantic Alliance in regard to tactical nuclear forces bore the positive marks of your firm leadership." An Anglo-American statement calls upon the "European allies to participate in every measure to strengthen collective defense" along with the United States and England.

Joint aggressive preparations are being carried out to the accompaniment of incessant anti-Soviet and anticommunist appeals by the Tories, who are tirelessly trying to "enlighten" their Western allies, seemingly worried that the latter will have second thoughts and say "no" to the escalation of tension in East-West relations. In her speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, the English prime minister advised American ruling circles to renounce all "doubts" and move from "self-analysis to action" to ward off the "communist threat."

In January 1980, when Washington launched a rabid anti-Soviet campaign, using the Soviet Union's military assistance of Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government as an excuse, England was the first and only NATO country to immediately respond to Carter's appeals for the curtailment of contacts with the USSR.

It should be noted that English diplomacy has always been distinguished by an ability to use the anticommunism of U.S. ruling circles in its own interests. Churchill's speech in Fulton in 1946, which announced the

"official" beginning of the West's cold war against the USSR, provides ample proof of this. The situation was the same in 1957, when the Soviet Union launched a satellite and London immediately joined in the hysteria over the West's "nuclear missile lag," achieving exactly what it had hoped for: In 1958 President D. Eisenhower sanctioned cooperation with England in the nuclear sphere for "security" purposes, and it was on this basis that Great Britain's nuclear forces were established with American assistance.

London resorted to the same tactics in 1979. During the course of their talks, M. Thatcher and J. Carter touched upon a question which could not escape the attention of foreign political correspondents, in spite of mutual attempts to avoid publicity--this was the question of the future of English nuclear forces.

It is no secret that the nucleus of England's strategic forces consists of four submarines armed with Polaris missiles. These were purchased from the United States back in 1962 at a low price, due to the "special relationship," after H. Macmillan's meeting with J. Kennedy in Nassau. In exchange, London opened its naval bases in England (in Holy Loch) to American submarines carrying Polaris missiles. According to Western experts, the nuclear systems purchased from the United States will be obsolete by 1990. English ruling circles now face the prospect of replacing them with more modern systems. The calculations of prominent English experts, particularly J. Smart, former director of the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, indicate that the independent modernization of these forces would cost England 5 billion pounds sterling and, considering its present economic difficulties, would be an extremely painful task. The line of nuclear cooperation with France, England's EEC partner, does not appear very promising as expenses would be borne equally. The most preferable alternative, in the view of English experts, would be the purchase of the American Trident missile system, which would cost "only" 1 billion pounds. At the same time, as Admiral Hill Norton cautioned in the 15 September 1979 issue of the ECONOMIST, "the prime minister should not expect fate to offer a second tasty morsel," as was the case in 1962 with the Polarises. According to H. Norton, Washington is not likely to respond graciously to Great Britain's request for assistance in the modernization of its nuclear forces.

When the Conservatives took office, they refuted all of the "Hamletlike" doubts of the Labor Party: England's new nuclear forces--to be or not to be? For the Conservatives, judging by official statements, nuclear weapons still represent the main trump card in their attempts to enhance Great Britain's international prestige and accomplish the planned "political gambit." But the acquisition of the Trident system will presuppose close military-political cooperation with Washington, and London has therefore decided to accomplish the planned transaction as soon as possible. The political price will include extensive cooperation with Washington in its global anticommunist strategy--in Europe, in Africa, in the Indian Ocean region and in the Far East. London has also made a sizable advance

payment by making its territory available for American missiles. At present, according to reports in the Western press, the Pentagon is seeking opportunities to expand the network of American bases in England, particularly air fields for the F-111 planes, which will carry winged missiles.

It is difficult to say at this time whether England's advance payment for the planned transaction is sufficient. There are signs, however, that Washington is prepared to meet London halfway. On 29 November 1979, President J. Carter recommended that the Congress approve a bill amending the 1958 U.S.-English agreement on cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for the purpose of mutual defense, which envisages the renewal of this agreement for another 5 years and the possibility of nuclear transactions. The sparse phrases of the joint Anglo-American communique regarding the preservation of English nuclear potential ("the two governments agreed to continue discussing the most appropriate ways of attaining these goals in the future") conceal the fierce bargaining being conducted by these allies, with their "special relationship" dictating the price.

No matter how the Tories try to pass their nuclear ambitions off as worries about Western "security," there is no doubt that these ambitions will be directed over the long range against their partner-rivals in the capitalist world under the conditions of the continued decline of English influence in the EEC and in the entire world and under the conditions of the fierce inter-imperialist struggle over economic issues. London hopes to exchange its "military assets" for economic and political concessions from France, the FRG and even the United States. It is no coincidence that English officials attending the summit meeting of EEC members in Dublin pleaded with the EEC to comply with England's demands to take England's great contribution to "European security" into account and reduce its contribution to the agrarian fund accordingly. But the Western European leaders remainded deaf to London's appeals.

Doubts about the success of the Tories' "political gambit," connected with the revival of the "special relationship" with the United States and the subversion of detente, are creeping in to some segments of English ruling circles, disturbed by the continuous decline in London's prestige.

Just before M. Thatcher's visit to Washington, the English OBSERVER warned the Conservatives against exaggerated obsessions with the buildup of nuclear weapons, which could have a pernicious effect on England's economy and its role in the world. "If the prime minister is seriously concerned about the international situation, she should revive Great Britain's role in East-West relations. A trip to Eastern Europe in the coming year would be the best way of doing this."

An official statement published at the conclusion of the visit contained no shortage of mutual assurances regarding the "exceptionally close relationship" between the United States and Great Britain and the need for

extensive mutual political support. Washington demonstrated its approval of England's policy line in the Rhodesian question by lifting the embargo on trade with Rhodesia. In turn, London asserted that England would be the "first to support the United States in a conflict with Iran." The English GUARDIAN had the following comments to make in regard to the outcome of the talks: "The visit was exceptionally successful.... The United States and Great Britain again have a 'special relationship.'"

But the abundance of mutual courtesies and compliments at the talks in Washington could not conceal the dramatic struggle of the two Atlantic allies over questions of bilateral relations and each side's cynical hopes of winning advantages for itself.

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NEW WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 66-70

[Article by Ye. P. Ionova]

[Text] The latest reorganization of the civil service took place in Washington last autumn. This time it affected the largest federal agency in the sphere of domestic policy--the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).

Most of the social programs approved by Congress in recent decades have been under the jurisdiction of this department, created in 1953 by President Eisenhower. The expansion and increasing complexity of the process of social regulation, unavoidable under the conditions of escalating conflicts in the American society, gave rise to several problems impeding the effective functioning of government in this area. For example, the development of the social functions of the executive branch was accompanied by the increased bureaucratization of social program management: The department bureaucracy swelled to the bursting point on the central and local levels (it consisted of 156,000 people in 1978), there was parallelism in the work of individual subdivisions, inefficient expenditures of government funds grew, administrative procedures became increasingly complex and, finally, the necessary planning and coordination were nonexistent. Independently operating agencies with extremely diverse functions were united within the department framework: the Office of Education, Public Health Service, Social Security Administration, Office of Human Development and the Health Care Financing Administration. They, in turn, had a multitude of other independent services and bureaus under their jurisdiction. The unwieldy structure, interdepartmental confusion and unmanageability of this department made reorganization a priority question long ago. Various reorganization plans were discussed in government circles and Congress.

During the 1976 campaign, J. Carter was already proposing the creation of an independent department of education on the basis of this agency's educational programs. After prolonged debates in Congress, this proposal

took on the form of a law, signed by the President on 17 October 1979. According to this law, the former combined department became the Department of Health and Human Services and a separate Department of Education was created.

In order to assess the causes and nature of the fierce political struggle that broke out over the creation of the new department in Washington, it will be necessary to touch at least briefly upon the difficulties and problems now being experienced in the sphere of American education.

Capitalism's inability to train and utilize manpower in a planned manner lies at the basis of these difficulties and problems. In the United States, as the current President has admitted, there is a "constant decline in the quality of education" and in "academic standards." The government is incapable of providing for the financial needs of secondary schools, and higher education, for which the overwhelming majority of students must pay, is largely under private control. This nation essentially lacks an integral system of national enlightenment and higher education, academic institutions depend on local interests, and local authorities not only manage government academic institutions but also bear most of the burden of their financing. The absence of a single set of academic standards, curricula and general criteria in this sphere is affecting the quality of graduating specialists at all levels. Many young people are dropping out of secondary school. But even many of those who graduate from high school do not have the necessary skills to find jobs in the labor market.

In 1977 the federal government's share of total government expenditures on elementary and secondary education did not exceed 8 percent. It is true that federal assistance to the schools increased 60 percent in the last 2 years, but it is still not having a decisive effect on the problem of educational funding. Moreover, the local tax system, which is used to finance education, is incapable of meeting its needs.

The advocates of a special agency in charge of educational matters proposed increased federal assistance to the schools and local tax reform aimed at stimulating educational spending and, consequently, at improving the quality of academic training and making education more accessible to children of low-income families. They pointed out the fact that there was no integral policy in this sphere, that the existing educational programs of various departments and agencies were unrelated, that the activities of these departments and agencies were uncoordinated and that the training of specialists on various levels was being accomplished in a manner which separated higher education from secondary, including secondary specialized, education. For example, 20 different agencies were financing various elementary and secondary education programs and 40 agencies were subsidizing higher education. The creation of a special agency was supposed to centralize the management of the academic system.

They also asserted that the establishment of this department would aid in putting an end to the constant cuts in government expenditures on education--cuts made by Congress within the context of its regular revision of social programs in the budget.[1] This would necessitate, they said, the separation of these expenditures from general appropriations for social needs and the augmentation of the political role and significance of the special agency in charge of education by putting it under the direct jurisdiction of the President, which would strengthen the authority of this agency as well as the functions of the presidency with respect to national policy in the sphere of education.

It is indicative that the idea of creating a department of education has been around for many years, and a stubborn battle over this issue was going on in Congress for all these years. In the last 70 years, more than 110 legislative proposals pertaining to this matter have been discussed on Capitol Hill. It was not until 1977, however, that the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs began to seriously consider this matter. As mentioned above, the bill was actively supported by the President. In the Senate it was defended by C. Percy, and its advocates in the House of Representatives were F. Horton and J. Brooks, the chairman of this chamber's Committee on Government Operations.

Two distinct camps took shape in the struggle over the bill, and this battle in Congress was paralleled by a conflict between various "interest groups" exerting pressure on legislators. These disagreements primarily reflected the opposing goals of "pressure groups" representing the interests of public education on one side and higher education on the other.

The bill was supported by the National Education Association. According to the head of the association, John Rayor, this measure would not only aid in standardizing curricula and improving their quality, but would also promote racial desegregation in the schools.

The coalition favoring the creation of a department of education also included the National Association of Student Councils, the American Association of School Administrators, the Council of Chief State School Officers and the National Association of State Boards of Education. Their views were also shared by all of the organizations making up the Coalition of American Public Employees, of which the National Education Association is a member. These organizations founded the Joint Committee of Citizens for the Creation of a Department of Education, which began energetic lobbying activities in Congress.

The creation of the department was most vigorously opposed by the leadership of the American Federation of Teachers--trade unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO and uniting 250,000 educators. Its president, A. Shanker, a

1. Whereas expenditures on education in 1966 amounted to 11.5 percent of all HEW expenditures, in 1970 the figure had dropped to 8 percent, and in 1976 it was 5.5 percent.

rabid anticommunist and advocate of racism, headed the education commission formed at the last AFL-CIO congress. Under his supervision, the commission drafted a resolution which pointedly criticized the plan for the creation of this department.

The main argument of the heads of the American Federation of Teachers, just as of other opponents of the plan to create a department, was that the augmentation of the federal government's role would be contrary to the principles of the traditional structure of the academic system in the United States and would violate the chief principle--the sovereignty of local governments in the management of academic institutions. As Rayor pointed out, however, the actual reason for the stand taken by A. Shanker and his followers was that they saw the augmentation of the federal government's role in educational policy-making as a threat to the racial segregation they support.

In April 1979 a special committee of opponents of the creation of a separate department of education was formed at A. Shanker's suggestion. Its members included Senators D. Moynihan and S. Hayakawa and representatives of several universities, including the presidents of Smith College and Stanford University.

The "interest groups" representing the interests of higher education and the scientific community (the leading organization among these groups was the American Council on Education, uniting representatives of various colleges and universities) also put up serious opposition to the plan to create a department of education and, mainly, to the transfer of university assistance programs to the new agency. Their argument for their position was the fear that elementary and secondary school interests would be dominant in the department of education (the majority of federal programs pertain to these academic levels) and that higher education would not be given proper consideration. Among the most vigorous opponents of the department's creation was the National Science Foundation (NSF)--an organization endowed with autonomous status in the federal establishment and having an extremely important effect on scientific development in the nation. The NSF receives subsidies for the organization of scientific research from several federal agencies, including the Department of Defense and the Department of Labor. It received less financial assistance from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In view of the fact that most of the research in the nation is concentrated in higher academic institutions and, according to the bill, the functions of managing higher education would be transferred to the new department, representatives of the NSF declared, the creation of a department of education would "not be in the interest of science."

It should also be borne in mind that although higher academic institutions and research establishments are interested in federal financial aid, their representatives are protecting their relatively autonomous position by opposing any increase in government intervention in the affairs of higher

education and science. The administrative organ of the NSF--the National Science Council, made up of prominent American scientists and closely connected with the college and university academic community--is oriented primarily toward the private sector, toward the private universities and colleges where most of its funds go. The transfer of NSF programs to a new federal agency was interpreted by the "interest groups" representing the academic community and higher education as the infringement of the independence of academic circles and the interests of corporations connected with them, particularly university connections with the military-industrial complex.

The campaign against the creation of a department of education was also joined by bureaucrats from the departments of Defense, Labor and Agriculture and other agencies whose functions would be restricted if education-related programs were to be taken away from them.

Although the battle between the supporters and opponents of the new department ended in a victory for the former, it cannot be said that the latter suffered a defeat: They were able to remove much of the essence of the bill and achieved a compromise proposal, and it was this compromise that was approved at a session of both houses of Congress last September.

The joint session had to be called because the bills previously approved by the Senate and House of Representatives differed substantially. In the House of Representatives, where the position of the bill's opponents was stronger, they were able to push through several amendments which considerably changed the content of the bill (for example, amendments prohibiting the department of education from demanding desegregation-related busing as a condition of federal assistance). Eventually, however, these amendments were deleted from the final draft of the bill as a result of the persistent struggle of the department's supporters at the joint congressional session.

This is how the new, 13th federal department came into being. It will have an annual budget of 14 billion dollars and 17,000 employees. The new department will be in charge of 152 programs. These pertain mainly to financial assistance to elementary and secondary schools, vocational training programs, student aid and so forth.

Many important educational programs were left under the control of other federal departments and agencies. Even the Department of Health and Human Services retained control over two programs in this sphere--programs for assistance in the education of preschoolers from low-income families and educational placement services for American Indians. But the main result of the struggle of the "interest groups" connected with higher education was that the National Science Foundation did not lose a single one of its programs. This reinforced the existing autonomy of higher education, its actual independence of the government, its fragmented structure, the NSF's close connections with private business and the military-industrial complex and so forth.

Influential veterans' organizations, primarily the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, were also able to keep important programs within the jurisdiction of the federal agency with which they are closely connected (the Veterans Administration). As we know, U.S. ruling circles are trying to encourage young people to join the army by making military service more appealing, particularly by offering veterans several significant educational privileges: The government pays their tuition in higher academic institutions, offers them free vocational training, finances the rehabilitation of disabled veterans and their dependents and so forth. The military establishment would not "entrust" control over these functions to a purely civilian agency and has essentially retained this control.

President Carter appointed Shirley Hufstedler, member of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the State of California, the new secretary of education. This is her first administrative post. It is indicative that she has never had any connections with public education, but has been a member of the board of trustees of several higher academic institutions. The American press has interpreted this appointment of a prominent representative of the judicial community with little political experience to the office of secretary of education as a continuation of the President's policy of creating a "loyal cabinet" without any strong political figures. Besides this, Carter's choice reflects his desire to win the support of the women's movement, in which S. Hufstedler is quite active, on the threshold of the 1980 elections.

The creation of the Department of Education reflected the tendency toward the centralization of regulatory functions in the social sphere. But this turned out to be only a half-way measure because it did nothing to correct the fragmented state of the American educational system. The new department is supposed to exercise only the most general control over this sphere, in which the leading role will still be played by local government and, above all, district school boards. As J. Carter said at the ceremonial signing of the law creating the new department, most of the responsibility for the educational system will still be borne "by state and local government and private organizations."

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EXPORT CONTROLS IN TRADE WITH THE EAST

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 70-76

[Article by T. V. Kobushko]

[Text] In October 1979 the U.S. Congress extended the 1969 export regulation act for another 4 years. At the same time, numerous amendments were introduced which slightly changed some aspects of export control. These amendments could have a considerable effect on future U.S. trade with the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, as it is precisely against these nations that this instrument of trade discrimination is directed. In connection with Congress' decision, it would be interesting to examine the nature and workings of export control, its sources and the metamorphosis it has undergone since the time the first law was passed (1949), as well as its effect on trade in the past and present.

From the first years of the cold war, the United States used export control, along with tariff and credit discrimination, to minimize its trade with the socialist countries. In an attempt to impede their postwar recovery and their further economic development, the American authorities banned shipments of practically any kind (and not only weapons, military equipment and so forth) to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The "strategic" lists even included frames for graves, zippers, used clothing and so forth. Washington tried to impose the same policy on its allies. For this purpose, a coordinating committee (COCOM) was created under the United States' aegis and was joined by all of the NATO countries (with the exception of Iceland) and Japan.

Control over U.S. exports to the socialist countries was first instituted in 1948 and has remained essentially unchanged since that time. In accordance with the export regulation act of 1969 (amended), which was in effect at that time (just as the export control act of 1949), a license was needed to export any commodity out of the nation. This license could be general or individual. Commodities exported in line with a general license previously acquired by the merchant did not require any special authorization. An individual license, on the other hand, had to be

renewed in each specific transaction (for the majority of commodities, it was issued by the export control office of the bureau of East-West trade in the Department of Commerce). The type of license required for each commodity was stipulated in this department's official handbook ("Export Control Regulations"), which was reissued each year.

The procedures involved in acquiring licenses were different for different groups of countries, and according to the U.S. Department of Commerce there were seven such groups. The greatest variety of commodities authorized for export with a general license, for example, could go to the two groups taking in all of the capitalist nations,[1] the majority of developing countries and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union, the PRC and the majority of European socialist countries made up another group. Yet another consisted of Cuba, the DPRK, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Kampuchea--and there is still almost a total embargo in effect here.

The goals and principles of export control have mostly stayed in step with changes in the global strategy of U.S. imperialism, which has also determined American trade policy toward the socialist countries.

The export control act of 1949 envisaged restrictions on the export of military or strategic items to these countries. In 1962, in connection with the USSR's serious successes in economic, scientific and technical development, the act was amended to extend the control to the specific items which could, according to American legislators, aid in strengthening the economic potential of the socialist countries. This step contributed to the development of an approach toward export control in which the dominant consideration was the notorious "national security" in its broadest interpretation, and export restrictions were as rigid as possible.

By the end of the 1960's, when the global political and economic situation had changed radically, the United States had to reassess its policy line. The rapidly increasing economic strength of the countries of the socialist community and their greater influence in international affairs demonstrated the inability of American and world imperialism to impede our development or cause us to regress. Another factor which contributed to the reassessment of Washington's foreign trade policy was the increasingly uneven economic and political development of the capitalist countries. As a result, the United States' position as the indisputable leader of the capitalist world was seriously undermined. Whereas in the 1950's the United States could, by virtue of its unconditional economic supremacy, issue direct orders to the Western European countries and use COCOM as a means of urging them to limit shipments to the socialist countries, in the 1960's the United States' partner-rivals began to develop energetic trade with the East--that is, with the socialist states.

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1. With the exception of Canada, as exports to this nation are virtually unrestricted.

As a result, American companies lost their chance to acquire profitable orders from the socialist countries or found themselves unable to participate in filling the majority of the orders placed by these countries with the United States' rivals.

The data on U.S. trade with the largest socialist country--the USSR--are indicative. The restrictive trade policy throughout the 1960's diminished the U.S. share in Soviet trade turnover with the developed capitalist countries from 4 percent in 1960 to 3.4 percent in 1970. The more favorable political atmosphere of the 1970's increased the U.S. share of this trade somewhat. For a number of reasons, however, the largest capitalist power did not take first place here, as it was surpassed by other capitalist nations in terms of commodity turnover scales. In 1978, for example, Soviet commodity turnover with the United States amounted to 1,852,000,000 rubles, but the same indicator was 3,304,000,000 in the case of the FRG, 2,320,000,000 in the case of Japan and 1,971,000,000 in the case of Italy.

The failure of the policy of maximum restrictions on exports was officially acknowledged in certain phrases included in the export regulation act of 1969, which declared that "it is the policy of the United States to encourage trade with all countries." In subsequent years the tendency toward weaker control did indeed begin to prevail. For example, the list of restricted and prohibited exports to the USSR and the majority of other socialist countries, which in 1970 consisted of around 1,300 entries (and each entry could take in several types of commodities), decreased to approximately 200 entries by the end of 1979.

But the level of restrictions on exports from the United States was still higher than in other NATO countries and Japan, even though this gap was considerably reduced in recent years.

At present, the list of commodities controlled by the U.S. Department of Commerce contains 38 more entries[2] than the COCOM lists. Besides this, the more rigid control in the United States not only means that restrictions apply to a broader variety of commodities, but also that there is stronger enforcement of these restrictions. For example, 867 requests for licenses for the export of goods for a total sum of 240 million dollars were submitted to COCOM. Of these requests, 31 for a sum of 19 million were denied, and 30 of the denials were insisted upon by the United States. Delays in the consideration of requests and other factors led to a situation in which another 44 requests were withdrawn by the firms themselves.

The following elements of the export control mechanism present additional difficulties for American exporters who wish to ship restricted goods to the socialist countries.

2. With the exception of petroleum, the export of which is being regulated in connection with its shortage in the nation.

Firstly, there is the need for a number of organizations to agree that an individual license should be issued--the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense and the State Department. Amendments introduced into the 1969 export regulation act in recent years have been aimed at augmenting the Defense Department's role in making decisions on the issuance of licenses for the shipment of "commodities and technology to the socialist countries which could considerably enhance their military potential." Besides this, by a special decision of President J. Carter, the National Security Council has also been involved in the consideration of license requests since 1978. Any of these organizations can prevent a projected transaction without even stating its reasons.

Secondly, there are prolonged delays in the issuance of individual licenses, which are used to undermine projected deals. The maximum time limit for the consideration of requests by the Department of Commerce (90 days), which was instituted by Congress in 1977, has remained a meaningless formality, circumvented by the abovementioned export control office with the aid of letters informing the companies concerned that the issuance of licenses "will be delayed until after the deadline due to investigations in one or several agencies." Out of all the requests for licenses being considered in this office at the beginning of 1978, 298 took more than 90 days to be investigated, and the figure had already risen to 602 by the beginning of 1979. A representative of the Electronic Industries Association testified that more than a third of all licenses are issued after prolonged delays.

Thirdly, there are the vague criteria for the issuance of individual licenses and the establishment of new criteria related to foreign policy considerations. For example, the Carter Administration's reestablishment of control over exports of equipment for petroleum and gas prospecting and production in 1978 was purely political in nature. This is evident just from the fact that the general U.S. line of encouraging the production of all types of energy sources throughout the world was repeatedly proclaimed at the same time.

One of the results of export control has been that American companies have lagged far behind Western European and Japanese firms in the area of shipments of the most modern industrial commodities to the socialist countries. For example, the United States accounts for 30 percent of total world capitalist exports of machines, equipment, instruments and devices, but only 12.7 percent of all exports of these products to the socialist countries. These items constitute 17.2 percent of total American exports, but only 9.3 percent of U.S. exports to the socialist countries. Besides this, as the president of the American Export and Insurance Promotion League has pointed out, "on many of the middle and highest levels of technology--machine tools, turbines, reactors, jet aircraft, ships--foreign competitors from [Western] Europe, Japan and even some of the developing countries are exporting goods that approach or even surpass the best American models."

Congressional hearings in recent years have proved that even the American legislators realize that restrictions on trade with the USSR primarily harm U.S. economic interests. In particular, they have noted that "the systems set up in the past focused on the restriction of exports, and no subsequent events have been able to change this approach." Moreover, it was stressed in congressional hearings that the main obstacles faced by American exporters are the "complexity of these regulations and the unpredictability of their application."

Particularly serious objections to the existing export control system were voiced by representatives of the business community and the administrators and personnel of various departments and agencies in congressional hearings in May-October 1979 on the question of extending the export regulation act of 1969 to 30 October 1983. Criticism of this type of control as a major obstacle to the development of exports was also voiced by representatives of the National Association of Manufacturers, as well as associations of businessmen in various branches of the processing industry. Speakers pointed out the negative effects of export restrictions on the American economy, the U.S. balance of trade, employment, and investments in scientific and technical research.

For example, the president of the National Association of Machinists said that in the case of machine tools, the U.S. "share in world exports decreased over 14 years...by almost two-thirds. In 1978 the socialist countries accounted for 50 percent [cost volume] of all machine tools used outside the United States, but our industry sent only 1 percent of the total product to this vast market." It was stressed that difficulties in the acquisition of licenses and the entire mechanism of COCOM restrictions were "hurting American industry."

The main arguments cited in American business circles to substantiate the need to liberalize export control can be summed up as the following.

Firstly, attempts to impede the economic growth of nations in the socialist community with the aid of restrictions on exports of "strategic" goods are useless. The futility of these efforts is also due to the fact that they have virtually met with no support from the United States' allies, and the socialist countries can usually find other means of acquiring the majority of commodities or can produce them themselves.

Secondly, this kind of export control has a negative effect on the U.S. economy; the difficulties and uncertainty involved in the acquisition of export licenses are undermining the competitive potential of American companies. The socialist countries prefer to deal with other, more reliable suppliers. For many types of modern equipment, particularly computers and complete enterprises, a single initial contract stipulates the choice of a supplier for the entire subsequent period. According to representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "in a number of technically advanced branches, clients do not even look into the possibility of

acquiring American products or into the quality of these products due to the difficulties created by the existing export licensing procedure."

The truth of these arguments has even been acknowledged by representatives of the administration and Congress. For example, Congressman Bingham has said that "our (American--D. K.) policy...obviously has not led to any kind of significant delay in Soviet economic growth.... Our allies have refused to support us...and have simply sold the Soviets whatever we refused to sell them."

Besides this, as many American businessmen have pointed out, export control can sometimes have an essentially stimulating effect on the development of a particular branch of the economy in a socialist country. For example, Technical Director Loffler of the National Association of Machinists believes that "the Soviet Union is becoming the world's largest producer of machine tools because rigid American restrictions forced it to develop its own technology." At the same time, these very restrictions resulted in "lower employment in the nation [the United States] and less available funds for the kind of research and engineering that is essential for the preservation of technological parity."

The existing export control system is also inflicting serious damages on American exports of electronic computer equipment. The level of U.S. computer exports to the socialist countries is extremely low. The vice president of the Control Data Corporation said, for example, that "the United States has shipped more large computers to Honduras than to the Soviet Union." On the whole, according to the calculations of experts, American computer companies are annually losing orders from the socialist countries worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Export restrictions on computer shipments have been criticized quite pointedly in the business community in recent years in connection with the increasing significance of these items in East-West trade. Under these circumstances, American computer firms are often excluded from the competition for orders from the socialist countries.

For example, the U.S. authorities' prohibition of the use of American peripheral equipment in conjunction with the Ryad computer produced in Poland as part of a CEMA project led to a situation in which this nation began to manufacture similar equipment with a Swedish license, depriving the U.S. company of sales opportunities in the Polish market. According to American suppliers, the refusal to issue a license for the use of American memory disks in conjunction with Ryad computers in Hungary was even more absurd: Similar units are produced by Bulgaria for the other CEMA countries.

Even the Carter Administration has admitted that the criticism of the existing export control system in the United States is valid in general. In this connection, the report prepared for congressional hearings by the comptroller of the currency (the head of the Office of Government

Financial Operations) of 1 March 1979, "Export Control: The Need to Clarify Policy and Simplify Regulations," is indicative. This document contains the following assessment: "The government does not have an effective policy-making mechanism to reconcile the conflicting goals of export stimulation and export control. Besides this, the machinery for decision-making on the particular types of technology and commodities that should be subject to control is cumbersome and slow-moving. In addition to all these problems, the export licensing system is marked by delays, instability and the absence of proper records." The existence of "total chaos" in this area was pointed out by L. Brady, director of the export control office. The fact that this agency is impeding the expansion of U.S. exports was admitted in July 1979 by then Secretary of Commerce J. Krepe.

In spite of all this, the opponents of detente have absolutely no desire to discard this "convenient" weapon inherited from the cold war--the export licensing mechanism. Their influence is reflected in the activities of Congress and the practical policy of the administration, which is based to a large extent on the premises of "Memorandum 31," prepared in the National Security Council by Professor S. Huntington--famous advocate of a "hard line" in economic relations with the USSR--for the purpose of forcing the Soviet Union to "make concessions" in the political sphere.

Adhering to this policy, the White House prohibited the shipment of a number of American commodities to the USSR and other socialist countries in 1978 and 1979. Many in the United States felt that this was a senseless action which hurt American business. The heads of around 100 large corporations belonging to a special committee for the advancement of American trade sent a petition to the White House and Congress, pointing out the serious consequences of this policy. Congressman Bingham introduced a bill proposing amendments to the 1969 export regulation act, in which he included the request that the President "consider" the reaction of other countries to the restrictive U.S. measures, the possibility of achieving American foreign policy goals without such measures and the effect of these measures on the reputation of the United States as a reliable exporter.

In general, the amendments to the 1969 act, passed in October 1979, also reflected the struggle between the two tendencies in question. The progressive features of the new legislation include the following: an unequivocal statement that the United States should strive to stimulate exports on the broadest scale and that export restrictions should only be of a specific nature; the introduction of a new, intermediate type of license, the qualified general license, to be used in repeated shipments of the same commodities by the same exporter; a more flexible system of export control; the mandatory publication of projected restrictions of a foreign policy nature in the federal register, and the disclosure of the precise reasons for the denial of license requests; the establishment of a maximum term of 180 days for the consideration of license requests

(although exceptions to this rule will be permitted). The legislation reflected recognition of the fact that exports make up an important part of the balance of trade and play a major role in maintaining high levels of employment and production.

At the same time, the legislation envisaged the further augmentation of the Defense Department's role in deciding export control matters. It is possible that this will transfer the emphasis from commodity export control to technology transmission control in the next few years. Besides this, the executive branch has been given the responsibility of negotiating the transfer of COCOM activity to a contractual basis (up to the present time it has operated on the basis of a "gentleman's agreement"); this could give the United States some additional opportunities to exert pressure on its allies in the area of trade with the nations of the socialist community.

In this context, President Carter's televised speech of 4 January also deserves mention. In a futile attempt to change the peaceful Leninist foreign policy of the USSR, the U.S. Government unilaterally imposed new restrictions on the already limited trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations with our country. In particular, the President announced that exports of a number of commodities to the USSR would be reduced, including grain for animal and human consumption. As a TASS release pointed out, "measures of this kind are not likely to be approved by broad segments of the U.S. population that have repeatedly expressed their interest in cooperation with the Soviet Union and in the expansion of commercial contacts with this nation, correctly assuming that this will benefit the United States." Judging by reports from the United States, the general public is opposed to the new measures taken by the U.S. Government. For example, reports from the midwestern states indicate that the majority of farmer groups have pointedly objected to the curtailment of the grain trade.

All of this suggests that export control in the United States will continue to be more rigid than in the other capitalist countries in coming years. This means that American companies will continue to experience difficulties in the expanded delivery of the most progressive equipment, machines, instruments and other commodities to the socialist states, and this will undermine their competitive potential in the world market even more.

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PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF U.S. DOMESTIC FOOD POLICY

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[Article by V. N. Dem'yanenko]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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AUTOMATION IN THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY

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[Article by Yu. A. Savinov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE CONGRESS IN 1979

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 97-101

[Article by V. A. Savel'yev]

[Text] "The general impression is that the machine is idling, that we are witnessing a chronic crisis, which has finally become completely apparent, in the institutions that are no longer capable of solving problems for which they themselves are sometimes to blame." This is how the French magazine LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE defines the present state of the U.S. Government in the fall of 1977. How close is this diagnosis to the truth? To a considerable extent, this question has been answered by the results of the first session of the 96th U.S. Congress in 1979.

New congresses have never been distinguished by a quick take-off. But the 96th Congress, according to American observers, broke all records for sluggishness. "Lethargy As a Way of Life"--this was the title of a NEW YORK TIMES article analyzing the first results of the Congress' activities. For example, during the first 3 months of the session, the legislators sent only eight bills to President J. Carter for his signature, or less than half as many as during the first 3 months of the previous Congress, the 95th (which, in turn, was the lowest indicator since 1939). By the time of the Easter break the Senate had only had time for 38 roll-call ballots, and the House of Representatives had only conducted 67, or 62 percent and 42 percent less, respectively, than during the same period 2 years ago.

The number of speeches made on Capitol Hill has decreased noticeably. The senators only filled 4,399 pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, the official bulletin of congressional debates, with their speeches (and reprints of press articles: the legislators often request the inclusion of these in the record of proceedings), in comparison to 5,841 pages in the first quarter of 1977, while the printed volume of House proceedings declined from 3,190 to 2,246 pages. In February, when the House of Representatives allowed live television coverage of its proceedings for the first time in its history, the cameras recorded apathetic expressions on the faces of many legislators who were present.

Activities on Capitol Hill have vividly reflected the general nationwide atmosphere of pessimism, insecurity and anxious uncertainty. At a time of heightened political polarization in the United States over major issues, many legislators, if not the majority, have preferred to play a waiting game and refuse to make far-reaching decisions. According to American observers, the prevailing view in the Capitol is that there is no acceptable political solution to the acute problems now confronting the Congress, whether these are problems connected with the energy crisis or relations with Iran.

It is no secret that the President is considered to be the "chief legislator" in the United States: Although he does not officially have the right to initiate legislation, Congress has traditionally paid special attention to the chief executive's proposals. This is particularly true in the absence of "divided rule"--that is, when the White House and the majority of seats in the Capitol are controlled by representatives of the same party; this has been the situation in the United States since 1977. What can we say about the interrelations between the White House and the Capitol, on which the effectiveness of the administration's legislative program depends, in 1979?

American observers used the stock term "constructive dialog" less and less often last year when they evaluated these interrelations.

There is no question that Congress has considerably restricted the President's freedom of action. But the Capitol has not regularly opposed Carter. This would go against political tradition. According to the authoritative CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, "with the exception of the period of war in Vietnam at the beginning of the 1970's, the Congress has supported presidents more than it has challenged them in the 20th century." It is also important to remember that the President's powers have been restricted by more than the Congress: It is possible that they have been even more limited by various calamities in American politics, both domestic and foreign.

Although the President's relations with the Congress have been far from idyllic, the conflict between them has never transcended the bounds of what is called the "negative balance" in the United States. The fact is that ruling circles cannot permit the stoppage of the machinery of state, in which the indissolubly interrelated legislative and executive branches each perform their own functions. This is why the constant rivalry between the White House and the Capitol for a suitable measure of power must always be accompanied by their cooperation.

A central place among the foreign policy issues discussed at the first session of the 96th Congress was the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic arms limitation (SALT II). This problem towered above all others even before the Soviet-American documents resulting from the summit-level Vienna meeting were signed. Evidence of this can be found in the hundreds of

pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD with speeches by members of Congress on the "pros" and "cons" of an agreement with the USSR; at their insistence, many reprints of American newspaper and magazine articles pertaining to SALT were also included in the record. When the U.S. President sent the treaty and related documents to the Senate in accordance with constitutional provisions, this topic also superseded all others on the agenda of the Senate's chief task force dealing with foreign policy issues--the Foreign Relations Committee.

The hearings on the treaty began on 9 July and it was not until November that the committee managed to conclude them and prepare the necessary report. This lengthy discussion of the treaty was due to the vigorous opposition of reactionary forces, which launched a noisy campaign against it, to the attempts of some groups in the United States to make the SALT II treaty conditional upon totally unrelated matters (for example, the presence of Soviet military specialists in Cuba) and to the inconsistency of the administration and the group of senators supporting the treaty, who hoped to increase their chances of re-election in 1980 by a show of "firmness."

The very procedure for the discussion of the treaty in the Senate gives rise to a number of "cross-roads," at which point even an insignificant minority of senators can impede and prolong the discussion. Hearings in committees are followed by the submission of a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the second reading of the treaty at plenary sessions, the discussion of each separate article, the introduction of amendments or stipulations, voting on articles of the treaty and amendments (or stipulations) and, finally, the adoption of a Senate resolution giving its "advice and consent," and then the submission of the treaty to the President for his ratification.

What have the debates indicated?

There is a clear tendency among some of the senators to link the approval of the SALT II treaty with other issues. Most of the discussion concerned a dramatic increase in military spending. This was reflected, in particular, in the vote of approval cast by the majority of senators (55 for, 42 against) on 18 September for an increase of 5 percent in real terms (with allowances for inflation) in the U.S. defense budget for 1981/82. The administration, which originally favored a 3-percent increase, set forth a program in December, calling for an increase of 4.5-5 percent in military spending.

The separation of forces "for" and "against" SALT II continued in the Senate. There was a tendency toward the formation of a coalition majority of supporters of the treaty (made up of Democrats--ranging from liberals to moderate conservatives--and liberal Republicans).

The Senate did not manage to complete its examination of the SALT II treaty during the course of the past session.

At the beginning of January 1980, President J. Carter decided to postpone the Senate investigation of the SALT II treaty for an indefinite period of time, showing his lack of concern for the fundamental long-range interests of the world. A TASS press release stated that "campaign considerations and the desire to play up to chauvinistic group feelings, judging by all indications, played an important part" in the making of this decision. At the same time, as the TASS release noted, "ruling circles in the Soviet Union would like to think that a sober, farsighted approach to Soviet-American relations, including peace-keeping efforts, will ultimately prevail in the United States."

Returning to the results of the debates on the defense budget, we must say that neither house of Congress objected to the Pentagon's increased demands. Not one of the military establishment's requests was ignored in 1979. Congress allocated funds for the production of the MX intercontinental mobile missile system and for work on Trident submarines and cruise missiles. The allocation of funds for the production and deployment in Western Europe of 572 medium-range missiles (Pershing 2 and winged missiles), capable of carrying nuclear charges, was planned. The President even withdrew his objections to the construction of a new nuclear aircraft carrier at a cost of 2.4 billion dollars, which he had opposed for 2 years because of the probable "ineffectiveness and vulnerability" of this kind of mastodon. When the Senate approved the administration's draft budget for fiscal year 1980, it allocated 141.2 billion dollars for defense, which exceeded the previous year's expenditures by more than 11 billion dollars. Capitol Hill also approved of the plans announced in December for a constant rise in military expenditures over the next 5 years.

According to American commentators, however, this sharp rise in military expenditures will give new and powerful impetus to the already considerable inflationary tendencies and will exacerbate the economic difficulties now confronting the nation.

In 1979 another of Carter's campaign promises was also consigned to oblivion: At that time, he proposed not only cuts in military spending, but also the reduction of the sales volume of American weapons abroad. Total sales of U.S. weapons to foreign countries rose from 11.2 billion dollars in 1977 to over 14 billion in 1978. It is no coincidence that a report prepared by staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spoke of "general skepticism" regarding the Carter Administration's appeal for a "policy of self-restraint" in this area, since the United States does not practice the "restraint" it preaches, enthusiastically using the arms trade as a "diplomatic instrument." Congress has supported this policy.

On 15 December 1978 President Carter announced diplomatic recognition of the PRC, simultaneously declaring that the "mutual security" treaty with Taiwan would be terminated on 1 January 1980--a year after this announcement, as stipulated in Article 10 of the treaty. Congress had already passed a bill on the new status of relations with Taiwan by March. This bill, in accordance with the President's proposal, envisages the "preservation of commercial, cultural and other relations with the people of

Taiwan on an unofficial basis." But the question of whether the President had the right to cancel a treaty without the consent of the Senate (which had once approved the treaty by a two-thirds majority) became the topic of lengthy debates.

Not only the President and Congress, but also the judiciary, were drawn into the arguments over this issue. On 22 December 1978, Republican Senator B. Goldwater and several other legislators brought an action against the President in a federal court, accusing him of acting "unconstitutionally" when he unilaterally broke the treaty with Taiwan without the consent of the Senate.

The first round of this fight was won by Senator Goldwater's supporters. In the fall of 1979, Federal Judge O. Gash ruled that a treaty could not be broken without some indication of congressional approval of the President's position. But the U.S. Constitution does not regulate this procedure and existing precedents in American political and legal practice contradict one another. For example, just before World War I, President W. Taft broke off a trade treaty with the tsarist government in Russia on the basis of a decision by both houses of Congress, and in the 1920's President C. Coolidge abrogated a treaty with Mexico on the fight against contraband without Congress' consent.

Representatives of the administration protested the federal judge's ruling in a court of appeals. In this second round, the administration's position was upheld. It is possible that the final decision on this matter will have to be made by the highest court--the Supreme Court of the United States. Incidentally, the Supreme Court can decline to pronounce a verdict on the grounds that the issue is "too political in nature."

On 26 July 1979 the President signed a bill on multilateral trade agreements. The new law is intended to regulate various aspects of the tariff policy established in Geneva on 12 April. Both houses made fairly short work of this bill, not even objecting to the adoption of restrictions on amendments during its discussion in plenary sessions.

In general, Congress' work agenda consisted mainly of questions of domestic policy. The legislators had to give special attention to economic problems. In connection with this, a high-level White House employee admitted that "the American people...are waiting for concrete results in the resolution of energy and inflation problems."

As for the results of the activities of the administration and Congress in the energy sphere, they look depressing. At one time, the President announced a "fight" (he even called it the "moral equivalent of a war") to defend the "energy independence" of the United States. But are "fights" of this kind necessary? After all, despite the complaints about the oil "shortage," U.S. petroleum reserves increased from 1.168 billion barrels in May 1978 to 1.23 billion in May 1979. The Americans still do not

believe that the energy crisis is real or objective in nature. Moreover, the President has not been able to convince Congress that his proposals are realistic either. Serious congressional opposition has been encountered by almost all of the main elements of the administration's energy program: the tax on the windfall profits of oil companies (in the third quarter of 1979 they were higher than ever before in the last decade), the granting of additional powers to the President in this area, the allocation of 88 billion dollars to a new independent agency for the creation of a liquid synthetic fuel industry, the 6-month moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power plants and so forth.

The exceptional significance attached by the administration to the energy problem is attested to by extracts from a confidential memo prepared by S. Eizenstat, the President's domestic policy adviser (a copy of this document fell into the hands of the WASHINGTON POST). The memo cautions President J. Carter that the mounting energy crisis will "politically hurt" the administration. "It could even be said," the author wrote, "that none of the events that have taken place since this administration took office--neither the Lance affair nor the Panama Canal treaty, the conflicts with [Senator Edward] Kennedy and even the doubled rate of inflation--have pumped this much water into the hold of our ship."

This summer, congressional leaders promised to make a final decision on the energy program by October. Even then, however, it was clear that the law being written in the Capitol would probably not meet the President's wishes. Besides this, changes made in the cabinet by the President, according to general opinion, were the reason for the delay in Congress' adoption of the administration's energy program. After this, in an attempt to stop any increase in the taxes on the superprofits of oil monopolies, the senators who are the proteges of the oil industry even resorted to the "filibuster"--the tactic of conducting endless debates, in which the speech of each senator can be limited to 1 hour only with the consent of at least 60 senators (three-fifths of the total Senate). Regardless of the form the program will finally take, as some people in the United States have remarked, no noticeable improvement in the energy sphere should be expected in the near future.

No matter how vigorously the official and semi-official mass media in the United States may assert that the nation is "making rapid progress in energy conservation," neither the President nor Congress has been able to limit oil consumption. In fact, the United States is the only developed Western country with an increase in per capita annual oil consumption: It has risen 17.1 percent since 1973, whereas it declined, for example, 2.3 percent in the FRG.

The Democratic Administration once declared that the fight against inflation would be one of its top priorities. In 1979 the President and his assistants stubbornly refused to institute price controls. The rate of inflation rose. Consumer prices rose more than 13 percent in 1979. Besides this, the coming of election year was already being sensed at the

end of the first session of the 96th Congress. Under these conditions liberal Democrats in the Congress played up to the mood of many categories of voters by exerting stronger pressure, on the one hand, for increased federal spending (including social expenditures) and, on the other, for tax cuts. Both of these, however, stimulated inflationary tendencies.

Judging by all indications, yet another of President Carter's promises has not been kept--his promise to balance the budget by 1981. Director J. McIntyre of the Office of Management and Budget already had to admit this in the middle of 1979. He said that the declining rate of economic growth (or, more precisely, the beginning of a recession), reduced tax revenues in the federal treasury and increased expenditures on energy needs were making it extremely difficult to balance the budget. Congress (particularly the Democratic faction) obviously had no intention of helping the administration attain its goal of a balanced budget, which has traditionally been regarded as a policy objective of the Republican Party.

Virtually all of the promises made in the 1976 campaign regarding relatively far-reaching domestic political reforms (from the revision of social security laws to the creation of a national health insurance system) have been shelved or totally forgotten. The only presidential proposals passing through the Congress have concerned a few reorganizational measures: a separate deparment of education[1] and an agency on international cooperation and development have been created, and the legislators did not fail to restrict even these measures with a number of amendments.

Congress has rejected essentially all of the major proposed changes in the U.S. electoral system favored by J. Carter. For example, a constitutional amendment envisaging the abolition of the electoral college and the institution of direct presidential elections did not win the necessary majority of votes in the Senate. Attempts to pass a law on the federal funding of congressional campaigns failed.

The domestic policy achievements of the administration acquiring legislative form in 1979 appear quite meager, in the opinion of American commentators.

It would be wrong to seriously ascribe a total "inability to solve problems" to the highest legislative body in the United States, as LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE does. But the question of to what ends and in whose interests these problems are being solved, whether we consider the increase in the defense budget, the postponement of the SALT II debates or the granting of tax privileges to the oil companies, is quite a different matter. Congress' critics have good reason to believe that the serious problems now confroting the United States obviously require more initiative and, quite indisputably, a different approach from legislators.

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1. See the article by Ye. P. Ionova in this issue--Editor's note.

THE POWERS THAT BE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 102-107

[Third installment of digest by T. G. Il'in of chapters from the book "The Powers That Be" by David Halberstam, Alfred A. Knopf, 1979]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 108-117

[Article by A. N. Ivanenko]

[Text] President Carter's experience as head of the U.S. Administration has confirmed his fear that, in the process of implementing major governmental decisions and national programs, "one of the most difficult problems will be to learn how to deal with the federal bureaucracy."[1] This term signifies the administrative staffs of federal executive bodies--around 500,000 employees in 12 departments; 100,000 people in 75 so-called independent government agencies; several tens of thousands of people on various commissions, councils and committees and 6,000 employees on the White House staff.[2] Public opinion and the administration in the United States believe that the slow, wasteful and ineffective work of this huge staff is one of the main reasons for the low productivity of the federal programs which cost hundreds of billions of dollars annually.

In pilot attempts to reorganize the work of federal agencies on the basis of such modern methods as "planning-programming-budgeting" or "goal-orientation," as well as the "zero-based budget," this work is still routine and bureaucratic in nature and is subject to the political pressure of various groups. The decision-making process is sometimes held up for years, and administration is complicated by the existence of many poorly intercoordinated programs and the duplication of functions. According to the American President, "personnel activity is marked by bureaucratism, red tape and confusion" in public administration.[3]

All presidents have promised to heighten the efficiency of the administrative system in the executive branch of government and all of them have made more or less significant changes in the structure of its elements and in operational methods. President J. Carter made this one of the central points of his campaign program. In the first 2 years of his term, however, his work at the top level of administration did not go beyond the bounds of isolated reorganizational measures in this field. The structure of the Executive Office of the President was simplified, the number of advisory

bodies decreased and a new department of energy was created. At the same time, a civil service reform was being drafted in the White House under the direct supervision of the President. In May 1978 the draft was submitted to Congress and was approved, in amended form, on 13 October that same year. The administration called this reform the current presidency's major undertaking in public administration. It changes some general administrative principles, operational procedures of institutions and specific regulations pertaining to individuals employed by the federal government. The law touches directly upon the interests of only 2 million public administration employees. The administrative innovations in the law have a completely definite social purpose. In connection with the reform, U.S. President Carter promised to give America "better government" and to establish the rights of federal employees.[4] What has he actually done?

Reorganization of Personnel Work

First let us examine the administrative purpose of the reform. The main purpose of the civil service reform is to make work with personnel one of the main ways of heightening the efficiency of public administration. In essence, the reform is aimed at concentrating all personnel policy in central executive bodies, so as to increase the government's ability to carry out programs by means of more efficient personnel management. We will briefly discuss the principles governing personnel management prior to the passage of the 1978 act.[5]

The management of public employees is based on a detailed set of rules and restrictions concerning hiring, placement, evaluation, remuneration, promotion and disciplinary action, as well as the rights of employees. Most of these rules are embodied in legislation (pt V of the "Legal Code of the United States of America"). The basic principles governing the management of federal government personnel, reflected in legislation, were established in the last century.

The system is based on the principle of holding competitive examinations for all applicants for civil service positions, which is primarily intended to ensure that these individuals will have the necessary qualifications. A second important principle is the prohibition of discrimination against employees on the grounds of their party affiliation (this actually only applies to the bourgeois parties). This is supposed to guarantee that government institutions will remain stable at times of change in the political leadership. The principle of "political neutrality" is also in effect in the civil service, limiting the political activity of most civil servants.

The system for the remuneration, promotion and periodic retraining of employees was intended to keep personnel with the necessary qualifications and competence within the civil service. Placement and remuneration were organized on the basis of classification grades, depending on the complexity of work, job qualifications and the degree of responsibility. This

gave rise to a job hierarchy consisting of 23 grades. For example, remuneration for jobs falling between the first and fifteenth levels was based on a specific salary rate in a 10-step wage scale established for jobs of this category. The employee was given a raise either when he moved up to the next salary level in his present job (each subsequent level represents a 3-percent increase) by decision of his direct supervisor, or when he was transferred to a job on a higher level (generally requiring him to pass a competitive exam). In view of the fact that job evaluations were either nonexistent or purely formal in nature, salaries and promotions depended more on seniority than on the results of the specific employee's work.

To guarantee the observance of the basic principles of civil service, the Civil Service Commission was created as an independent agency under Congressional control. It is this commission that set up examinations for applicants. It also examined violations of the "merit system" and determined personnel management policy. Consequently, the commission performed the conflicting functions of a collective manager and an arbiter in labor disputes. Time showed that competitive examinations were not enough for the efficient placement and management of personnel, that the placement procedure took many months longer than necessary, that incentives were not provided for productive work and that it was easier to transfer or promote unsatisfactory employees than to dismiss them. All of this undermined the effectiveness of the civil service.

The reform envisages important changes in personnel management. In the first place, from now on a distinct line will be drawn between the functions of determining and conducting personnel policy, on the one hand, and the arbitration of labor disputes on the other. The Civil Service Commission has been divided into two independent federal bodies for this purpose--the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Office of Personnel Management will be responsible for the further centralization and better coordination of all personnel work in the system of public administration. It is a central body under the jurisdiction of the U.S. President, who will appoint, for a 4-year term, and dismiss agency administrators--the director and his assistants--with the consent of the Senate. The director will also be the U.S. President's representative in personnel matters. The Office of Personnel Management will be assigned all necessary organizational, standard-setting and supervisory functions in the area of government personnel policy. This will include appointments and promotions, the evaluation of work, the advanced training of federal employees, and their reward and punishment. The office will set the appropriate standards, which will be compulsory for all departments and agencies, monitor their observance and suggest and propose improvements in personnel work. It will be accountable to Congress on all these matters.

The Merit Systems Protection Board is a bipartisan arbitration board which will ensure the observance of laws on hiring, dismissal and transfers in accordance with the principles of the "merit system." Through specially

authorized individuals (administrative judges), the board will investigate complaints relating to the violation of employee rights. It will consist of three members, appointed by the U.S. President upon the recommendation and consent of the Senate, and a territorial network of staff employees.

The board will always include a representative of the opposition party. Board members will be appointed for 7 years. They can neither be dismissed during this term (with the exception of a special impeachment procedure in the event of inactivity or the abuse of power) nor reappointed for a new term.

A second important result of the reform is the introduction of annual job evaluations in all departments of the federal government, which is expected to heighten the work efficiency of employees and improve the operation of government institutions. At the same time, these job evaluations are supposed to motivate employees to achieve better final results. The evaluation represents an instrument by which goal-oriented management is conducted. It is supposed to measure the individual contribution of the employee (and the subdivision he manages, if he is an administrator) to the attainment of departmental objectives. The evaluation is now compulsory for all government employees hired on a competitive basis, and it is more thorough. It is organized in line with a single set of procedural principles worked out by the Office of Personnel Management. Special job performance councils in each department participate in the evaluation procedure along with immediate supervisors. It is these councils, under the supervision of the Office of Personnel Management, that establish requirements for employees and conduct the evaluation process. The evaluation procedure proper ends with the categorization of the specific worker's performance at a fixed level--there is a minimum of three: "unsatisfactory," "fair" and "totally satisfactory." In some departments, however, there are five categories for administrators--"outstanding," "excellent," "good," "fair" and "unsatisfactory." The competitive system of evaluating qualifications is still in force for civil service applicants. But this procedure is conducted by the department itself, although the choice is now based from among seven candidates instead of three.

The system of annual performance evaluations is becoming an effective instrument of personnel policy. Instead of the previous graded salary scale for administrators, there are now several salary levels and a bonus system based on performance evaluation. The maximum use of bonuses as financial incentives has been envisaged; they will be paid once a year in a lump sum (exempt from some deductions), but to no more than half of all employees. Bonuses will only be paid to workers whose last performance evaluation rated them "totally satisfactory," and the size of the bonus will depend on the specifics of the evaluation. For example, top-level administrators with an "outstanding" evaluation will be granted the maximum bonus--20 percent of their annual salary, while those with an "excellent" or "good" rating will receive lower bonuses in line with established restrictions (no more than half of the staff and under 5 percent of the total wage fund). Automatic salary raises have been abolished, and a

compulsory procedure has been established for assessing the results of annual evaluations of the performance of employees who have been promoted, have received advanced training and so forth. The performance evaluation system, with many of its features borrowed from the experience of private business and research organizations, has become the cornerstone of the new policy of personnel management.

The third purpose of the reform was to work out special procedures of personnel work with groups of top-level administrators--that is, the heads of independent subdivisions in departments and agencies and the directors of major programs. It is the higher level of responsibility of these public employees and the increasing significance of federal programs in public administration that motivated the Carter Administration to separate top-level management, numbering 9,200 individuals of grade 16 and higher, from the civil service system. Special procedures have been established for the hiring, remuneration, promotion, dismissal and retirement of this group of public employees.

What are the distinctive features of this system of top-level management? Above all, it is distinguished by considerable financial and other incentives--salaries measuring up to those of the administrators of medium-sized and large corporations and extensive career opportunities. Capable administrators are presented with a broader choice of advancement opportunities, since appointments and transfers on this level are now conducted on an interdepartmental basis, and within the framework of this "pool" of professions, the individuals are no longer divided into categories, and all transfers are carried out simply on the basis of performance evaluations. Administrators have additional opportunities to improve their qualifications by enrolling in one of the programs of the Office of Personnel Management. They have the right to apply for an administrative leave (of up to 11 months) once every 10 years to conduct research in a prestigious scientific center. Honorary titles will be awarded to "honored" and "outstanding" administrators, accompanied by a bonus of 2,500 and 5,000 dollars, respectively, to be paid annually for 5 years.[6] Top-level administrators will be offered special retirement benefits (including the option of retiring with a pension at the age of 50) and guaranteed employment (an administrator who is excluded from the top-level administrative service for work that is not totally satisfactory will have the right to take a job on grade 15 of the civil service system and retain his previous, higher salary).

The number of top-level administrative positions will be determined by the Office of Personnel Management for each agency 2 years in advance. Applicants for these positions will prove to special qualifications boards that they can meet the requirements of the job. They will only enjoy the benefits of the top-level administrative service after a 1-year trial period. Promotions and bonuses will only be open to administrators whose performance has been evaluated as "totally satisfactory." Any other evaluation will have a negative effect. Two unsatisfactory evaluations within 5 years (or two fair evaluations within 5 years) will mean that the administrator will have to leave the service and, although he will retain his

previous salary, he will not be eligible for reinstatement in the top-level management service.

There is no question that this means the creation of a new privileged group of administrators, an element of the American ruling class, no matter what kind of demagogic declarations about the need for the broadest possible representation of various population strata in top-level management are made to cover up this fact.

The separation of top-level administrators from the rest of the civil service and the institution of incentive "merit salary systems" signify a move toward a differentiated approach to the management of different categories of employees--rank-and-file public employees and administrators on various levels. Actually there are now three interrelated systems of federal personnel management.

The highest level of the political leadership consists of a few hundred jobs at the top (12 cabinet members and the chiefs of agencies and major subdivisions). The rules of the civil service do not apply to them. Individuals are appointed to these positions for a fixed length of time by the U.S. President "with the advice and consent of the Senate," but without competitive examinations or the authorization of qualification boards. For each of the three levels at the top, there is one and only one salary grade. This group of officials is under the direct jurisdiction of the President and the U.S. Congress.

The level of federal employees in the civil service system proper (grades 1 through 15) consists of more than 2 million civil servants, ranging from technicians to specialists on various levels and supervisors of task forces and other dependent subdivisions. Administrators in the civil service system (72,000 officials of grades 13-15) have been transferred to a salary and bonus system of remuneration. The maximum bonus for them, however, has been set at 12 percent of their annual salary. At the same time, it was announced that the regular cost of living raises would be cut in half for this category of administrators. Honorary titles have not been established for these administrators.

Attack on Employee Rights

The class aims of the reform have been made quite clear by the differentiated approach to the salaries and incentives offered to employees on different rungs of the hierarchical ladder. The reform represents a major threat to the employment of federal personnel. One of the main reasons for the institution of mandatory performance evaluations was to simplify the procedure of dismissing workers who are not good enough for one reason or another. In a public statement, J. Carter openly complained that the number of employees dismissed for "inefficiency" in 1977 (226) was too low. It is true that, prior to the reform, federal government employees were somewhat better protected by law against arbitrary dismissal than employees in private business. But these advantages only compensated for the lack of

other elementary rights, particularly the right to defend their own interests by means of strikes and collective bargaining and the right to take an active part in the political process.

As a result of the reform, it is now easier to dismiss any employee. Whereas the procedure previously envisaged a 90-day warning about negative performance, during which period the employee had an opportunity to improve his work and keep his job, the period has now been reduced to a month, and the final decision is made in the next 30 days. In Carter's bill, an "unsatisfactory" performance evaluation and the opinion of the supervisor that dismissal would "heighten the efficiency" of the particular subunit are recognized as grounds for firing an employee. Moreover, an unsatisfactory performance evaluation, in contrast to other evaluations, can be made at any time. There is also an entire set of disciplinary actions, including the suspension of employees without pay for periods of varying lengths, salary reductions (with or without changes in grade), forced vacations without pay and other measures, which, with rare exceptions, are not applied to top-level administrators.

Therefore, the class factor is quite apparent in the differentiated approach to the management of various employee categories. President Carter, as we know, criticized the civil service system because top-level administrators, just as other employees, "were exempt from penalties for poor work and deprived of tangible rewards for good work."[8] This defect has been corrected in such a way, however, that top-level administrators now have additional benefits while the rest of the employees are constantly in danger of losing their jobs. It is with good reason that even American researchers of moderate leanings have described Carter's reform as a triumph for the tough line in management and the system of penalties.[9]

What are the guaranteed rights of federal employees that are mentioned in numerous reports on this reform?

The principal achievement is supposed to be the abolition of the Civil Service Commission and its replacement with two independent federal bodies--the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit System Protection Board. The bipartisan nature of the board and its organizational separation from bodies determining personnel policy are being depicted as a major guarantee of employee rights, as this can allegedly ensure the objective investigation of all complaints. There is no question that the organizational side of the matter is important. However, even if we disregard the question of the class interests and sympathies of board members, who are appointed from among top-level administrative judicial representatives, and limit ourselves exclusively to an examination of the content of the reform, it is completely obvious that, regardless of how the defense is organized, it is possible only within the bounds of the board's competence and the legally defined rights of employees. First of all, far from all disciplinary actions can be appealed. For example, withholding the wages of an employee in connection with his temporary suspension or forced

vacation without pay, if it does not exceed 30 days, and the reduction of wages by one grade (3 percent) are totally within the competence of the establishment administration. Dismissal cannot be appealed either if it is connected with a general staff reduction and in some other cases. In the second place, a clear-cut feature of the administration's approach to guaranteed employee rights is the attempt to put the entire burden of proving that the administration has committed unlawful actions...on the party appealing for protection. This party must prove that the administrative action was based on a distortion of the facts. This extremely conservative article of the bill met with objections even in Congress, including the Senate with its extremely conservative stand on these matters, and was somewhat softened in the law passed in October 1978.

The general tenor of the reform is that incentives and actual rights decrease at each successively lower employee level. For these reasons, the reform was opposed by the National Union of Financial Employees and some groups in the largest union of federal employees--the American Federation of Government Employees. The same stand was taken by veterans' organizations because the reform has diminished the privileges of former servicemen in the civil service.

Some people in the United States believe that the reform is, to a significant extent, enhancing the administration's capability of controlling its own programs and heightening the "mobility" of the federal machinery of state as a whole. At the same time, it is not reducing the size of the federal bureaucracy.

The reform is clearly incapable of radically changing the work of the public administration sector. The fundamental causes of the inefficiency of the machinery of state can ultimately be found in the socioeconomic nature of the bourgeois state, the limited social base on which it rests and the radically conflicting interests of various classes and groups which are the "consumers" of federal government "services." It is just as obvious that the reform not only does not guarantee the rights of federal employees, but also signifies mounting insecurity for rank-and-file employees, weaker employment guarantees and the considerable intensification of their labor.

FOOTNOTES

1. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 6 May 1978, p 1139.

2. These figures apply only to public administration employees. They do not include the workers and employees of government enterprises, public health, education and scientific institutions and other establishments associated with the system of federal agencies. Counting the latter, the number of workers rises to 2.1 million. Besides this, federal workers also include 600,000 postal service employees and

more than 30,000 clerks in the legislative and judicial branches of government, among them around 10,000 people on the congressional staff.

3. "Message of the President of the United States. Civil Service Reform," Washington, 1978, p 1.

4. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 12 May 1978, p 1139.

5. The previous civil service system is examined in detail in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 1, 1977, pp 109-117.

6. "Message of the President of the United States. Civil Service Reform," pp 40-46.

7. "Text of Address by the President to the National Press Club," Washington, 2 March 1978.

8. "Message of the President of the United States. Civil Service Reform," p 3.

9. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, July-August 1978, p 309.

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BOOK REVIEWS

SALT and Military Research

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 114-115

[Review by V. V. Potashov of the book "Impact of SALT on U.S. Military Research and Development" Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 95th Congress, Second Session, 8 June 1978, Washington, 1979, 58 pages]

[Text] This hearing took place in June 1978, but the proceedings, after being censored, were published only in 1979, after the signing of the SALT II treaty. At the hearing, representatives of the U.S. Administration--Secretary of Defense H. Brown and his assistant, Director W. Perry of the Office of Research and Development, set forth the administration's views on SALT's projected impact on U.S. military programs.

Senator T. McIntyre, who chaired the hearing, set forth the essence of the question in the following manner: "Among all the criteria which could be used to evaluate SALT, there is nothing more important than the impact of this agreement on our military research and development." He defined the three main aspects of this issue: 1. Will the SALT agreement contain any restrictions on U.S. research and development programs? 2. Will the SALT agreement allow the United States to spend research and development funds more effectively by reducing strategic uncertainty through the acquisition of detailed data on Soviet strategic forces? 3. To what extent will the SALT agreement restrict Soviet research and development? (p 22).

The answers given to these questions by the administration's representatives were apparently something of a surprise even to the American senators. As H. Brown said, "In general, the provisions of the agreement as set forth in the protocol, will certainly have no negative effect on our research and development programs.... The same can be said of the SALT II treaty itself.... It is most probable that strategic programs for research and development will essentially retain their present form" (pp 16, 17). In answer to the specific questions of Senators McIntyre,

Hart, Nunn, Bartlett and others as to whether the United States would allow any restriction of research and development programs by the SALT II treaty, very unequivocally replied "no" at least 30 times and did not say "yes" even once.

Brown and Perry reported that the United States intended, regardless of the SALT II treaty, to deploy a new system of intercontinental ballistic missiles in place of the "Minutemen" system (p 5); the United States would deploy as many winged missile carriers ad necessary; the United States believed it had the right to considerably improve the present winged missiles; no restrictions would be imposed on the Trident program either, within the framework of the general ceiling on missiles with multiple warheads (p 9). According to W. Perry, the SALT II treaty would have no effect whatsoever on the development of new medium-range missile systems in the United States for deployment within the territory of the European NATO countries. In this connection, he expressly stated that "the United States made it clear at SALT that the transmission of weapons and technology to our allies would continue and could not be interpreted as a violation of the agreement" (p 38).

"I," H. Brown said, "would not really expect any cuts in spending, because research and development for all practical purposes are unrestricted and the maintenance of our research and development efforts is a significant safeguard, both with SALT and without it" (p 50). In fact, the decision made in December 1979 by the Carter Administration and NATO Council signifies a sharp increase in appropriations for military programs. The intensive development of American medium-range nuclear missiles and the decision to deploy them in a number of Western European countries are injuring the entire process of military detente by undermining its foundations. The United States' pursuit of military-technical superiority in new weapon systems and the plans to deploy them as close as possible to the Soviet border are contrary to the fundamental principle of our relations--the principle of equality and equivalent security--because this buildup of offensive potential will destabilize the strategic balance. The "Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic Guidelines of Subsequent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," which was signed by the Soviet and U.S. leaders at the same time as the SALT II treaty, clearly specifies the obligation of the two sides to "continue, with a view to reducing and preventing the danger of nuclear war, seeking measures to strengthen strategic stability, including the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, which destablize strategic equivalence to the maximum, as well as measures to reduce and prevent the danger of sudden attack."[1]

Apparently, the U.S. and NATO leaders are interested less in mutual steps to prevent nuclear war and to achieve disarmament than in exclusive military advantages. This is also indicated by the theoretical statement with which the Pentagon chief concluded the hearing: "As I stressed in my report, I believe that our weapon production policy should be conducted in

1. PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.

close connection with a policy or arms control to ensure adequate strategic potential and to guarantee the security of the United States and our allies" (p 58). In November 1979, in a TRIALOG magazine interview, H. Brown expressed his views even more clearly: "SALT is a supplement to our strategic programs, and not an alternative to them." This statement proves that the United States is striving not merely to coordinate two incompatible goals--the buildup and limitation of arms--but obviously to subordinate the latter to the former.

It is also obvious that a tendency to rely on a "position of strength," similar to the tendencies of the early 1960's, is once again taking its place in U.S. military-political strategy. Now, however, even far from progressive American military experts like R. Burt admit that the "concept of 'rearmament for the sake of disarmament,' worked out under President Kennedy, is nothing other than a cynical attempt to justify bigger defense budgets." This is all the more true now, given the acknowledged strategic parity of forces.

Overpopulation and Other Global Issues

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 115-118

[Review by G. S. Khozin of the book "The Twenty-ninth Day" by Lester R. Brown, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1978, XIII plus 360 pages]

[Text] When students in French schools are told about geometric progression, they are asked the following riddle: There is now only one lily pad in the pond, but each day the number of pads will double. If we know that the pond will be completely covered by pads on the 30th day, when will it be half-covered? The correct answer is the 29th day.

Brown begins his book with an alarmist warning: "Our global pond, which is now inhabited by 4 billion people, is already at least half full. During the lifetime of the next generation, it could be filled to capacity" (p 1).

The author of the book is a prominent expert on the problems of socioeconomic development. He worked in the U.S. Department of Agriculture under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and then occupied a high position in the Council on the Affairs of the Developing Countries for 5 years. Brown is now the head of the "World Watch Institute"--"an independent, non-profit research organization, established for the purpose of analyzing global problems and bringing them to the attention of the public." Institute activities are financed by private foundations, organizations within the UN system and federal agencies.

Scientific works and press articles by World Watch Institute researchers analyze global issues of the present day--ecological, energy and demographic problems, the fight against hunger and disease and so forth. The

author cites impressive factual material to convince the reader that global problems must be solved. It would be futile, however, for the reader of the institute's works to seek an analysis of the actual political and socioeconomic reasons for the exacerbation of these problems, not to mention businesslike recommendations, on the basis of which specific practical steps could be taken in individual states and large regions of the planet.

In general, the author expresses the correct opinion that political decisions regarding major international problems must now be made with consideration for a broader group of factors reflecting the material potential of states to attain particular goals, as well as the possible environmental consequences of these decisions.

In his opinion, it will be necessary to thoroughly analyze global problems, plan special measures and allocate resources for their quickest possible resolution. In spite of the "unspecified target" of the author's accusation regarding "nearsighted political leaders, who need to hang on to power for another year or another term and who therefore are reluctant in their work to look into the distant future, without which it will be impossible to attain such long-range social objectives as the restoration of forests, the conservation of energy or the stabilization of population growth" (p 10), it is apparent that the appeal of broad generalizations often causes L. Brown and his colleagues to indulge in some exaggeration of the evil effects of contemporary man's economic activity on the environment. The composition of the book and the nature of the facts and statistics cited by the author eloquently testify that he is more concerned with analyzing the existing state of affairs on the planet than with a search for cardinal solutions to global problems, including ecology.

Brown attempts to categorize the effects of societal activity on nature and their consequences for mankind. In his system of classification, the first level consists of physical signs of the increasing "ecological overloads" on the environment--the depletion of the planet's pastures, soil erosion and some symptoms of climatic changes. On the next level, he lists the economic consequences of these overloads--the raw material shortage, inflation, unemployment and stagnation or recession. It is quite indicative that the author does not draw any distinctions between the nature and urgency of these processes in states with different social structures. The final and highest level is made up of negative social and political processes and phenomena arising from tension on the first two levels--hunger, forced migration to the cities, the deterioration of standards of living and political unrest.

In the very first chapters of the book, the reader is offered a description of the increasingly complex interrelations between society and nature and he learns that the many diverse burdens placed on the environment by human activity are already beginning to exceed permissible norms. Brown stresses that the concept of permissible norms is well known to biologists,

soil scientists and experts on flora and fauna, but that the economic advisers and politicians who make the decisions do not have the slightest idea of what this means. But the "permissible load on the natural biological system depends on its maximum stable productivity, which, in turn, depends on the dimensions of this system and its reproduction potential" (p 13).

Citing concrete examples, Brown proves that the continuous deterioration of the planet's basic biological systems--world ocean fish reserves, forests, pastures and arable land--is not a minor problem of interest only to environmental experts. In view of the fact that economic activity on the planet depends on these basic biological systems, any threat to their existence could undermine the functioning of the world economy and, consequently, endanger the very future of the human race. This opinion naturally gives rise to the question of why the author assigns all mankind the responsibility for the sociopolitical consequences of technological progress, which has acquired its most distorted and intensive forms in the capitalist states and, to a considerable extent, has been carried over to the developing countries by capitalism. It is also interesting that Brown's suggestions on how these negative phenomena might be overcome are of an abstract and apolitical nature. In particular, he writes that overcoming all of these consequences will necessitate the creation of a "new social ethic" (p 8). It is pointless to speak of a new social ethic which would ignore such realities and burning problems of the present day as the struggle and interaction of opposing social systems, class antagonism between the working masses and the bourgeoisie, crises in the capitalist economy which give rise to conflict situations in various parts of the world, the arms race and the struggle for disarmament, and ideological battles over present and future problems. Brown asserts that if mankind will just substitute an "accumulation ethic" for the now prevalent "gross ethic," it will have a real chance of survival. But mere survival does not mean that the extremely difficult problems now facing states and influencing the world economy and international relations will be solved.

The long drawn-out discussions of demographic processes and trends in various states and parts of the world suffer from a lack of recommendations regarding at least the approximate possibility of solving these important problems. The energy problem, which represents a great difficulty for the United States and other capitalist states, is discussed only briefly in the book. The author limits himself to wishful thinking about a transition to a "post-petroleum energy industry," which he hopes will not be nuclear (p 127). Brown is aware that the attainment of this goal will involve the use of various combinations of forms and methods of energy production, available to states under specific conditions, as well as energy conservation measures and the more efficient use of energy. Brown assesses world food supply prospects primarily by comparing structures and volumes of food production and changes in world grain reserves under the conditions of increasing food requirements. In his opinion, the

instability of world food supplies in the 1970's "was more pronounced than at any other time in the war-ravaged year immediately after World War II" (p 128). Brown advocates an active policy to control the birth rate and food production.

According to Brown, the main economic consequences of today's global problems are a combination of escalated inflation and increasing unemployment ("stagflation"), and the use of "resource diplomacy" to regulate the changed political relations between the once-dependent states producing raw materials and the developed capitalist countries, which are experiencing an increasing need for significant quantities of mineral resources and are not capable of satisfying this need with their own internal sources.

The very expansion of the research framework and the combination of natural, technical, economic and sociopolitical subject matter in the book appear to L. Brown, just as to other bourgeois scholars who are not well acquainted with the creative heritage of Marxism-Leninism, to be a major achievement in the comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis of events taking place in individual countries and in the international arena. In fact, however, research of this kind represents only a timid step toward an objective view of the world. For example, L. Brown, in particular, predicts that "the next two decades will be quite filled with social changes, which will be extremely fundamental, regardless of the historical yardstick by which they are measured" (p 10). But his examination of these changes is based on a belief on the unshakeability of capitalism, which, according to many Western sociologists, political scientists and philosophers, will constantly evolve, reaching ever-higher levels of perfection. In this respect, Brown's views match up to the opinions of technological optimists and unrestrained apologists like Herman Kahn, who has said that many people "underestimate the dynamism and flexibility of capitalism."

We must also say that the book "The Twenty-ninth Day," just as the majority of other World Watch Institute works, focuses on the investigation of technical solutions to global problems (the transition to a "post-petroleum" energy industry, "demographic planning," the introduction of progressive methods for the use of waste products and secondary raw materials, the transmission of the "appropriate technology" to the developing countries, the protection of human health, the preservation of endangered species of animals and so forth), and on the personal views of a particular abstract inhabitant of the earth in regard to these problems. There is no mention here, however, that the very origination and exacerbation of the global problems of the present day have not resulted from the activity of all states, but primarily from capitalist activity.

The pages of Brown's book sound an appeal to mobilize all forces for the resolution of urgent problems, but not to determine and eliminate the causes of crises, which no longer take place in individual countries, but are of global scale. The separation of the economic, technical, energy and ecological aspects of the activities of states from major sociopolitical processes is the weakest link in the position taken by the

representatives of this school of research into the global problems of the present day.

Report on U.S.-China Relations

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 118-120

[Review by A. A. Nagornyy of the book "Beyond Normalization: Report of the UNA-USA National Policy Panel to Study U.S.-China Relations," New York, 1979, 79 pages]

[Text] This report is one of the first works in which an attempt is made to analyze various aspects of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC.

The history of the compilation of this work is interesting in itself. Back in the fall of 1978, the influential American United Nations Association decided to create a special committee to study the prospects of U.S.-Chinese relations in the 1980's. "It was already apparent then," R. Roos, chairman of the association's national policy panel, writes in the foreword, "that the normalization of relations with the PRC would raise a number of specific questions for American politics in the near future." The members of the committee were prominent experts on Chinese affairs (A. Barnett, R. Scalapino, J. Cohen, H. Hardin and others), influential businessmen (D. Rockefeller and J. Canelli) and representatives of political circles (Congressman J. Anderson and Senator J. Glenn). The group was made up of four sections which studied the following topics: the economic aspects of future U.S.-Chinese agreements; the strategic consequences of the evolution of U.S.-Chinese relations; the political-legal side of U.S.-PRC interrelations; and, finally, bilateral contacts with China (science, education, culture and so forth). In March 1979, a delegation made up of 20 members of the group visited Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei to clarify some obscure matters.

Therefore, this new report is the result of extremely intense and diverse activity by an entire group of authors, who have attempted to briefly set forth their use on American policy toward China.

It must be said that both the strong and the weak features of this work are largely connected with the specifics of its publication. The authors must be given credit for quickly responding to an extremely urgent matter. The value of the book also consists in its reflection of a balanced point of view, giving the reader an understanding of the basic elements of Washington's current China policy and the outlines of his future policy.

As for the weak spots of the work, they are also partially related to the specific features of this genre. The fact is that we are not presented with a consistent analysis of foreign policy issues, but, rather, with a policy-planning document, which is supposed to set forth a program for

Washington's future actions in relations with China. Apparently, this is why recommendations are quite often not backed up by any profound or thorough analysis.

The authors stress that the successes and failures in U.S.-Chinese relations are closely related to domestic political developments in both countries (p 22). This is followed by a brief analysis of the political situation in the PRC (which, incidentally, is not accompanied by a corresponding analysis of the American internal political situation and its effects on Washington's China policy). Expressing the opinion that the majority of social groups and strata in the PRC will benefit from the current initiatives of the Chinese leadership, the authors ignore the fact that the pragmatists in the Chinese ruling clique are not at all unanimous in their views on the future of the PRC. Although the possibility of a new internal political struggle in the Chinese leadership is not excluded in this report, the authors see a tendency toward stronger political stability in the present regime (here it is apparent that political stability in the PRC is associated with the reinforcement of Beijing's anti-Soviet line). The basic condition for this kind of stability is, according to the authors, "the attainment of the goals set forth in the 'Four Modernizations' program, since the Beijing leadership has, more than any other, linked its future with national economic success (pp 25-26).

Conclusions regarding the increasing significance of economic factors in the total set of U.S.-Chinese relations are examined by the authors in an extremely fragmented and tendentious matter. For example, when the authors discuss the economic program of the PRC, the primary objective of which is supposedly agricultural modernization and expansion, they seem not to notice that capital investments in heavy industry are three times as high as capital investments in the agricultural sector in the 1979 PRC budget. The authors also warn against the danger of "excessively high" expectations, which have arisen both in the American business community in regard to the prospects of U.S.-Chinese economic relations, and in the Chinese leadership in regard to the dimensions of U.S. participation in the process of China's development. At the same time, considering the importance to American interests of the preservation of Beijing's political orientation, the authors strongly recommend as much intensive assistance as possible in the economic development of the PRC. According to their estimates, China will have to increase its foreign debt to approximately 20-25 billion dollars in the next 6 years (up to the end of 1985). In connection with this, they said it is probable that mutual commodity turnover will increase to 4-5 billion dollars by 1985. According to expectations, this level will be made possible, in particular, by the expansion of PRC export potential (oil), the broad-scale crediting of Beijing and, finally, direct U.S. investments in the Chinese economy. In an apparent warning to their Chinese partners, the authors state that "American interest in joint enterprises will depend on the judicial status of the commercial legislation now being drawn up in the PRC" (p 40).

The important issue of the strategic consequences of normalization is only discussed in third place in the report. On the whole, the establishment of full diplomatic relations, according to the authors, has aided in strengthening American influence in the region. As they stress in this report, U.S. recognition of the PRC is related to several major issues, primarily the content and duration of the new-born U.S.-Chinese interrelationship, Soviet-American relations in Asia and other geographic regions, and U.S. and PRC relations with other countries in Asia. In connection with this, the authors analyze the strategic goals of each Asian power in this region under the conditions of U.S.-Chinese normalization. It must be said that geopolitical logic leads the compilers of the report to the conclusion that American and Chinese interests coincide to a considerable degree. The question of the global mutual interests of the United States and USSR is completely ignored. In particular, nothing is said about the desire of the USSR and the at least proclaimed desire of the United States to reach an agreement on problems of such great importance to the entire world as arms race control, disarmament, the prohibition of nuclear tests and of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and so forth. Moreover, the authors see the PRC's main strategic goal in its alleged desire for "territorial integrity" (p 49). It is no secret, however, that Beijing itself issues territorial claims and sometimes tries to settle them with the aid of military force. Some other examples of the authors' unobjective approach to foreign policy realities on the Asian continent could be cited.

At the same time, the authors reject the idea of direct alliance with Beijing's anti-Soviet course, saying that this would not be in the U.S. interests.

Finally, the report also investigates bilateral relations in the areas of science, technology, culture and education. "One of the most important changes in U.S.-Chinese relations in the last year," the study says, "was the rapid expansion of exchanges of scientists, students and trade and cultural delegations" (p 64). The compilers of the report believe that these exchanges benefit both sides, although they stress that Beijing is much more interested in such exchanges. The modernization and incorporation of progressive technology (including military), the authors write, will necessitate the creation of an entire army of highly educated specialists, who can be trained with the assistance of the West, especially the United States.

There is no question that the recommendations of the report's authors are interesting. They are addressed to the American Government and essentially convey the following message: Within the near future, Washington must institute a complex of measures to render various types of assistance to the PRC. In economics, this will entail the expansion of private and government loans, the granting of most-favored-nation terms in trade and the encouragement of private companies to make direct investments in China. In the political sphere, this will call for the reinforcement of

overall relations with Beijing. In the area of military strategy, this will call for stronger American military presence in the Pacific and the encouragement of other Western countries to sell weapons to Beijing.

Just as in the past, the authors recommend that the government refrain from direct sales of weapons to the PRC, as well as from any kind of agreements with Beijing aimed at the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance. Nonetheless, the recommendations essentially substantiate the policy of deliberately strengthening China, a nation which makes territorial claims on neighboring states and quite readily resorts to the use of military force. It appears that the authors are simply cleverly camouflaging their own true desires regarding U.S.-USSR-PRC relations. It is also striking that the authors of the report essentially take no interest in such issues as the involvement of the PRC in disarmament negotiations, the continuous atmospheric tests of Chinese nuclear weapons and many other of Beijing's actions which are inconsistent with the interests of world peace.

International Information Exchange

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 p 120

[Review by A. B. Pankin of the book "Mezhdunarodnyy obmen informatsiyey" by G. N. Vachnadze, Tbilisi, Sabchota Sakartvelo, 1979, 278 pages]

[Text] In this book, the author examines a complex of questions connected with one of the most urgent problems in contemporary international relations--international information exchange. The author analyzes the theoretical assumptions and practical policy of several leading Western countries in this field.

The closest attention is given to a study of the ideological premises of American imperialism in this sphere, their evolution and their implementation during various stages of postwar history in relation to different groups of countries.

The prevalent U.S. concept--the so-called principle of the "free flow of information"--envisages the opening of state borders for the dissemination of information of all types, which, according to American ideologists and politicians, would make a maximum contribution to mutual understanding between people.

In fact, however, this concept, as the author proves, is only the theoretical basis for political, ideological and cultural expansion by American imperialism. The United States is disseminating huge quantities of products of the U.S. press and television throughout the non-socialist world, and American news agencies have seized the lion's share of the news market in the capitalist nations and most of the developing countries. News reflecting the American point of view dominates the information disseminated there.

The author demonstrates that the concept of the "free exchange" of information is actually aimed at guaranteeing bourgeois, primarily American, press articles and other products unimpeded access to other countries and, simultaneously, at maximum "suppression" of information from other sources, especially the USSR and other socialist countries. It is no wonder that American "informational imperialism" is being opposed by the majority of states in the world. The author of this book describes the struggle waged at various international forums--from the all-European conference in Helsinki to UNESCO conferences--for the establishment of truly democratic and egalitarian principles of information exchange.

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THE UNITED STATES CIVIL DEFENSE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 pp 121-127

[Article by V. S. Frolov]

[Text] The effectiveness of the national system of civil defense (CD) and the expediency of its deployment under present conditions are constantly debated in U.S. military and political circles. Several questions of fundamental importance are being raised in the course of these debates, and the answers to these will determine the scales and purposes of CD construction in the nation.

The current administration is giving considerable attention to the drafting of plans for expanding the CD system. President J. Carter has already approved a new program for the "deployment of U.S. civil defense in the event of nuclear attack." The new program is a detailed explanation of the "Plan for Redeployment in the Event of Crisis" and is intended to heighten the effectiveness of evacuation measures on the nationwide scale.[1] Specific decisions regarding the allocation of the necessary funds for the new program will be made annually. The anticipated cost of the 5-year period of evacuation plan preparation has been estimated at 1.3 billion dollars. The total cost of the new CD program over 7 years (up to the end of 1985) will be, according to experts, 2 billion dollars. What is the reason for this, as American analysts call it, "turning point in U.S. strategic policy"?

It is important to remember that both the Pentagon and the White House use the term civil defense to define the particular nationwide defense measures aimed at guaranteeing the "survival" of the population and economy of the nation in a nuclear war. Therefore, civil defense now represents an important component of the so-called "national strategy" of the United States. This strategy is based on the assumption that the main function of government and the chief objective of government policy consists in the attainment of certain "national goals," reflecting "national interests," and in struggle against "antagonistic" forces in the international arena. It is not surprising that civil defense is one of the chief elements of the

triad of strategic forces in long-range U.S. military programs.[2] This triad, as we know, consists of strategic offensive forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic aviation and guided-missile submarines), strategic forces of "active defense" (air defense and antimissile defense) and strategic forces of so-called "passive defense" (civil defense or, according to current terminology, "civil preparedness" forces).

Strictly speaking, CD forces have no direct influence on enemy air attack installations (means of delivery and warheads) and therefore can only conditionally be categorized as "defense" in the usual military sense. If we approach the matter "from the other end," however, and evaluate CD measures in terms of their results, they will be equivalent to corresponding "measures" by "active defense" forces--for example, national antimissile defense. Moreover, according to foreign experts, in view of the capital investments totaling around 30-40 billion dollars or more, the CD system should be preferable (in terms of the "cost-effectiveness" criterion) to antimissile defense.[3] We must also remember that the United States signed a treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems on 26 May 1972 in Moscow, and ratified on 3 October the same year. This treaty has no time-limit and allows for only two regions throughout the nation to be covered by antimissile defense means (one near the capital and the other near ICBM launching silos). In addition, in each of these regions the components of the system are strictly limited: the number of ABM launchers and interceptors (no more than 200) and the number and range of radar stations. The Protocol to the ABM Treaty, signed in 1974, reduced the number of ABM systems allowed to one, with 100 ABM's.[4]

Organizational Structure

Judicially and officially, the deployment of U.S. civil defense was accomplished in accordance with a 1951 federal law. The responsibilities of civil defense, as defined by this law, consisted in "protecting the life and property of the U.S. population in the event of enemy attack." The responsibility for organizing civil defense was assigned to federal, state and local governmental bodies. The Office of Civil Defense was created in the White House, and the head of this office was put under the direct jurisdiction of the President. Later, responsibility for the present state and future improvement of civil defense was assigned to the secretary of defense, and the head of the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) became his assistant.

In 1972 the OCD became the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA). It was also given the responsibility of implementing measures to alleviate the consequences of natural calamities, which had been the job of a mobilization alert office up to that time. The director of the DCPA and his deputy are civilians who are appointed to these positions, are under the direct jurisdiction of the secretary of defense and are responsible for: 1) conducting refuge construction programs, 2) planning evacuation measures, 3) establishing public alert systems (warning them of the threat of

attack or natural calamities), 4) establishing CD communication systems, 5) assisting state and local government agencies after an attack (or natural calamity), 6) giving states financial assistance in the implementation of CD programs, 7) forecasting and quantitatively evaluating the destruction potential of an attack (or natural calamity), as well as calculating remaining resources, 8) organizing and supervising the activities of the CD committee of the Department of Defense (this committee was created to draft the recommendations of the defense secretary regarding CD problems. Its members include representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, branches of the armed forces and local CD agencies).

The director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency represents the United States in NATO's civil defense committee, conducts a program for the mutual exchange of technical information and research with other countries and coordinates his activities with corresponding bodies in Canada in the event that joint CD measures will be required.

When a state of emergency is declared in the nation or part of the nation, the President can give the DCPA director jurisdiction over the personnel, material resources, equipment and buildings of the Defense Department and other federal agencies. This gives the DCPA director extremely far-reaching powers and an opportunity to exercise his authority without the restrictions specified by federal law for normal situations.

As an office of the Department of Defense, the DCPA is located in the Pentagon. It essentially represents a coordinating and advisory body, guiding the actions of 30 federal departments and agencies and state and local governments in matters pertaining to the planning and implementation of CD measures. The DCPA has eight regional branches, corresponding to the number of CD districts into which the nation has been divided. Each district contains from 2 to 11 states (depending on the strategic importance of installations located there).

The DCPA has its own computer center and personnel training facility in Battle Creek (Michigan).

The general supervision of civil defense on the state level is the responsibility of the governor. An advisory council (or committee), essentially representing the CD headquarters, is set up as part of his staff. The chief (or director) of state CD headquarters is appointed by the governor. Through his deputy, the director organizes and supervises the activities of the corresponding CD services. For the state of New York, only five such services have been established: planning communications, antinuclear defense, and material and technical supply operations after a nuclear attack and in times of catastrophe (natural disaster). The same CD structure is found in counties and other large cities.

To ensure the uninterrupted management of CD measures on the nationwide scale, an underground administration center has been set up in each district. It contains the regional DCPA headquarters and representatives of

some other federal agencies. The administration center is protected against all of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. It contains a 30-day supply of fuel, food, drinking water and other supplies, as well as emergency generators. The centers are equipped with communications systems which unite all of the headquarters with the DCPA.

Interaction with the Army

It is known that the American Army was not involved in combating the aftereffects of natural disasters or organizing aid to disaster victims until 1860. The facts show, however, that it gradually began to be used more and more in rescue operations because the United States had virtually no other organization capable of performing this work at that time. Gradually, rescue operations in disaster zones became one of the functions of the army. For example, in 1871, at the time of the huge fire in Chicago, troops were sent in to fight the flames. Victims were issued 10,000 tents and 200,000 meals. At the time of the yellow fever epidemic in the Mississippi Valley in 1878, the army delivered 150 tons of supplies to the disaster zone and shipped parcels of food collected by various public organizations. By 1920 operations to aid disaster victims became so much a part of ordinary army life that a special administration was created to control this activity. In 1968, after the U.S. civil defense system had been organized, a special administration was created as part of army headquarters, and it became a kind of link connecting the Pentagon with civilian local government agencies responsible for repair operations in disaster zones. This administration is responsible for disaster relief. It organizes the advanced training of special military units, with the appropriate equipment, establishes warehouses of emergency rescue equipment and drafts instructions and memos on emergency procedures. This administration periodically verifies the preparedness of military units, and it also maintains round-the-clock contact with civilian authorities, ensuring efficient intervention at the first sign of danger. When a natural disaster occurs in a region, the fight against it (or, more precisely, against its aftereffects) generally develops according to the following pattern. If local forces and means are inadequate, the state government allocates the necessary material resources. Federal agencies offer assistance in the event of major disasters, using the material and technical resources of the DCPA, the Department of Agriculture and the Army Corps of Engineers. Besides this, army subunits can be called in for assistance even earlier in accordance with the instructions of the chief of the regional DCPA. Examples of this kind of interaction between civilian and military subunits can be seen in their participation in rescue operations following the explosion on a ship carrying ammonium nitrate in Texas City and after a hurricane which swept through the American South and Midwest in spring 1975.

As we know, in addition to the national armed forces, there are also local troops in the United States. All of the states have their own troop formations which do not depend on one another but have the same weapons, ammunition and uniforms. The responsibilities and duties of these formations

fall into two basic categories: "Protecting and maintaining internal order" and "rendering assistance in times of natural disasters and catastrophes." The governor is the commander-in-chief of state troop formations. In the event of calamities of a nationwide character (major epidemics and so forth), the President can place state troops under the jurisdiction of the national supreme command.

The structure of army organizations on the whole differs from one state to another. For example, the military establishment of the state of New York includes a military and naval affairs administration, an army national guard, an air force national guard, a naval militia and a state guard. In October 1973 a disaster relief agency (DRA) was opened as part of the military and naval affairs administration. It was assigned duties connected with disaster relief and other CD measures. The DRA is a civilian organization; its entire staff consists of civilian employees trained at the DCPA staff training facility in Battle Creek. The DRA decides and coordinates matters of statewide and nationwide significance and regulates the funding of CD operations. At times of disaster relief operations, the DRA processes information on the disaster, coordinates the offers of official assistance from such organizations as the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and so forth. The DRA draws up documents, on the basis of which the governor requests the President to declare a state of emergency. Besides this, the DRA manages resources and funds placed under its jurisdiction in line with the CD program. The federal government pays half the cost of the DRA's personnel and administrative expenses, amounting to approximately 3.5 million dollars a year. In addition, the DRA is concerned with matters of material and technical maintenance, the repair and storage of materials, the management of government property (equipment) transferred to the state by the federal government for civil defense needs, and the management of goods and property received by the DRA from the federal CD administration. The combined annual expenditures on CD programs (including the cost of maintaining a personnel staff) exceed 5 million dollars. In the event of nuclear conflict, according to DCPA instructions, the chief responsibility of the DRA will be the protection of the population from radioactive fallout. Besides this, the DRA's interaction with air defense (ABM) agencies and the Red Cross will always play a much more important role in a state of emergency.

Within the state, the DRA hires and trains personnel in protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ensures the maintenance of permanent signals and recording devices, equipment in shelters, atmospheric monitoring instruments and remote-control radiation measurement devices in excellent working order, and takes care of the storage, renewal and distribution of equipment for protection against WMD.

The Education of the Population and the CD Administration

A program to train the population to defend itself against WMD has been conducted in the United States since 1960. It includes the education of students in schools and universities, the training of persons enrolled in

CD courses in colleges and universities and in special state-organized courses and seminars, and the advanced training of administrative personnel in the CD staff training facility.

The fundamentals of civil defense are taught in the schools, and special programs have been developed to instruct students in the principles of behavior in a state of emergency. The principal teaching aid, which is still being used, was published in 1973; it is a textbook for students and teachers in junior high and high schools, entitled "Your Chances of Survival." It is supplemented with five short films on basic CD subject matter. Besides this, other textbooks have recently been published--"Our Natural Surroundings" and "Educational Games"--in which the study of civil defense takes the form of a process of student participation in a series of progressively more complex games.

Colleges and universities use essentially the same teaching program as other schools, but more attention is given to the development of various methods of public protection in a state of emergency (warning signal operations, the rules governing the occupation of shelters and the housing of people in them, first aid, rescue operations and so forth). In engineering colleges, particularly architectural engineering, ways of increasing the durability of building structures and the scientific substantiation of the degree of mechanical (as well as thermal and radiation) resistance of designed protective installations are specially included in course and graduation projects. Each year, at least 300 students from these colleges are asked to sit on special committees which inspect buildings and determine whether they have shelters suitable for protection in the event of nuclear attack.

The financial and material resources of public and private academic institutions are used extensively in the CD education of the population. Universities and colleges are contracted by the DCPA to organize conferences and seminars with government employees, to train instructors in CD procedures and to organize public information sessions on the local level.

The DCPA stresses the need to teach the public first aid skills. This program has been carried out since 1962 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, under the supervision of the DCPA and with the active support of state and local public health departments, the American Red Cross Society, the Pentagon medical service and public and private medical facilities.

A special DCPA academic facility for the training of CD administrators was founded in April 1951 in Olney (Maryland). In 1953 it was moved to Battle Creek (Michigan). The facility is used mainly for the training of DCPA administrators on all levels and representatives of federal and local government agencies, advisory councils and departments, the Pentagon, commercial and industrial firms, enterprises and academic institutions. This is also where administrators and heads of services of CD agencies in the NATO countries and other capitalist states are trained.

The facility has a highly qualified faculty and an excellent material base. The facility offers regular and correspondence courses (11 in all) and advanced training courses for local CD administrators. The entire training program is divided into four 12-day stages. The basic functions of local CD administrators are studied during the first stage, and the conditions and distinctive features of their work, modern methods of management organization, interaction in administrative bodies and the structure of local agencies and their executive staff are studied during the second. In the third stage, students are acquainted with the personal and professional requirements of local CD administrators, management practice and the psychology of human behavior in various extreme ("stress") situations. During the fourth stage they study "conflict ideology" (naturally, in line with the Pentagon's interpretation), current international and military developments, national defense and civil preparedness, ways of solving CD problems, the interaction of CD agencies on various levels, the CD budget and civil defense in other countries. A seminar is also organized during this fourth stage, prior to the end of the training course. The main topics of discussion are: "Introduction to Civil Defense," "The Organization of CD Practice Drills," "The Fundamentals of Radiation Monitoring," "United States Civil Defense" and "The Fundamentals of Radiation Detection and Control."

More than 60,000 people have already completed the training course at the facility since the time of its founding, and another 119,000 have taken correspondence training courses. In all, up to 30 million people have been educated in aspects of civil defense--that is, almost one out of every seven inhabitants of the nation.

Evolution of Doctrine

The main objective of the Office of Civil Defense in the beginning of the 1950's was the reliable protection of large cities and military-industrial installations against mass air attacks. From the very first days of its existence, the OCD was extremely active. It published a massive series of instructions and popular science literature for distribution to the public. On the orders of the OCD, research into the "most effective" protection for the civilian population against the destructive effects of nuclear blasts began to be conducted as early as 1951 on the U.S. atomic testing grounds in Nevada. Expert army engineers investigated the "viability" of various types of refuges and shelters under the effects of a nuclear blast with a yield of 1 megaton. A Pentagon doctrine was adopted, according to which early-warning radar systems and air defense would sound an alert in the event of mass air attack. Subsequent events would then follow this pattern: The alerted urban population would quickly leave large cities for nearby suburbs (so-called "tactical evacuation"). Here the shockwave of atomic bombs dropped on military industrial installations would hardly be felt, and people could protect themselves from the radioactive particles emanating from the mushroom cloud by taking refuge in relatively inexpensive air raid shelters.

Air raid shelters began to be built throughout the nation. Debates broke out in the press over the best kind of shelter to build: family or communal. The construction business profited greatly from this boom.

The development of nuclear weapons, particularly intercontinental ballistic missiles, forced the White House to reconsider Pentagon doctrine regarding the activities of the OCD. Experts predicted that it would not be feasible to evacuate the population of large cities to rural locations at the time of sudden nuclear missile strikes. A new course was therefore adopted--the intensive construction of not only antiradiation shelters, but also anti-shock refuges--shelters for protection from the effects of the shock-wave. According to Pentagon estimates, most of the civilian population would be able to reach air raid shelters with an advance warning of only 10-15 minutes (based on the assumption that it would take 25-30 minutes for an ICBM to reach its "target city." But the cost of the anti-shock shelters was much greater than air raid shelters of the same size. According to experts, anti-shock shelters for all of the personnel of military industrial installations would cost at least 250-300 billion dollars to build. For this reason, a decision was made to gradually augment available protective facitilies.

The DCPA plans to evacuate the civilian population from 400 regions in the event of military danger. These regions are supposed to be potentially most dangerous in a nuclear attack ("maximum risk" regions). They include urban industrial centers, areas near ICBM silos and regions of military-economic significance. A special four-volume guide for planning the processing and assistance of evacuees has already been published. It contains detailed instructions for local government agencies, so that the migration process of tens of millions of people will be controlled on all levels.

Besides this, drills have been conducted to practice the evacuation of various population groups from "maximum risk" zones, among which the Pentagon has naturally listed the White House. Here is what the NEW YORK TIMES said about this in September 1978: "One day a man and woman stood on the south lawn of the White House. Suddenly a Marine helicopter appeared in the dark sky, braving gusts of heavy wind. White House Secret Service men stood paralyzed, stunned by the sudden appearance of the helicopter. But before they could make a move, the man and woman crossed the lawn and seated themselves in a vehicle which sped away into the gloom. The two chief protagonists in this mysterious drama were Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, and his personal secretary. Their operation was one of a series of practice alerts conducted in 1978 to verify the efficacy of measures for the emergency evacuation of White House leaders and staff 'in the event of nuclear attack.' The first time Brzezinski and his secretary played the parts of President and Mrs. Carter. In other practice drills, the performers were Hugh Carter, the President's cousin, and a White House administrator."

Funding Program

The 7-year program for the continued deployment of U.S. civil defense, covering the period from 1979 through fiscal year 1985, envisages total funding of approximately 2 billion dollars. The program includes: 1) the evacuation of the population in times of crisis from large cities and regions of probable nuclear strikes (evacuation procedures can be instituted by presidential decision on any day of the week and, presumably, will increase the "chances of survival" for an additional 65-72 million people); 2) the adaptation of available fallout shelters for protection from shock-waves and thermal radiation; 3) the training of the public in self-protection measures, including the rapid erection of the simplest shelters; 4) completion of the construction and equipping of seven CD administration centers in the nation, guaranteeing protection against all of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons; 5) the improvement of warning, alert, communication, detection and prediction radar installations; 6) the organization of several research and development projects in the area of civil defense.

Expenditures (in millions of dollars) are broken down by years and individual points of the program in the table:[3]

Expenditure Items	Fiscal Year						
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Early-warning and communications system	10	10	10	10	10	12	12
Radar detection and radiation monitoring	10	12	13	13	15	17	17
Information, education and training of the public and CD services	15.2	22	40	40	48	66	74
CD administrative staff	60.9	61	64	67	68	70	71
Equipment and maintenance of shelters	23.9	44	71	06	95	148	118
Evacuation and protection of evacuees (allocated at times of crisis)	16	26	41	56	56	56	56
Construction and equipment of CD administration centers	3	15	28	39	40	60	62
CD research and development	14	16	17	18	17	40	21
Total expenditures (excluding "evacuation and protection of evacuees")	137	180	243	283	293	293	375

It must be said that the actual total expenditures on civil defense in the United States are much higher than the table shows. These expenditures are generally made through other, "hidden" budget items. Suffice it to say that the DCPA received an additional amount exceeding 450 million dollars from 25 federal departments and agencies in the past fiscal year.

Besides this, sizable sums are allocated each year to compensate for possible losses due to natural disasters, major industrial accidents and catastrophes. For this reason, total annual CD expenditures on the national scale are close to 1 billion dollars. But even this is not the grand total: The army provides the DCPA with many technical facilities, equipment, radiation monitoring devices and other items without charge. Incidentally, the Pentagon, which is always trying to wrest bigger and bigger sums from the federal budget, has recently suggested the further enlargement of the DCPA by merging it with four federal administrations responsible for dealing with various disasters, and by creating, in this basis, a single federal administration for emergency action. Naturally, the Department of Defense is supposed to retain the function of general management and control.

All CD deployment maneuvers in the United States are camouflaged with a loud propaganda campaign about the imaginary "Soviet military threat," the falsity of which has been repeatedly exposed by the Soviet leaders.

Nonetheless, the facts testify that the current administration and Pentagon are giving considerable attention to the further deployment of U.S. civil defense. Moreover, they regard CD as a factor of strategic significance, the relatively importance of which could increase considerably in time. This is attested to, for example, by the President's plan to centralize CD decision-making even more by removing the DCPA from the jurisdiction of the Pentagon and "attaching" it directly to the White House. It must be said that this is not simply a matter of "guaranteeing the survival" of the population and the U.S. economy in a nuclear war. The fact is that the deployment of an effective CD system can give American military circles the illusion of confidence in their protection from retaliatory nuclear missile strikes by the victims of aggression, and this, in turn, will tempt them, according to some American experts, to reactivate politics from a "position of strength" and even to plan for initial strategic nuclear attacks.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 December 1978.

2. See Yu. V. Katasonov, "SShA: voyennoye programmirovaniye" [The United States: Military Programs], Moscow, 1972.

3. "Annual Progress Report on Civil Defense Research," Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1969.

4. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1974 god" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. 1974], Moscow, 1975, pp 102-103.

5. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, No 29, 1978, H1672-H1676.

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